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Appendix A: Some relevant sections of the Irish Mental 
Health Acts  
Provisions of the Mental Treatment Act (1945) which have been referred to in the  main 
body of the dissertation are given in full in Section I; those of the Mental Health Act 
(2001) are given in Section II. 
Section I: The Mental Treatment Act (1945) 
Commencement of proceedings by patients or ex-patients 
Time limit on certain proceedings.  
259.—Proceedings by a person who has been detained in a mental institution and 
has ceased to be so detained and which are in respect of an act purporting to have 
been done in pursuance of this Act shall not be instituted after the expiration of 
six months after the cesser of the detention. 
Leave of the High Court for certain proceedings. 
260.—(1) No civil proceedings shall be instituted in respect of an act purporting 
to have been done in pursuance of this Act save by leave of the High Court and 
such leave shall not be granted unless the High Court is satisfied that there are 
substantial grounds for contending that the person against whom the proceedings 
are to be brought acted in bad faith or without reasonable care. 
(2) Notice of an application for leave of the High Court under sub-section (1) of 
this section shall be given to the person against whom it is proposed to institute 
the proceedings and such person shall be entitled to be heard against the 
application. 
(3) Where proceedings are, by leave granted in pursuance of sub-section (1) of 
this section, instituted in respect of an act purporting to have been done in 
pursuance of this Act, the Court shall not determine the proceedings in favour of 
the plaintiff unless it is satisfied that the defendant acted in bad faith or without 
reasonable care. 
(4) Where, on an application under sub-section (1) of this section, leave is given 
to bring any proceedings and the proceedings are commenced within four weeks 
after the date on which leave was so given, the proceedings shall, for the purposes 
of section 259 of this Act and of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, be 
deemed to have been commenced on the date on which notice of the application 
was given to the person against whom the proceedings are to be brought. 
Section II: The Mental Health Act (2001)   
‘Mental disorder’ 
3.—(1) In this Act “mental disorder” means mental illness, severe dementia or 
significant intellectual disability where —  
(a) because of the illness, disability or dementia, there is a serious likelihood of 
the person concerned causing immediate and serious harm to himself or herself or 
to other persons, or 
(b) (i) because of the severity of the illness, disability or dementia, the judgment 
of the person concerned is so impaired that failure to admit the person to an 
approved centre would be likely to lead to a serious deterioration in his or her 
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condition or would prevent the administration of appropriate treatment that could 
be given only by such admission, and 
(ii) the reception, detention and treatment of the person concerned in an approved 
centre would be likely to benefit or alleviate the condition of that person to a 
material extent. 
(2) In subsection (1) —  
“mental illness” means a state of mind of a person which affects the person's 
thinking, perceiving, emotion or judgment and which seriously impairs the mental 
function of the person to the extent that he or she requires care or medical 
treatment in his or her own interest or in the interest of other persons; … 
 
Criteria for involuntary admission to approved centres. 
8.—(1) A person may be involuntarily admitted to an approved centre pursuant to 
an application under section 9 or 12 and detained there on the grounds that he or 
she is suffering from a mental disorder. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall be construed as authorising the involuntary 
admission of a person to an approved centre by reason only of the fact that the 
person —  
(a) is suffering from a personality disorder, 
(b) is socially deviant, or 
(c) is addicted to drugs or intoxicants. 
 
Best interests of person 
4.—(1) In making a decision under this Act concerning the care or treatment of a 
person (including a decision to make an admission order in relation to a person), 
the best interests of the person shall be the principal consideration with due regard 
being given to the interests of other persons who may be at risk of serious harm if 
the decision is not made. 
(2) Where it is proposed to make a recommendation or an admission order in 
respect of a person, or to administer treatment to a person, under this Act, the 
person shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, be notified of the proposal and be 
entitled to make representations in relation to it and before deciding the matter 
due consideration shall be given to any representations duly made under this 
subsection. 
(3) In making a decision under this Act concerning the care or treatment of a 
person (including a decision to make an admission order in relation to a person) 
due regard shall be given to the need to respect the right of the person to dignity, 
bodily integrity, privacy and autonomy. 
Power to prevent voluntary patient from leaving approved centre. 
23.—(1) Where a person (other than a child) who is being treated in an approved 
centre as a voluntary patient indicates at any time that he or she wishes to leave 
the approved centre, then, if a consultant psychiatrist, registered medical 
practitioner or registered nurse on the staff of the approved centre is of opinion 
that the person is suffering from a mental disorder, he or she may detain the 
person for a period not exceeding 24 hours or such shorter period as may be 
prescribed, beginning at the time aforesaid. …  
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Treatment not requiring consent 
57.—(1) The consent of a patient shall be required for treatment except where, in 
the opinion of the consultant psychiatrist responsible for the care and treatment of 
the patient, the treatment is necessary to safeguard the life of the patient, to restore 
his or her health, to alleviate his or her condition, or to relieve his or her suffering, 
and by reason of his or her mental disorder the patient concerned is incapable of 
giving such consent. 
(2) This section shall not apply to the treatment specified in section 58, 59 or 60.1 
 
Referral of admission order and renewal order to a tribunal 
17.—(1) Following the receipt by the Commission2 of a copy of an admission 
order or a renewal order, the Commission shall, as soon as possible —  
(a) refer the matter to a tribunal3, 
(b) assign a legal representative to represent the patient concerned unless he or she 
proposes to engage one, 
(c) direct in writing (referred to in this section as “a direction”) a member of the 
panel of consultant psychiatrists established under section 33 (3)(b) to — (i) 
examine the patient concerned, 
(ii) interview the consultant psychiatrist responsible for the care and treatment of 
the patient, and 
(iii) review the records relating to the patient, 
in order to determine in the interest of the patient whether the patient is suffering 
from a mental disorder and to report in writing within 14 days on the results of the 
examination, interview and review to the tribunal to which the matter has been 
referred and to provide a copy of the report to the legal representative of the 
patient. …  
 
Review by a tribunal of admission orders and renewal orders. 
18.—(1) Where an admission order or a renewal order has been referred to a 
tribunal under section 17 , the tribunal shall review the detention of the patient 
concerned and shall either —  
(a) if satisfied that the patient is suffering from a mental disorder, and 
(i) that the provisions of sections 9, 10, 12, 14, 15 and 16, where applicable, have 
been complied with, or 
(ii) if there has been a failure to comply with any such provision, that the failure 
does not affect the substance of the order and does not cause an injustice, 
affirm the order, or 
(b) if not so satisfied, revoke the order and direct that the patient be discharged 
from the approved centre concerned. 
(2) A decision under subsection (1) shall be made as soon as may be but not later 
than 21 days after the making of the admission order concerned or, as the case 
may be, the renewal order concerned. … 
 
                                               
1
 S. 58. concerns psycho-surgery; S. 59, electro-convulsive therapy [ECT] and S.60, the administration of 
medicine. 
2
 The Mental Heath Commission is established under S. 32 of the Act. 
3
 Under S. 48 of the Act, the Mental Health Commission is given power to establish Mental Health 
Tribunals. 
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Leave of High Court for certain proceedings. 
73.—(1) No civil proceedings shall be instituted in respect of an act purporting to 
have been done in pursuance of this Act save by leave of the High Court and such 
leave shall not be refused unless the High Court is satisfied: 
(a) that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, or 
(b) that there are no reasonable grounds for contending that the person against 
whom the proceedings are brought acted in bad faith or without reasonable care. 
(2) Notice of an application for leave of the High Court under subsection (1) shall 
be given to the person against whom it is proposed to institute the proceedings and 
such person shall be entitled to be heard against the application. 
(3) Where proceedings are, by leave granted in pursuance of subsection (1) of this 
section, instituted in respect of an act purporting to have been done in pursuance 
of this Act, the Court shall not determine the proceedings in favour of the plaintiff 
unless it is satisfied that the defendant acted in bad faith or without reasonable 
care. 
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Appendix B: Coercive, non-psychiatric, medical 
interventions 
A number of coercive, non-psychiatric, medical interventions are discussed in this 
appendix: the coercive use of caesarean sections is discussed in Subsection B-1; the 
forcible detention and treatment of tuberculosis sufferers is discussed in Subsection B-2 
and the use of compulsory preventive medication is discussed in Subsection B-3.  
B-1: Forced Caesarean Sections  
Since the 1980s, some US State courts have, on occasion, granted orders compelling a 
woman to submit to a caesarean section; these orders were, in the main, sought by 
obstetricians as a preemptive defence against possible liability in the event of injury to 
the foetus.1  
The first application2 to an English court for such an order was made in 1992; it 
concerned a mother who refused, on religious grounds, to submit to a caesarean section.  
The court declared that the operation, being vital to the protection of the interests of the 
patient and her unborn child, was lawful.3  This decision was criticised by the Royal 
College Of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists firstly, because the judgement “… 
[elevated] the status of the fetus in law to such an extent that its supposed rights become 
more important than its mother’s.”4 but, more importantly, because similar decisions 
might immeasurably damage the doctor-patient relationship and drive away those in 
greatest need of help.5  This argument is of particular interest in that it is similar to that 
put forward by some psychiatrists and civil libertarians in arguing against the practice of 
coercive psychiatry. 
Though the decision in Re S was also widely criticised by legal experts, similar 
decisions followed at an ever increasing rate.6  These cases were reviewed by the Court 
of Appeal in 19967 and it laid down the general principle that a competent woman has 
an absolute right to refuse medical intervention even where that decision might lead to 
her death or the death of the foetus. 
                                               
1
 Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (1996), S 2.1. 
2
 Re S (Adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992]. 
3
 Wilson & Smith (1995) have argued that:  
[it is unclear] whether the declaration was ordered upon the basis of protecting the incipient 
interests of the unborn child alone or in tandem with those of the mother.  If the former, it might be 
difficult to insulate such decisions from authorising other coerced medical interventions, for 
example, a kidney ‘donation’ on an unwilling relative, or even mother! (p.395) 
4
 Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (1996), S. 3.8.9. 
5
 Ibid. S. 3.9.2. 
6
 At the rate of over one a month during 1996; see Goldbeck-Wood (1997). 
7
 Re MB (Caesarean Section) (1997). 
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Some subsequent court applications have sought to use the protection afforded by the 
UK Mental Health Acts to circumvent the Court of Appeal ruling.  In one such case a 
pregnant woman, X, on visiting her GP was told that she had pre-eclampsia8.  He 
advised immediate hospitalisation which she refused.  He then contacted a social worker 
who arranged that X, who had had no previous history of mental disorder, be committed 
to hospital under the Mental Health Acts and an application was made to the High Court 
to proceed with a caesarean section without the knowledge of X or her legal advisers.9  
In subsequent proceedings taken by X the Court of Appeal ruled that her admission to a 
mental hospital was unlawful and entitled her to substantial damages for false 
imprisonment and for being forced to undergo treatment against her will.10    
Because of the constitutional protection afforded to the unborn under the Irish 
Constitution, the Irish courts are unlikely to follow the English precedents limiting 
coercive caesarean section in that these were based on the view that, before birth, the 
foetus has no defensible right as against its mother.11  In view of newspaper reports12 of 
threats, by a Dublin hospital, of legal proceedings against a woman who refused to have 
a caesarean section, the question is likely to come before the Irish courts in the 
foreseeable future.  
Before leaving this topic, there is a final point which is of importance in assessing the 
question of ‘for whose sake’ the intervention is being made.  This concerns the 
additional risk placed on the woman by being subjected to a caesarean section, and the 
point was made by the chairman of the American Medical Association’s Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs in speaking against the practice of forced caesarean 
sections: 
It is a fundamental ethical and legal principle that patients cannot be forced to 
accept a risk to health to benefit another, whether the other is a person or a foetus. 
… The risk of death for the pregnant woman from a caesarean section is two to 
four times higher than that from a vaginal delivery.13 
This issue finds a parallel in the assessment of, and the weight that should be accorded 
to, any additional health risks attendant on forced psychiatric treatment undertaken on 
the grounds of perceived dangerousness to others. 
                                               
8
 Pre-eclampsia is a hypertensive disease which is a major cause of maternal and foetal morbidity and 
mortality. 
9
 Dyer (1998a). 
10
 Dyer (1998b).  
11
 Royal College Of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (1996), S. 5.3: “Although obligations to the fetus in 
utero increase as it develops, UK law does not grant it personal legal status.  This comes from the 
moment of birth.” 
12
 The Sunday Times (2005). ‘Mother threatened with forced caesarean’. The Sunday Times. 24 April.  
13
 Dyer (1994). 
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B-2: Forcible Intervention Against Tuberculosis Sufferers 
Tuberculosis (TB) is a contagious disease which presents a serious threat to world 
health; it currently infects one third of the world’s population and kills approximately 2 
million individuals annually.14  Due to some patients not fully completing their course 
of treatment, new drug resistant strains of the disease have emerged which are difficult 
and expensive to treat.15   
The legal situation in the UK in relation to detention and compulsory treatment of 
persons suffering from TB is set out in the Code of Practice of the British Thoracic 
Society:   
Compulsory treatment is not allowed but in exceptional circumstances it may be 
necessary to consider compulsory admission of a patient who is causing serious 
risk of infection to others. … Clearly this is not the kind of action to be undertaken 
lightly as it involves depriving someone of his or her liberty. … If the person has 
to be detained it will be necessary to obtain a magistrate’s order for admission … 
and another order for detention.16 
During 2005, a number of news stories appeared in the British media highlighting the 
danger of drug resistant TB and the inability of the health authorities to ensure that 
patients completed their treatment programmes.  The manner of reporting amounted to a 
campaign in favour of introducing compulsory treatment for TB.  One newspaper, for 
example, under the heading ‘TB human timebomb infects 12’17 reported that a convicted 
criminal with a highly contagious form of tuberculosis had infected at least 12 people 
because the authorities were powerless to make him accept medical treatment.  It 
claimed that doctors were “furious” that legislation had not been enacted to enable 
compulsory treatment and it reported a consultant with the Government’s Health 
Protection Agency as stating that “the biggest problem with TB is that we cannot 
compulsorily treat people”.  The article quoted a Government spokesperson as stating 
that a review of Britain’s public health laws was being considered but that human rights 
legislation might prevent imposing compulsory treatment orders.  
The Guardian, under the heading ‘Law lets TB patient infect 12 others – No one can be 
forced to take treatment’,18 carried essentially the same story but added: 
But the idea that an individual can knowingly be infectious and retain his 
anonymity due to rules on patient confidentiality is potentially politically 
                                               
14
 DeAngelis & Flanagin (2005).  
15
 It has been reported that medication normally costs $11 per patient whereas treatment of the drug 
resistant strain can cost up to $250,000 per patient; see The Irish Times. (1996). ‘WHO Warns of Global 
TB Disaster’. The Irish Times. 22 March. 
16
 Joint Tuberculosis Committee of the British Thoracic Society (2000), p.888. 
17
 The Mail on Sunday. (2005). ‘TB human timebomb infects 12’. The Mail on Sunday. 8 May. 
18
 The Guardian. (2005). ‘Law lets TB patient infect 12 others - No one can be forced to take treatment’, 
The Guardian. 9 May. 
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explosive.  Seven in 10 people with the disease come from an ethnic minority and 
two-thirds were born abroad. 
The same story was again carried by the BBC online news story but with a gloss: a 
Professor Peter Davies, secretary of the charity TB Alert, was quoted as stating: “To 
insist on compulsory treatment would be a step too far.  Forced treatment would be just 
horrendous.”19  In that Professor Davies is one of the leading experts on the treatment 
of TB20, it seems that coercive treatment might not be the ‘obvious solution’ that many 
considered it to be.   
A parallel may be drawn between the depictions of TB and mental illness in the popular 
media where mental illness is often viewed through the narrow and distorting prism of 
dangerousness; as a consequence, ideas of mental illness and dangerousness are often 
conflated in the public mind.21  The link between dangerousness and mental illness is 
the subject of Chapter 6 of the dissertation but it may be of assistance in the 
disentangling of these ideas to, at this stage, briefly examine the academic response to 
media demands for coercive treatment of individuals with TB.   
An editorial in the British Medical Journal22 described how, in response to an epidemic 
of TB in the early 1990s, New York City instituted a successful programme of 
eradication by adopting a twin track approach: investing in model treatment 
programmes but also by relying on a coercive strategy.  Prior to this, coercion had been 
invoked only if the individual posed a serious risk to the health of others (a risk-
assessment strategy); the New York programme, however, permitted coercion in respect 
of non-infectious individuals who were adjudged unlikely to fully complete a treatment 
programme (a non-compliance strategy).  More than 200 non-infectious patients were 
detained under this provision, some for over two years.  The editorial argues against the 
employment of such coercive strategies:  
Before detention is resorted to, practical (and cheaper) alternatives should be 
available.  If an order for detention is sought then details of attempts at less 
                                               
19
 BBC (2005). ‘Care refusal spread TB to others’ BBC News [online], available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4528543.stm [accessed: 21 August 2006].   
20
 According to the British Medical Journal, Professor Davies: 
… set up, and is now Director of the Tuberculosis Research and Resources Unit.  In 2004 he was 
appointed Honorary Professor to Liverpool University. Professor Davies has written extensively.  
He edited Clinical Tuberculosis, the only definitive reference work on tuberculosis published 
outside the USA. 
[Online], available:  http://www.bmjmasterclasses.com/respiratory/speakers [accessed: 20 April 2006.].  
21
 Such public perceptions, even if erroneous, create a momentum and actuality of their own and lead to 
the development of government policies designed to assuage, rather than correct, these perceptions; this, 
in the view of many commentators was what motivated the (English) Mental Health Bill 2004 which has 
now been withdrawn following strong criticism by a coalition of civil libertarians and the psychiatric 
profession.  The Royal College of Psychiatrists (2004), for example, argued that: “the proposed 
legislation is extremely unlikely to have any impact on suicide or homicide rates.” 
22
 Coker (1999b).  
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restrictive alternatives should be presented to the magistrate.  Moreover, an 
explicit objective examination of the potential threat posed by each non-compliant 
individual should be made and legal representation made available for those at 
whom the order is directed.23 
The editorial – which anticipates that, as happened in New York, media campaigns in 
the UK will call for the detention of non-compliant individuals – urges that “Both civil 
rights and public health can be protected, but the emphasis should be on resource and 
organisational requirements, rather than coercion.”24 
Writing in response to this editorial, a correspondent described how in Australia, even 
though legislation had provided for the coercive treatment of TB:  
… in over eight years, not a single order has led to a patient with tuberculosis 
being imprisoned. … over 4000 cases have been effectively managed in the 
community. … Rather than investing in a good public health system and well 
resourced community based services, the United States seems to be using 
‘deprivation of liberty’ to solve not only its social problems but also its 
tuberculosis epidemic.  This is an abuse of human rights and makes no sense in 
terms of public health.25 
An editorial26 in the journal Thorax, in discussing the New York campaign, emphasised 
the importance of distinguishing between the perception of risk and the actual risk 
posed by an individual with TB.  Whereas the perception of risk, fuelled by media, was 
that all New Yorkers were at risk, the reality was quite different.   
… those using homeless shelters in which beds were spaced 18 inches apart and 
HIV prevalence was high were obviously at greater risk of exposure than those in 
the leafy suburbs.  But the perception was high in New York that all were at risk, 
and undoubtedly encouraged the response seen.27 
This emphasis on assuaging the perception of risk rather than estimating the actual risk 
led even civil libertarian critics to ignore: 
… the actual magnitude of the threat posed by non-infectious poorly compliant 
individuals, particularly by those opposing the regulatory changes.  The Health 
Department officials simply suggested that “over time, it is likely that they (poorly 
compliant, non-infectious individuals) will pose a very serious threat to large 
segments of the public.”28 
The editorial concluded that: 
An approach to our understanding of risk with regard to tuberculosis must 
therefore attempt to define the risk of an event occurring (for example, the 
transmission of tuberculosis from a smear negative poorly compliant individual), 
determine the gravity of that event, weight different available measures to be 
taken, and alter the perception of risk with time both as our understanding 
                                               
23
 Ibid. p.1435. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Levy & Alperstein (1999).  
26
 Coker (1999a). 
27
 Ibid. p.96. 
28
 Ibid. p.95. 
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improves and as circumstances change. … The global control of tuberculosis may 
be harmed more than it is assisted by inappropriate, ill judged, culturally 
insensitive coercive public health measures.29 
Aside from the US, the international consensus30 on TB control appears not to favour 
coercive public health measures – a position reemphasised in a recent British Medical 
Journal editorial.31    
The parallel between coercive intervention in relation to TB and coercive psychiatric  
interventions was noted in a submission made by The Royal College of Psychiatrists to 
the (UK) Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill: 
Nonetheless there are a small number of mentally disordered people who present 
serious risks to others. … the central issue is what degree of certainty should be 
required before determining that such a person is dangerous.  For example if a 
person suffering from tuberculosis, or other notifiable infectious disease, refuses 
treatment they will only be detained if the form of TB makes it almost inevitable 
that other people will become infected.  Any lesser standard in relation to the 
mentally disordered would be inappropriate. Clinically this is particularly difficult 
to determine, hence, for example, the estimation that, with current knowledge and 
skills, between 2000 and 5000 people would need to be detained to prevent one 
homicide …32 
Adding further emphasis to its views on coercive psychiatry, the College prefaced its 
submission with a quotation:  
The whole picture (on the provision of care and treatment) is distorted by the use 
or prospect of compulsion, which deters people from seeking treatment, denies 
them the right to choose the treatment they want, and prioritises certain kinds of 
patient in the offer of services.33 
__________ 
A case concerning the compulsory detention in relation to TB came before the Irish 
courts in 2008.34  The applicant who had, some years earlier, been treated for TB in 
South African, was suspected of suffering from TB when she became ill in Ireland.  She 
refused treatment and was detained under the S.38 of the Health Act (1947) but had 
been assessed by psychiatrists as competent.  She had been detained for over a year and 
began habeas corpus proceedings seeking her release.  It transpired that though the 
Health Act (1947) provides for detention and segregation it does not provide for 
compulsory treatment.  
                                               
29
 Ibid. p.96. 
30
 Coker (1999a), p.96; Ribeiro (2003).  
31
 Maher (2003). 
32
 Royal College Of Psychiatrists (2004), p.17-8. 
33
 Ibid. p.1, quoting Baroness Hale of Richmond, Sieghart lecture, British Institute of Human Rights 
2004. 
34
 See O’Connell, B. (2008). ‘Court action over TB woman's year-long forced hospitalisation.’ The Irish 
Times. 6 November.  
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B-3: Compulsory Preventive Medication 
Even the most cursory outline of this topic is far beyond the scope of this appendix; my 
purpose in adverting to it is to draw attention to the existence of occasions when, in a 
non-psychiatric setting, preventive medication is made compulsory.  By ‘preventative 
medication’ in this context, I mean medication given to an individual for a condition 
from which he presently does not suffer, but for which he is considered to be at risk.  
The discussion is restricted to developments in the UK and Ireland as these are the areas 
of most relevance to the argument being developed in this dissertation.  
Compulsory vaccination was first attempted in the UK in 1853 when smallpox 
vaccination was made mandatory for infants.  In reaction, an anti-vaccination movement 
was quickly established whose political influence grew to such an extent that by 1889 a 
Royal Commission was appointed to find more acceptable methods of resolving the 
problem.  Their report in 1898 was something of a compromise in that it recommended 
that, whilst compulsion should remain, any parent who could satisfy magistrates that 
they conscientiously believed that vaccination would be harmful to their child, was 
excused.  Even this was not acceptable to the anti-vaccinationists (who included such 
eminences as George Bernard Shaw) and in 1907 a new Act was passed which allowed 
parents to obtain exemption by simply attesting to their honestly held belief that 
vaccination was not in the best interests of their child; within a few years this resulted in 
25 per cent of newborns avoiding vaccination.  The resistance to vaccination arose not 
only because it was believed to carry risk (some believed it to cause leprosy) but also 
because it contravened deeply held beliefs about the integrity of the body.  The attempt 
at compulsion can be viewed as a struggle between, on the one hand, the protection of 
the common good and, on the other, the safeguarding of the rights of the individual, and 
– in that smallpox is a highly infectious disease – the interest of the body politic was no 
mere theoretical one, yet individualism triumphed over the common social interests.35   
Although the political struggle over compulsory smallpox vaccination occurred over a 
hundred years ago it seems that public attitudes in the UK have changed but little in the 
intervening period as is evidenced by the depth of emotion engendered by the 
introduction of the (non-mandatory) MMR vaccine.  
__________ 
The issue of compulsory mass medication became a topic of controversy in Ireland in 
1960 with the introduction of legislation permitting the fluoridation of the public water 
                                               
35
 In writing this section, I have relied heavily on Pedersen (2005) and Dalrymple (2006). 
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supply. The constitutionality of this legislation was challenged in Ryan v AG (1965) 
which is one of the most important cases in Irish Constitutional Law in that it 
established that the personal rights of citizens were not limited to those enumerated in 
the constitution but included unspecified rights such as the right to bodily integrity.  The 
plaintiff argued that the process of fluoridating water not only amounted to ‘mass 
medication’ (and that the state had no power to administer drugs in such a fashion)36 but 
was also a source of danger to the public.  The court held that even if it was agreed that 
fluoridation was dangerous (a position that it did not accept) the plaintiff’s case failed 
because: 
The plaintiff has no legal right to a supply of piped water and the Act of 1960 
does not impose any obligation on her … to drink or use the water coming 
through the piped water supply. … Moreover, … [the plaintiff] can, by the 
expenditure of a few pounds, remove all or almost all the fluoride ions coming 
through the piped water supply.37 
There has been continuing controversy in Ireland over the use of fluoridation with some 
arguing that it increased the risk of childhood bone cancer.38  In response to such 
concerns, the Irish government established a ‘Forum on Fluoridation’ whose report39 in 
2002 recommended that fluoridation should continue but with a decrease in the 
permissible level of fluoride.  In an appendix to the report, Professor Binchy examined 
the developments in Irish Constitutional Law since the Ryan case with a view to 
determining whether a new constitutional challenge to mass fluoridation might be 
decided differently.  He argued that if mass fluoridation were to be regarded by the 
courts as a form of mass medication then, in so far as there is a right to refuse medical 
treatment,:“ … it is hard to see how there is nonetheless an obligation to submit to 
legislatively authorised State action that constitutes medical treatment.”40  He 
considered such an interpretation unlikely. 
The question of compulsory vaccination came before the Irish courts in  
North Western Health Board v HW and CW (2000) where the Health Board sought an 
injunction to compel the parents to consent to a PKU test41 on their child.  The parents 
had refused consent on the grounds that the test was invasive.  The court refused to 
grant the injunction holding that (other than in exceptional circumstances) parents were 
entitled to make these decisions even if, as it believed in the instant case, they made the 
                                               
36
 Ibid. at p.345. 
37
 Ibid. at p.314. 
38
 The Irish Independent. (2006). ‘Dentists warn of flouride water dangers’. The Irish Independent. 8 
April.  
39
 Department of Health and Children (2002).  
40
 Ibid. p.222. 
41
 This is a test for disability which requires the taking of a blood sample.  
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wrong decision.  The judgement noted that the State did not seek to use compulsion in 
relation to the innoculation and vaccination of children where the case for compulsion 
was far stronger than in respect of the PKU test. 
The riposte made in the Ryan case (that there is no obligation on anyone to use the 
medicated supply and that non-medicated alternatives can easily be obtained) is likely to 
be used as a defence against any possible criticism of recent proposals42 to add folic 
acid to bread in an attempt to reduce the number of cases of infants born with spina 
bifida.  The agency anticipated “ … general ethical population concerns about prospect 
of ‘compulsory’ or ‘mass medication’ issues.” 43 
A practice of administering preventive psychiatric medication has been recently adopted 
in the US in relation to young people who have not, as yet, developed schizophrenia but 
who are believed to be susceptible to developing it later in life.  Although the results of 
a recent study using antipsychotics were less than impressive – they were summarised 
by one of the lead authors in the words: “The positive result was only marginally 
significant, and the negative result was clear.”44 – they have not lessened the 
enthusiasm for future trials.  Though such medication is not mandatory at present, it 
may become so in view of proposals by the US administration for the mass screening of 
schoolchildren for susceptibility to mental illness.45 
                                               
42
 As advocated by The Food Standards Agency in the UK.  Similar proposal have recently been made in 
Ireland; Donnellan E. (2006). ‘Body calls for use of folic acid in bread’. The Irish Times. 18 July.  
43
 The Times. (2006). ‘Folic acid in bread to cut birth defects’. The Times. 5 April; The Independent. 
(2006). ‘Add folic acid to bread’ to tackle birth defects’. The Independent. 5 April. 
44
 The New York Times. (2006). ’Mixed Result in Treating Schizophrenia Pre-Diagnosis’. The New York 
Times. 1 May.  
45
 Lenzer (2004).   
The American Psychiatric Association, in their July 2004, Advocacy News took some credit for keeping 
this story out of the American news: “The BMJ story has gained some traction in derivative reports on 
the Internet, though mainstream media have not touched the story, in part thanks to APA’s work, for 
which the administration is appreciative.” [Online], available:  
http://www.psych.org/join_apa/mb/newsletters/advocacy/AdvNewsJuly2004.htm#21  [accessed: 3 May 
2006.].   
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Appendix C: The Amy case: conflicting perspectives 
The details of this case are set out in Chapter 2.1  The focus of this appendix is on the 
conflicting testimony of Dr. Cameron who was Amy’s hospital physician [Subsection 
C-1], Dr. Watler [Subsection C-2] and Dr. Gervais [Subsection C-3] who were her 
psychiatrists and Dr. Cameron’s response to the psychiatric testimony [Subsection C-4].   
Subsection C-5 contains some observations on the case and Subsection C-6 draws some 
conclusions. 
C-1: Cameron (hospital physician)2 
The person I encountered was a petite, bright and charming woman who came 
across as younger than her 77 years.  She exuded a vivacity, a determination to 
make the most of every moment, but hinted that she was aware of the bad news 
the biopsy might bring.  During her history and physical she regaled me with a 
long, rambling monologue.  Her garrulousness didn’t strike me as at all unusual.  
Many people deal with anxiety by talking, and Amy was evidently concerned 
about the biopsy. 
- on her haematologist: 
… found her to be “an alert and intelligent lady” … “She has an excellent 
understanding of this disease and has decided not to have any treatment.” 
- on her psychiatrist: 
For him, her habit of speaking tangentially was evidence of mental illness.  He 
recorded inconsistencies in her behaviour, such as reporting “intense pain” while 
refusing to take analgesics. … the psychiatrist raised the issue of paranoid 
ideation and said that psychosis could not be ruled out.  He … suggested that Amy 
be certified … 
- on her attending physician: 
… was convinced that Amy was competent. … He conferred with Amy’s family 
physician; both agreed that, as difficult as the situation was, Amy had the right to 
take her own life. … [he] felt that her actions were rational: she had a value 
system and had made a decision consistent with her beliefs.  He also noted wryly 
that the current test of rationality was often concurrence with the opinions of 
one’s physician. 
- on her social worker: 
… expressed concern that Amy appeared mentally ill.  She felt that she was “… 
unstable, paranoid and grandiose … not rational.” 
- on legal considerations: 
Curiously, there was little consideration of the legal implications.  No one 
suggested that a lawyer’s opinion be sought. … Any concerns we might have had 
about legal liability were pushed aside by the debate about the patient’s interests.  
                                               
1
 See Subsection A. 
2
 All text in the body of Subsections C-1 to C-4 are direct quotations from Cameron (1997a), Watler 
(1997), Gervais(1997) and Cameron (1997b) respectively. 
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- on autonomy: 
The decision to let Amy leave hospital was not a black-and-white issue. … Amy 
didn’t have to die; her death lacked the inevitability that accompanies terminal 
illness.  I didn’t feel that she was mentally ill in the clinical sense. Her decision to 
die was, to me, not the defeated wish of a depressed person, but an affirmative act 
to conclude her life on her own terms. … As I grappled with this ambivalence, I 
kept returning to one theme, one certainty.  I was confident that we had respected 
Amy’s rights.  She died the way she wanted to, with her dignity intact. … I think 
Amy taught me that it is imperative to respect the autonomy of the people we care 
for even if we disagree with their reasoning. 
C-2: Watler (psychiatrist) 
- on mental disorder (generally):  
There is no evidence that patients with serious medical illnesses ‘rationally’ 
choose to die. …  
There is common belief that the forensic term ‘mental disorder’ is synonymous 
with psychiatric classification or ‘clinical’ conventions. … Mental disorder is, in 
fact, very poorly defined in the various mental health acts, and this omission is 
quite deliberate.  The physician need not establish an ‘identifiable psychiatric 
illness’ as a requirement for involuntary committal. Rather, persons should be 
detained for evaluation when there is high-risk behaviour and evidence to suggest 
any form of mental disorder.  The brevity of this detention — a maximum of 7 
days in Nova Scotia — does not represent a significant deprivation of freedom.  
- on mental disorder (Amy):  
What evidence was there to suggest that Amy was suffering from a mental 
disorder? 
- Months before, she had refused a life-saving intervention with a high therapeutic 
index.  
- Her speech and writing demonstrated significant thought-form disorder. 
- There was psychomotor agitation, irritability and lability3 of mood.  
- There was social withdrawal and suspiciousness.  
It seems speculative to conclude that Amy was not mentally ill in the ‘clinical’ 
sense or, more important, in the forensic sense. 
With recent suicidal behaviour and evidence to suggest a mental disorder, the law 
requires that an unwilling patient be involuntarily committed.  That Amy’s 
clinicians could not agree on the presence of a mental disorder is precisely the 
reason for detaining high-risk patients for further evaluation. 
C-3: Gervais (psychiatrist) 
- on Amy’s refusal of treatment: 
There is no doubt that the patient’s rights, such as refusing treatment, must be 
respected.  Nevertheless, one should look into this refusal and its meaning, … She 
was an intelligent, articulate person who talked in an apparently logical way and 
was listened to in a similar logical way, but she was certainly not listened to with 
the ‘third ear.’ 
                                               
3
 “Emotionally or behaviourally unstable.” Shorter Oxford Dictionary (1997). 
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- on Amy’s psychiatric symptoms: 
In psychiatric terms, this woman was showing signs of grandiosity: she was called 
“The Queen” in her neighbourhood and she would not let nature or fate or destiny 
or God take her life.  Instead, she would be the one who decided when to live and 
when to die, and in a way she would act like God.  This, to me, is manic denial. 
C-4: Cameron’s response 
I find it illuminating that most people who knew this woman superficially, 
whether from reading about her or after a single consultation, felt that she was 
mentally ill.  By contrast, those who came to know her well over time, who had 
established a relationship with her, were convinced she was eccentric but 
competent. 
I reject Watler’s assertion that anyone refusing treatment with a ‘high therapeutic 
index’ must be mentally ill. … People who refuse blood transfusions for religious 
reasons are not mentally ill, even when their decision does not seem rational when 
measured against our values. 
C-5: Some observations on the Amy case 
I wish to make a number of observations on the Amy Case under some specific 
headings:  
(i) Consent 
Dr. Gervais argues to the effect that even though Amy stated that she did not want any 
psychiatric intervention, she ‘really’ did and this would have been obvious had she been 
listened to with the “third ear”.  To imagine this argument being made by one charged 
with rape, is sufficient to demonstrate its folly; furthermore to argue that, against clear 
evidence to the contrary, one’s belief can be justified by listening with one’s ‘third ear’ 
is – if not itself delusional in the clinical sense4 – sufficient to immunise any delusion 
against rational argument. 
(ii) ‘Facts’ 
Dr. Watler proceeds to draw conclusions from what he believes to be established facts 
amongst which are: “Her speech and writing demonstrated significant thought-form 
disorder”; “There was psychomotor agitation, irritability and lability of mood”, yet 
which seem curiously at odds with Cameron’s description: “Her garrulousness didn’t 
strike me as at all unusual.  Many people deal with anxiety by talking”.   
(iii) Mental Illness 
Watler draws a distinction between suffering from mental disorder and being diagnosed 
with a specific psychiatric illness.   
                                               
4
 Vide Chapter 3 and the clinical definition of delusion. 
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This distinction is capable of two interpretations, a narrow and a broad: the narrow 
interpretation would be that the individual who has a mental disorder, has – because of 
difficulty in carrying out a differential diagnosis – not yet been diagnosed as suffering 
from a specific psychiatric illness.  A similar such situation might occur in a non-
psychiatric medical setting, when a patient is suffering from a fever but it is not clear 
yet whether he is suffering from a malarial or some other fever.  The broad 
interpretation is when it is possible that an individual might suffer from a ‘mental 
disorder’ and not suffer from any identifiable psychiatric illness.  It is clearly this broad 
sense that Watler has in mind when he says:  
Mental disorder is, in fact, very poorly defined in the various mental health acts, 
and this omission is quite deliberate.  The physician need not establish an 
‘identifiable psychiatric illness’ as a requirement for involuntary committal.  
Rather, persons should be detained for evaluation where there is high-risk 
behaviour and evidence to suggest any form of mental disorder. 
This poses grave difficulties for any analysis of misdiagnosis in psychiatry for not only 
does the term ‘misdiagnosis’ cover a diagnosis which was not made in accordance with 
the specific diagnostic criteria for the various psychiatric disease categories as specified 
in the standard diagnostic manuals – such as the ICD-10 and the DSM-IV – but it also 
covers those who were never believed to suffer from an identifiable psychiatric illness 
but who have been wrongly diagnosed as having ‘mental disorder’. 
This distinction is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
(iv) Default presumptions relating to coercive psychiatric interventions  
When presented with a recalcitrant individual for psychiatric evaluation, Watler’s 
‘default position’ is to urge involuntary committal for evaluative purposes; he states: “It 
seems speculative to conclude that Amy was not mentally ill”.  Transposed to the 
criminal law, this principle would read: ‘It seems speculative to conclude that the 
accused is not guilty’ whereas the relevant legal principle actually is ‘If a reasonable 
doubt exists as to the guilt of the accused, he should go free’. 
Such a stark contrast between psychiatric and legal principles seems difficult to justify 
unless one believes that coercive psychiatric intervention is essentially benign and this 
appears to be Watler’s position: “The brevity of this detention – a maximum of 7 days in 
Nova Scotia – does not represent a significant deprivation of freedom.”  It was argued 
earlier that, in some circumstances, a coercive psychiatric intervention might be 
compared to a rape because of the intimacy of its intrusiveness.  If this comparison is 
well-founded, then arguments as to the brevity of the detention are comparable to a 
rapist seeking to mitigate his crime by arguing that the rape lasted but a short time.  
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(v) Irrationality 
The term ‘irrationality’ is not mentioned explicitly in the discussion, whereas the terms 
‘not rational’ and ‘rational’ do occur: Cameron describes one such use by Amy’s 
attending physician who “… felt that her actions were rational: she had a value system 
and had made a decision consistent with her beliefs;” Watler considers the refusal of 
treatment with a high therapeutic index to be “not rational”.  The contrast between 
these two positions highlights the difficulty in determining the meaning to be accorded 
to these terms when used in a psychiatric setting. 
(vi) Psychiatric Labels 
The usage of psychiatric labels5 –  
“manic denial” … … “signs of grandiosity” … … “significant thought-form 
disorder” … … “psychomotor agitation, irritability and lability of mood” … … 
“social withdrawal and suspiciousness” … … “unstable, paranoid and grandiose 
… not rational” … … “paranoid ideation” … … “psychosis could not be ruled 
out”,  
 – is so pervasive as to be promiscuous and as if the terms were benign; it shows little 
awareness of the potency of these terms and of the serious consequences that may flow 
from their inappropriate use.   
____________ 
C-6: Conclusions 
Although the Amy case is but a single case of psychiatric intervention on the grounds of 
irrationality, it is a particularly powerful example in that the psychiatrists involved must 
be assumed (in responding to an article in a medical journal which was critical of their 
professional expertise and judgement) to have carefully considered their reply and 
drafted it in a manner which would meet with the approval of their professional 
colleagues.  Unless the Amy case is truly exceptional, the (tentative) conclusion may be 
drawn that the psychiatric usage of terms such as ‘irrational’ is so lacking in precision 
and awareness of the detrimental consequences of their ascription, as to merit the 
description ‘cavalier’. 
 
 
                                               
5
 The labels which follow, were applied to Amy by various professionals and are direct quotations from 
either Cameron (1997a), Watler (1997), Gervais(1997) or Cameron (1997b). 
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Appendix D: Estimates of the rate of marital infidelity 
The goal of this appendix is to see whether it is possible to estimate the probability that 
the wives of individuals in circumstances such as Blehein’s1 or Fulford’s Mr. O.S.2 – 
i.e. jealous husbands in unhappy marriages who believe their wives to have been 
unfaithful – actually have been unfaithful.   
Some general statistics are given in Subsection D-1; some more particular estimates are 
given in Subsection D-2 and some conclusions are drawn in Subsection D-3. 
D-1: Some general statistics on rates of infidelity 
Hargrave (2000) whilst noting the difficulties involved in estimating rates of marital 
infidelity, summarises some studies: 
Kinsey (1953) … estimated that 50% of husbands and 26% of wives engage in at 
least one extramarital affair3 … Glass and Wright (1992) put the estimates at 44% 
for men and 25% for women. … So it is probably realistic to assume that the rate 
of infidelity is somewhere between 30% and 55% for men and between 25% and 
40% for women.4  
UK studies give comparable estimates: 
- A 1949 survey (the results of which were withheld at the time)5 found that 20% of 
women admitted to having had an extra-marital affair.  
- A 2005 study by the counselling service Relate found that 24% of wives admit to 
having had affairs.6 
D-2: Some more particular statistics on rates of infidelity 
More nuanced estimates are available where, for example, the sample population is 
restricted to couples who describe themselves as ‘unhappy’ or where a husband exhibits 
jealousy or where a husband believes that his wife has had an affair. 
Unhappy marriages 
The Kinsey Institute quotes7 a study in relation to ‘unhappy’ couples: 
Respondents who reported that their relationships were “pretty happy” and “not 
too happy” were two and four times more likely, respectively, to have reported 
                                               
1
 See Chapter 3. 
2
 Ibid.  
3
 A 1991 update to the Kinsey study found a rate of 31% [see University of Berkley, Department of 
Statistics, (2006)]. 
4
 Hargrave (2000), p.165. 
5
 Sussex University, Press release, ‘Sussex archive reveals secret sex lives of 1940s Britain’. [online], 
available:http://www.sussex.ac.uk/press_office/media/media505.shtml [accessed 5 July 2006].  
6
 The Sunday Times (2005) ‘Secret Passions of the Grey 1940’s’. 4 September. 
7
 The Kinsey Institute. ‘Frequently asked sexuality questions to The Kinsey Institute’ [online], available: 
http://www.kinseyinstitute.org/resources/FAQ.html#Laumann [accessed: 10 August 2006].  
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extramarital sex than respondents who reported that they were “very happy” 
with their relationships [Atkins (2001)]. 
Jealous husbands 
A US study examined the effect of a husband’s jealousy on the wife’s propensity to 
have an extramarital affair:  
Women who complained that their husbands are jealous and possessive 
reported a higher probability that they will have brief affairs with other men. 
… Although causality cannot be inferred from these correlational data, the 
pattern does suggest that the husbands’ displays of jealousy and 
possessiveness may veridically reflect a higher likelihood of their partners’ 
infidelity, especially in the form of a brief affair.8 
Suspicious husbands 
Andrews (2008) sought to determine the reliability of a partner’s belief in the 
unfaithfulness of their spouse.  Men who reckoned that the probability that their wives 
had had an affair exceeded 50%, were classified as ‘suspicious’; the study concluded 
that the likelihood that the beliefs of such suspicious husbands, was correct, was 
69.2%.9  Hence, given that a husband is ‘suspicious’, it is 2.3 times more probable that 
his wife was unfaithful, than that she was not. 
D-3: Conclusions 
Taking 25% as a tentative estimate of the extent of female marital infidelity and 
restricting the discussion to marriages where the husband was jealous and the couple 
were “not too happy”, a tentative estimate10 of the probability that the wife was 
unfaithful exceeds 50%, i.e. it is more likely than not that the wife of a jealous husband 
in an unhappy marriage has had, or will have, an extramarital affair.  The presence of 
jealousy on the husband’s part would, according to Buss (1997) increase the probability 
of wife being unfaithful.  The suspicion that she was having an affair would, according 
to Andrews (2008), increase the probability to 70%. 
                                               
8
 Buss & Shackelford (1997), p.213. 
9
 Data abstracted from Andrews (2008), Table 3, p.353.  
10
 Talking a sample of 84 couples [84 is chosen to avoid the occurrence of fractions] and assuming that an 
equal number of couples were “very happy”, "pretty happy" and "not too happy", then assuming that 25% 
of wives (i.e. 21) were unfaithful [Atkins (2001) supra]: 
- 3 would be in marriages described as “very happy” 
- 6 would be in marriages described as “pretty happy” 
- 12 would be in marriages described as “not too happy” 
Thus the probability that the wife was unfaithful in a marriage described as “not too happy” would be 
12/21 = 57%.  
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More formally, the following conclusion can be drawn: 
In marriages which were described as ‘unhappy’ and where the husband 
exhibited jealousy, a tentative estimate of the probability that the wife was 
unfaithful, exceeds 50%.  A tentative estimate of the likelihood of the correctness 
of a ‘suspicious’ husband’s belief that his wife is unfaithful, is 70%. 
__________ 
In attempting to apply such results to cases such as Blehein’s, the objection might well 
be made that the spouses studied by, for example, Andrews (2008) were not reported as 
exhibiting any evidence of mental illness.  To this, it can be countered that in cases such 
as Blehein’s, the only11 evidence of mental illness in cases of delusions of infidelity, is 
often just the supposed ‘delusion’.   
A further point of interest arising from Andrews (2008) is that those ‘suspicious’ 
husbands who believed their wives to be having an affair were unable to justify this 
belief (in the sense discussed in Chapter 3) but based their belief on hunches or 
‘guesses’; their doing so did not appear to raise the spectre of mental illness (pace the 
psychiatric analysis of such cases as discussed in Chapter 3).  
 
 
                                               
11
 See Enoch (1967) (supra): 
I have now in an asylum two quite rational-looking men, whose chief delusion is that their wives, 
both women of undoubted good character, had been unfaithful to them.  Keep them off that subject 
and they are rational.  But on that subject they are utterly delusional and insane. (p. 47) 
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Appendix E: Prevalence of unjustifiable beliefs amongst 
‘normal’ subjects 
As discussed in Chapter 3, one who cleaves, unshakably, to a belief (other than a 
religious belief) without being able to justify it, can be clinically diagnosed as 
‘delusional’; implicit is the presumption that such beliefs do not occur amongst the 
‘normal’1 population.  The goal of this appendix is to examine the prevalence of such 
tenaciously held, unjustifiable, beliefs amongst the general population [Subsection E-1], 
amongst some academic or professional subgroups [Subsection E-2] and to draw some 
conclusions [Subsection E-3]. 
E-1: Unjustifiable beliefs in the general population 
Some US studies are first examined and then some UK studies. 
United States 
A Harris (2003) survey into the beliefs of Americans, found that:  
Many people believe in miracles (84%), the devil (68%), hell (69%), ghosts 
(51%), astrology (31%) and reincarnation (27%). … The 84% of the public who 
believe in miracles falls to 72% among those with postgraduate degrees, and rises 
to 90% among women and 90% among African-Americans. 
A Gallup (2005) poll found that three in four Americans held paranormal beliefs in at 
least one of the following: 
… extra sensory perception (ESP), haunted houses, ghosts, mental telepathy, 
clairvoyance, astrology, communicating with the dead, witches, reincarnation, and 
channeling.  There are no significant differences in belief by age, gender, 
education, or region of the country. 
United Kingdom 
A 1998 survey2  to determine the prevalence of paranormal beliefs found that 47% 
believed in thought reading (14 % having had direct experience) and 34% believed that 
objects can be moved by the power of the mind (4% having had direct experience). 
A Mori (2003) survey found that: 
… 40% now said they believed in ghosts, and 15% that they had “personal 
experience” of ghosts; 6% of the public, indeed, said they had based a decision on 
their belief in ghosts. … 18% of the public said they believed in fortune telling or 
tarot, and 38% in astrology.  
                                               
1
 The ambiguities inherent in the term ‘normal’ are discussed in Chapter 3. 
2
 Daily Mail (1998) ‘Survey of Britons’ 2 Feb.  Copy available online: http://www.uri-
geller.com/survey1.htm [accessed 31 July 2006].  
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E-2: Examples of unjustifiable beliefs amongst the professions  
Lest it be thought that the professions and academia might be inured from such 
unjustifiable beliefs, I wish to mention a 2007 survey of the beliefs of university 
students and then two particular examples: the first concerns the beliefs of a Harvard 
professor, in alien abduction; the second concerns the beliefs of UK social workers, in 
the prevalence of the ‘satanic abuse’.  
Student survey  
This study examined the beliefs of 800 German university students of psychology, 
philosophy and science and was published in Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology; it 
found, inter alia:  
That extrasensory perception and telepathy may occur is assumed by 64% of the 
students, incidences of miraculous mental healing by 45%, the validity of 
horoscopes by 17%, and the use of exorcism under extreme circumstances by 
14% …3  
Alien Abduction  
Mack was professor of psychiatry and wrote extensively on alien abduction4.  He 
believed that: 
 … “aliens” from higher space-time dimensions are visiting Earth, and that this 
“Phenomenon is occurring in the context of the threat to the earth as a living 
system, a response to the ecological devastation that our particular species has 
undertaken.”  The aliens are engaged in what he called a “cosmic correction”; 
they appear to function “as a kind of intermediary between the Source of creation 
and us, emissaries perhaps of that correction.” 5 
Satanic Abuse 
This example is of interest in relation to the evidential base that supposedly normal 
professionals use to ground their beliefs.   
Satanic abuse, as described in the British Medical Journal: 
… seemed to have reached epidemic proportions in a small part of the north east 
of England.  The paediatricians and social workers seemed to be zealots – children 
who turned up at hospital with minor unrelated symptoms were diagnosed as 
having been sexually abused, with reflex anal dilatation as the sole criterion, and 
were taken into care.6 
One of the most controversial interventions occurred in Rochdale where, without 
warning, police and social workers took 16 children into care for what was to be a total 
of 34 years and four months.7  It was alleged they had been forced into devil worship 
                                               
3
 Fahrenberg & Cheetham (2007), p 190. 
4
 Mack (1994) is a sympathetic study of such cases. 
5
 The (London) Independent, (2004) ‘Obituaries John E. Mack’, 8 Oct. 
6
 Essex (1997). 
7
 BBC News (2006). ‘Lost years of 'satanic panic' children’. BBC. 11 January. [online], available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/real_story/4602302.stm [accessed 1 Aug 2006].  
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and had been sexually abused.  The event that precipitated the intervention was the 
experience of one boy who appeared to be unduly fearful and who often spoke about 
ghosts, which (to the social workers involved) was his way of referring to sexual 
abusers.  Yet there was never any proof – forensic, medical or otherwise – to support 
claims of ritual abuse against any of the families.  When police raided the house they 
took as ‘evidence’ a cross made by one child from two lollipop sticks and a religious 
wall plaque that she had given her mother, portraying Jesus on the Cross, which bore 
the words “God bless our home” and featured a small well for holy water.  It was later 
alleged that this had been used to hold blood.8  
None of these allegations were upheld by the courts.   
Subsequently the British Government appointed Jean La Fontaine (an anthropologist) to 
head an investigation, she found that: 
… to those for whom the status of the accuser allowed of no doubt, evidence was 
irrelevant, although there was faith that it would be forthcoming.  To show 
scepticism was to be accused of supporting paedophiles; to try and explain was 
seen as an attempt to excuse.  The claim that satanic abuse was the cause of 
serious psychic damage to children and adults was a moral judgement, not a 
rational argument from the facts.  
It is this belief in unverified and unverifiable mystical evil that, par excellence, 
classes belief in satanic abuse with belief in witchcraft whether in the European 
distant past or in the recent past … 9 
One point of especial interest, in the context of coercive psychiatric interventions, is that 
the judge in the Rochdale case, did accept that the social workers were motivated by 
zeal rather than by malice: “I do not question the good faith or good intentions of the 
social workers, who I acknowledge were working under considerable pressure.”10  Such 
a defence would11 exonerate psychiatrists (unlike social workers) from civil liability for 
a coercive intervention based on similarly unjustifiable grounds. 
E-3: Conclusions 
I wish to avoid, what biologist Richard Dawkins calls, the “Argument from Personal 
Incredulity”12 and simply conclude, not that all the above beliefs are untrue, but that the 
psychiatric perception of the beliefs of normal subjects – especially the perception that 
normal people are able to justify their beliefs – is not possible to sustain in the face of 
such evidence.   
                                               
8
 The Times (2006). ‘Our stolen childhood’ The Times. 10 January. 
9
 La Fontaine (1998), p.185. 
10
 The Times (2006). ‘Our stolen childhood’ supra. 
11
 See the Mental Health Act (2001), S. 73.  
12
 I.e. that if it seems impossible to me, it must not be true; see Dawkins (1995), p 29.   
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Appendix F: Problematic aspects of psychiatric probability 
assessments   
The importance of the role played by probability assessments in medical decision 
making1 is most clearly manifest when the consequences of an erroneous probability 
assessment become apparent; the criminal conviction in the Sally Clark case 
[Subsection F-1] provides a striking example.  The Clark conviction was overthrown 
because the medical expert based his testimony on explicit data and a probability 
calculation both of which were provably incorrect.   
Much more insidious are ‘intuitive’ probability assessments made in response to an 
inadequately formulated problem and which are made in the absence of explicit data 
(e.g. psychiatric assessments as to what is ‘normal’); it is extremely difficult to mount a 
direct challenge to any such assessments in the absence of explicit data especially since 
‘intuitive’ judgements have a natural affinity with ‘common-sense’ perceptions; 
accordingly it is important to emphasise the often radical difference between a 
probability assessment which has been rigorously calculated, and one based on intuition 
– a phenomenon encapsulated in the description of probability assessments as often 
being ‘counter–intuitive’; examples are given in Subsection F-2.  Intuitive probability 
assessments underlie many psychiatric diagnoses either explicitly (as in the definition of 
delusion2) or implicitly (as in the assessment that a particular behaviour or belief is not 
‘normal’); many such intuitive psychiatric assessments will be shown3 to be erroneous; 
in consequence many psychiatric assessments of what is pathological (assuming the 
pathological and the normal to be mutually exclusive categories) are also necessarily 
erroneous.   
Theoretically more complex errors – the so-called ‘Base Rate’4 errors – feature 
prominently in the mis-interpretation of test results whether in general medical practice 
(e.g. mammography) [Subsection F-3] or in clinical psychiatry (e.g.  assessments of 
dangerousness) [Subsection F-4].  The presence of such errors is pervasive in the 
psychiatric literature on dangerousness,5 moreover the errors are of such a magnitude [c. 
                                               
1
 Sutherland (1992), for example, states: “Whether doctors acknowledge it or not, most medical diagnosis 
relies on probabilities, …” (p. 176). 
2
 Sedler (1995), p.256: “Bizarre delusions are generally impossible, whereas nonbizarre delusions are 
generally improbable.” 
3
 Infra and Chapters 3 and 6. 
4
 Also known as ‘Conditional Probability’ or ‘Bayesian Analysis’.  
5
 See Chapter 6 for an extended discussion.  
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ten–fold]6 as to render such assessments not only deeply flawed but, in themselves, 
parlous – an ironic conclusion in that some psychiatrists believe that the cause of some 
psychiatric illnesses lies in an inability to make correct probability assessments.7   
Conclusions are listed at the end of subsections F-2 and F-4. 
F-1: The Sally Clark case  
In 1999 a solicitor, Sally Clark, was convicted of smothering one baby son and of 
shaking her other son to death.  Her conviction hinged on expert evidence given by an 
eminent paediatrician Professor Sir Roy Meadow who estimated the likelihood of two 
infants from the same family dying of SIDS8, as one in 73 million.   
The Royal Statistical Society took the unprecedented step of writing to the Lord 
Chancellor to register its objection to the way the statistic had been calculated,9 and 
stated that:  
… a medical expert witness drew on published studies to obtain a figure for the 
frequency of sudden infant death syndrome … He went on to square this figure to 
obtain a value of 1 in 73 million for the frequency of two cases of SIDS in such a 
family.  This approach is, in general, statistically invalid … 
Aside from its invalidity, figures such as the 1 in 73 million are very easily 
misinterpreted.  Some press reports at the time stated that this was the chance that 
the deaths of Sally Clark’s two children were accidental.  This (mis-)interpretation 
is a serious error of logic known as the ‘Prosecutor’s Fallacy’.10. 
Clark’s conviction was subsequently quashed.11  
A number of points arising from this case are of interest in the present context:  
- Meadow’s probabilistic estimates were not based on intuition but on published 
data, furthermore he used (albeit inappropriately) accepted mathematical 
techniques.  Thus both the data and the calculation were open to external scrutiny 
and rebuttal.  
The statement of the Royal Statistical Society12 emphasised the severe 
consequences that could flow from erroneous probability assessments.   The 
                                               
6
 See, for example, Szmukler (2001a) infra. 
7
 See infra and Blankenburg (2001), p.308. 
8
 Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. 
9
 BBC News, (2003). ‘On This Day:2003: Solicitor cleared of killing sons’ BBC News [online], available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/29/newsid_3412000/3412647.stm [accessed: 7 
August 2006].   
10
 The Royal Statistical Society (2001); the ‘Prosecutor’s Fallacy’ is discussed in F-III (infra). 
11
 BBC News, (2003) (supra). 
12
 The Royal Statistical Society (2001):  
Society does not tolerate doctors making serious clinical errors because it is widely understood 
that such errors could mean the difference between life and death.  The case of R v Sally Clark is 
one example of a medical expert witness making a serious statistical error, one which may have 
had a profound effect on the outcome of the case. 
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consequence that might follow from an erroneous psychiatric probability 
assessment based on clinical intuition are no less severe in that they may equally 
result in wrongful incarceration but, lacking an explicit evidence base (as was used 
by Meadow) they would not be open to the independent scrutiny of bodies such as 
the Royal Statistical Society; in the absence of explicit statistical evidence to the 
contrary, such probability assessments would be effectively immune from review.13  
- The true probability of a double cot death (in excess of 1 in 214)14 would, when 
viewed from the perspective of intuitive probability, be regarded as highly 
improbable and as providing no reason to set the verdict aside; it exemplifies the 
falsity of the intuitive nostrum (infra): “that the extremely low probability of an 
event happening is evidence that it has not happened.”  
Because of the absence of ‘raw data’, many probability judgements that arise in the 
course of psychiatric clinical practice are not amenable to a mathematical analysis15 and 
are thus wholly reliant on intuition (‘clinical judgement’).  It is relatively easy to correct 
intuitive probability assessments when they can be compared with mathematical 
probability assessments based on the agreed data; however, in the absence of such data, 
the evidence would suggest that intuitive probability assessments should be treated with 
extreme caution.  In such circumstances Montaigne’s advice is apposite: “… there is a 
silly arrogance in continuing to disdain something and to condemn it as false just 
because it seems unlikely to us.”16 
As will be shown in the following section, Montaigne’s advice is well founded. 
F-2: The Counterintuitive Nature Of Some Probability 
assessments 
The counterintuitive nature of probability assessments will be shown by: 
- taking some common intuitive probability assessments which can be shown to be 
erroneous, [F-2(i)]  
- outlining some research on the unreliability of intuitive probabilistic reasoning, [F-
2(ii)]  
                                               
13
 See the discussion in Chapter 6 on psychiatric assessments of dangerousness. 
14
 The author of the original study stated that: 
… although his study contained the one in 73 million figure, it was “somewhat unreliable” 
because of the “extreme rarity” of double cot deaths. “It was never intended as a real statistical 
estimate,” he told the hearing.  The true rate could range between 1 in 214 and 1 in 8,500.    
Laurance, J. (2006) ‘Child abuse expert 'used statistics out of context' at cot death trial’. The Independent. 
24 June. 
15
 See, for example, the discussion in Chapter 3 on the phenomenon of ‘hearing voices’. 
16
 de Montaigne (1991), p.200. 
 398 
 
 
- considering some seemingly commonsensical – but nonetheless unsustainable – 
statements concerning probability which are implicit in many ‘common sense’ type 
arguments and which are also to be found in some academic writings on 
psychiatry.17 [F-2(iii)] 
F-2(i): Examples of counterintuitive probability assessments 
I will give three examples. 
(a) The longest record for a run on black in a game of roulette occurred in a Monte 
Carlo casino in 1913 when the ball landed on black a record twenty-six times in 
succession.  Amongst watching gamblers this precipitated: 
… a near-panicky rush to bet on red, beginning about the time black had 
come up a phenomenal fifteen times … players doubled and tripled their 
stakes (believing) that there was not a chance in a million of another repeat.  
In the end the unusual run enriched the Casino by some millions of francs.18 
The error (known as ‘The Gambler’s Fallacy’) is based on a failure to understand 
statistical independence.  Two events are statistically independent when the 
occurrence of one has no statistical effect upon the occurrence of the other; in 
playing roulette the occurrence of black has no effect on the colour to occur on the 
next throw of the ball.  A similar error is involved when a coin thrower believes 
that after he has tossed three Heads in succession, Tails is more likely.  
(b) The second example concerns the (unjustified) belief that in a family of six 
children the outcome BBBGGG19 is more likely because it appears to better 
represent the ‘typical’ member of the distribution than GGGGGG which seems 
‘unusual’ and hence less probable.  This exemplifies the so-called ‘Representative 
Bias’ which occurs when thinking is overly influenced by what is stereotypically 
true; in the psychology of decision making it is known as the ‘representativeness 
heuristic’20 and is responsible for many cases of misdiagnosis.21  
                                               
17
 E.g. Blankenburg (2001) infra. 
18
 Huff & Geis (1959), p.28. 
19
 B= Boy; G= Girl. 
20
 Klein (2005): 
Kahneman and Tversky showed this heuristic in a classic experiment in which they presented 
participants with descriptions of people who came from a fictitious group of 30 engineers and 70 
lawyers (or vice versa).  The participants then rated the probability that the person described was 
an engineer.  Their judgments were much more affected by the extent to which the description 
corresponded to the stereotype of an engineer (for example, "Jack is conservative and careful") 
than by base rate information (only 30% were engineers), showing that representativeness had a 
greater effect on the judgments than did knowledge of the probabilities. 
21
 Bornstein & Emler (2001): 
This “representativeness” heuristic frequently yields accurate results because representativeness 
often correlates with likelihood.  Unfortunately, it also leads people to overweight highly 
representative individuating evidence and to undervalue relevant prior probabilities.  Positive test 
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(c) In an attempt to emphasize “how simple intuition can be misleading”, Holt & 
Anderson (1996) cite:  
… the (true) story about a man who received a positive outcome on a first-
stage test for the virus that causes AIDS.  The test that was used had a 4% 
rate of false positives and, for simplicity, it is assumed that there were 
virtually no false negatives.  The person committed suicide before follow-up 
examinations, presumably not realising that the low incidence of the virus in 
the male population (about 1 in 250 at that time) resulted in a posterior 
probability of having the virus of only 10%.22   
This provides an example of a typical ‘base–rate’ error [see F-III infra]. 
F-2(ii): Some research on the unreliability of intuitive reasoning 
Tversky & Kahneman (1983) examined the lack of congruence between intuitive and 
formal (i.e. mathematical) probability assessments.  Their research had lead them to 
hypothesize that intuitive probability assessments are often made on what is intuitively 
perceived as being a representative instance rather than on truly probabilistic 
considerations; they sought to test this hypothesis by asking subjects which of two 
propositions ‘A’ and ‘A and B’ are more probable.23  They asked practising physicians 
to make intuitive predictions on the basis of clinical evidence and found that: 
The incidence of violations of the conjunction rule in direct tests ranged from 
73% to 100%, with an average of 91%.  Evidently substantive expertise does not 
displace representativeness and does not prevent conjunction errors. … Most 
participants appeared surprised and dismayed to have made an elementary error of 
reasoning.24 
F-2(iii): Intuitively correct, but erroneous, probability statements 
I have chosen three statements which are, I suggest, intuitively plausible yet are in fact, 
erroneous: 
- (a) that the extremely low probability of an event happening is evidence that it has 
not happened; 
- (b) that estimates of probability point to what is true and that it is irrational to 
believe in other than the most probable outcome; 
                                                                                                                                          
results are especially salient in this respect and difficult to ignore, leading doctors in many cases to 
overestimate the probability of disease.  For example, a positive mammogram is perceived as so 
indicative of breast cancer that it may lead doctors to ignore the relevant base rate — such as that 
women in a certain age group, without other symptoms, have a very low prior probability of breast 
cancer — and hence to overweight the import of the positive test result. (p. 99.) 
Tversky & Kahneman (1983) proposed that the use of the representativeness heuristic is one of the main 
causes of base rate errors. 
22
 Holt & Anderson (1996), at p.179. 
23
 Irrespective of content, ‘A’ must always be more probable than ‘A and B’ since every occurrence of ‘A 
and B’ is necessarily an occurrence of ‘A’.  
24
 Tversky & Kahneman (1983), p.301-2. 
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- (c) that probabilistic estimates are objective and thus if estimates conflict, one 
must be erroneous.   
F-2(iii)(a): The extremely low probability of an event happening is 
evidence that it has not happened  
A simple thought experiment is sufficient to dispel this belief: imagine one tosses a box 
of matchsticks into the air and that one carefully notes the precise position and 
orientation of each of the fallen matches and the relationship it bears towards its 
adjoining matches.  Had one calculated – before tossing the matches in the air – the 
chance that this particular ‘aggregate orientation’ (out of all possible aggregate 
orientations) would happen, then its probability would have been miniscule.   
A similar error is pointed out by Blackburn when he notes the fallacy inherent in 
arguing that because “… much statistical research argues that since X has a low 
probability of being caused by chance therefore X is caused by ---.”25   
F-2(iii)(b): Estimates of probability point to what is true and to how the 
future will unfold  
The use of probability measures in relation to the unfolding of events is an indication of 
the existence of a state of ignorance in relation to the true mechanism, or cause, of the 
unfolding.  Probability, unlike entropy, does not function as ‘time’s arrow’; 
determinations of the most probable outcome do not point unequivocally to the true or 
to how the future will unfold.26   
The error being discussed appears to be not uncommon even within the philosophy of 
psychiatry: Blankenburg (2001), for example, seeks to interpret psychiatric illness – 
and, in particular, schizophrenia – as a deficiency in common sense and, in furthering 
his arguments, argues for the proposition that the probable provides the basis for what is 
true: 
                                               
25
 Blackburn (1999), p.224. 
26
 A thought experiment which took an existing complex situation and which asked whether it had 
evolved along the path of the most probable outcome, should be sufficient to dispel overestimations of the 
role of probability assessments.  
The noted biologist Stephen Jay Gould died in 2002; twenty years earlier he had been diagnosed with 
mesothelioma and had been told that “mesothelioma is incurable, with a median mortality of only eight 
months.”  He posed the question [Gould (1985)]:  
What does ‘median mortality of eight months’ signify in our vernacular?  I suspect that most 
people, without training in statistics, would read such a statement as “I will probably be dead in 
eight months”. 
He described his intellectual reaction: 
… fine, half the people will live longer; now what are my chances of being in that half. … I 
immediately recognized that the distribution of variation about the eight-month median would 
almost surely be what statisticians call “right skewed.”  
In the event, Gould lived for another 17 years – a telling reminder of the limitations of probability 
assessments especially those based on intuition.  
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As far as judgement is concerned, it is less a matter of differentiating true from 
false than of distinguishing the probable from the improbable.  Vico had 
emphasized that just as science is concerned with the truth, so common sense is 
concerned with the probable (verisimile).  It is precisely those errors and 
derailments at the beginning of the hebephrenic psychoses that make evident for 
us the fact that the significance of the probable is in no way a deficient mode of 
cognition of what is true.  Rather, the probable is encompassing and provides the 
basis for what is true, which is here meant in the sense of what is correct and 
demonstrable.27  [Emphasis added] 
When Blankenburg uses the term ‘common sense’ he is using it as meaning that sense 
which is common or shared within a society as is evident when he states that: 
… it is not uncommon for the relatives of the patient to report that the illness 
began with the patient raising questions about “the most ordinary things”.  These 
are things, which, to the common sense of the healthy person, are the most 
obvious, naturally understood things in life.  In contrast, the patients still manage 
to solve difficult, intellectually more demanding tasks without considerable 
effort.28  [Emphasis added] 
Blankenburg is not alone amongst philosophers in seeking to elevate the status of 
‘common sense’ to that of incontrovertible truth; a tendency of which Papineau is 
highly critical:  
Any amount of nonsense was once part of common sense, and much nonsense no 
doubt still is.  It was once absolutely obvious that the heavens revolve around the 
earth each day, that the heart is the seat of the soul, that without religion there can 
be no morality, …29 
When common sense can, on principle, be elevated by philosophy and be buttressed by 
coercive psychiatry, then the danger of a militant orthodoxy being able to exert an 
intellectual hegemony, becomes real; the cases of Soviet dissidents30 provide a stark 
warning of the possible dangers. 
F-2(iii)(c): Probabilistic estimates are objective and thus if estimates 
conflict, one must be erroneous.   
Building on the analysis of the previous section it is clear that probabilistic estimates are 
objective – and thus command acceptance – if, and only if, the data on which they are 
based is explicit and is accepted, by all parties, as being the appropriate basis of 
calculation.31  In particular, intuitive probability assessments are not objective and 
                                               
27
 Blankenburg (2001), p.308.  
28
 Ibid. p.306. 
29
 Papineau (2006) see also Chapter 2. 
30
 See Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
31
 Jaynes (1994) emphasises this point: 
Perhaps this makes clearer the reason for our seemingly fanatical insistence on indicating the prior 
information ‘I’ explicitly in every formal probability symbol P(A | BI).  Those who fail to do this 
may be able to get along without disaster for a while, … But eventually they are sure to find 
themselves writing nonsense, …  
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cannot command assent.  Such probability assessments are estimates – more correctly, 
‘hunches’ – based on ‘information’ which may be long forgotten and inaccessible to 
conscious scrutiny; accordingly they may conflict without either party being necessarily 
‘wrong’.  The psychiatric testimony given during the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui,32 
provides an example of the subjectivity of some psychiatric probabilistic assessments.   
During Moussaoui’s trial, his defence team sought to establish that he was mentally ill 
and they introduced a number of psychiatrists to so testify; the prosecution introduced 
psychiatric evidence in rebuttal.33   
Dr. First, a psychiatrist and editor of the DSM-IV, was one of the defence witnesses.   
First told the court that Moussaoui suffered from paranoid and grandiose delusions one 
of which was that he would be freed by President Bush; he testified that: 
Moussaoui’s most persistent grandiose belief, First said, is that President Bush 
will free him from jail, perhaps as part of a prisoner exchange with al Qaeda. 
Moussaoui also believes he could be of value to the United States, First said, 
because his testimony could “clear up September 11 in 15 minutes.”34  
In order to argue that this belief is delusional it is first necessary to establish its falsity;35 
the nature of Moussaoui’s belief rendered this impossible and First argued that the 
belief was so highly improbable as to be false.36  But such probabilistic estimates are a 
highly subjective exercise and manifest little other than the particular and limited 
background of the one who makes these estimates: the estimate made by a WASP 
academic as whether the President of the USA might pardon a Muslim terrorist is likely 
to be radically different to that made by a disaffected young Muslim.37  The point was 
well made by the psychiatrist for the prosecution:  
                                               
32
 USA v Zacarias Moussaoui (2002); Moussaoui was charged with withholding information in relation to 
the September 11th 2001 attacks on the US. 
33
 The clash of psychiatric testimony is relevant to the validity and consistency of psychiatric diagnosis; 
see Chapter 4. 
34
 Hirschkorn, P. (2006) ‘Defense experts call Moussaoui schizophrenic.’ CNN News [online], available: 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/04/19/moussaoui.trial/index.html [accessed: 17 August 2006]. 
35
 See the discussion of delusion in Chapter 3 where it is noted that clinical psychiatrists often replace the 
‘falsity criterion’ by a ‘justifiability criterion’. 
36
 Arthur & Elsibai (2006):  
Dr. Michael First, a psychiatrist at Columbia University, told a federal jury that Moussaoui is 
preoccupied with delusions such as his belief that President Bush will free him. 
''It is so completely implausible on the face of it that it qualifies as a false belief," First said 
yesterday. 
Arthur, B & Elsibai, N. (2006) ‘New defense testimony given on Moussaoui mental state.’ The Boston 
Globe, 20 April [online], available: 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/04/20/new_defense_testimony_given_on_moussaoui_
mental_state/ [accessed: 17 August 2006] 
37
 It might be argued that the DSM-IV requirement that, to be delusional, a belief “ …  is not one 
ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture”, would make this distinction 
unnecessary.  It would have fallen to the prosecution to make the argument that Moussaoui’s belief was 
accepted in his subculture; and whilst it seems this argument was made, it was not substantiated: “Dr. 
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On cross-examination, Patterson refused to concede that Moussaoui’s belief he 
will be freed is irrational, saying it is plausible that Moussaoui could be freed as 
part of a hostage exchange. “I know we traded arms for hostages,” Patterson said, 
referring to the Reagan-era Iran-Contra scandal.38 
The disparity between the beliefs of Muslims in the UK and the wider UK population 
was highlighted by some research39 which suggest that intuitive assessments made by 
an American psychiatrist, of the prevalence of beliefs such as held by Moussaoui – 
being, as he is, a French Muslim of Algerian extraction and thus closer to fellow 
Europeans than to Americans – are singularly unlikely to accord with the actual 
prevalence of such beliefs.   
The conclusion that I wish to draw from the above discussion is that psychiatric 
assessments of the improbability, or of the pervasiveness, of beliefs should be treated 
with considerable scepticism unless they can be shown to be grounded in reliable 
statistical data. 
F-3: Base Rate errors in general medical diagnosis 
Before discussing base rate errors it is crucially important that the following two 
statements be distinguished:  
- the probability that A is true, given that B is the case;40 and   
- the probability that B is true, given that A is the case.41 
For example, the probability that a man, who was born in Ireland (B), speaks English 
(A) is radically different from the probability that a man who speaks English (A), was 
born in Ireland (B).42  
__________ 
The main source of errors occurring in medical and psychiatric probability 
assessments43 is occasioned by the ignoring of relevant base rates.44  In the present 
                                                                                                                                          
Patterson does not elucidate in his report how he determined other persons of Mr. Moussaoui’s 
subculture would act or believe as Mr. Moussaoui does in Mr. Moussaoui’s situation.” 
[See USA v Zacarias Moussaoui, Reply To Government’s Position On Competency]. 
38
 Barakat, M. (2006). ‘Testimony Concludes in Moussaoui Trial’. The Washington Post. 21 April.   
39
 A survey of the attitudes of Muslims living in Britain found, for example, that: 
- half of Muslims aged 18-24 (51%) feel that 9/11 was a conspiracy, this proportion drops to 43% 
amongst those aged 25-44 and 45+  
- to the question “Do you believe that Diana was killed to stop her marrying a Muslim?” More 
responded ‘Yes’ (36%) than responded ‘No’ (31%). 
Channel 4 (2006). 
40
 P(A | B). 
41
 P(B | A). 
42
 The error committed by Fulford (2006) supra and others lies in not distinguishing between the 
probability that a jealous man is dangerous (e.g. might commit murder) and the radically different 
problem of calculating the probability that a murderer exhibits jealousy.  See infra and Chapters 3 and 6. 
43
 With the possible exception of those based on intuition. 
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context the error is best described by means of an example drawn from clinical 
medicine: Eddy’s (1982) classic study of the misinterpretation of probability 
assessments in relation to mammography.45  
The problem posed by Eddy (1982) was: 
The prevalence of breast cancer in a specified population is 1%.  The probability 
that the result of mammography is positive if a woman has breast cancer is 79% 
and 9.6% if she does not.  What is the probability that a woman with a positive 
result actually has breast cancer? 
Eddy reports that, of 100 clinicians, 95 estimated the probability to be c.75%.  The 
correct probability is c. 8% – a tenfold error.46  
The solution is most easily understood by translating the probabilities into a ‘frequency 
analysis’ based on a hypothetical population of 1,000.   
- “the prevalence of breast cancer in a specified population is 1%” implies that 10 
have cancer and 990 do not. 
- “probability that the result of mammography is positive if a woman has breast 
cancer is 79%” implies that of the 10 that have cancer, 8 (0.79 x 10 rounded to the 
nearest unit) will test positive and, hence, 2 negative. 
- “probability that the result of mammography is positive if a woman does not have 
breast cancer is 9.6%” implies that of the 990 that do not have cancer, 95 (0.96 x 
990 rounded to the nearest unit) will test positive and, hence, 895 negative. 
The above data can be portrayed in tabular form: 
 (A): Women with cancer (B): Women with no cancer Total 
(I): Women with positive test 8 95 103 
(II): Women with negative test 2 895 897 
Total  10 990 1000 
Table F-1: Presence of cancer compared to mammography results.  
 
Based on an examination of the tabular data, a positive test [Row (I)] implies that the 
subject has an 8 in 103 chance of actually having cancer; in contrast, if the woman 
actually has cancer [Column (A)], then she has an 8 out of 10 chance of testing positive.  
Eddy cites many medical textbooks and journals which confuse these probabilities; 
Sutherland cites47 a US study which found that 95% of doctors also confuse these 
figures.  Ayton (1995) reports that most of the staff at Harvard Medical School give 
incorrect answers when presented with the problem; a study by Hoffrage & Gigerenzer 
(1998) found that only 10% of a group of German physicians were able to determine the 
                                                                                                                                          
44
 The ‘base rate’ being the rate of occurrence in the main population, of the phenomenon under 
examination. 
45
 The use of X-rays to detect breast cancer. 
46
 Ayton (1995) reports preventive mastectomies being performed on the basis of such errors. 
47
 Sutherland (1992), p.173.  
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positive predictive value of four diagnostic tests when given the appropriate 
probabilistic information.  
The ‘Prosecutor’s Fallacy’ (mentioned by the Royal Statistical Society statement on the 
Clark case) is also attributable to a base-rate error.48 
F-4: Base Rate errors in psychiatry 
Some theoretical aspects of these errors are first discussed [F-4(i)]; the magnitude of 
some of the errors involved are then examined [F-4(ii)] and, lastly, the contention that 
the inability to apply base rate analysis can be diagnostic of psychiatric illness, is 
discussed. [F-4(iii)] 
F-4(i): Theoretical aspects  
Base rate errors are both prevalent and generally unacknowledged in academic 
discussions of psychiatric risk assessment (i.e. assessments of dangerousness, or 
propensity to commit acts of violence); such assessments will be discussed in Chapter 6 
and (from a more theoretical perspective) in this section.  
In assessing the ability of tests to predict future violence, one is faced with the problem 
‘given a positive test, what is the probability that the subject will behave violently?’  
Quite a different problem is involved when one gives the test to  
those who have behaved violently, and determines the proportion who have a positive 
test (given that a subject behaved violently, what is the probability that he has a positive 
test).  Ignoring the distinction between these two problems constitutes the base rate 
error.49 
As an example from academic psychiatry, consider a research paper50 entitled ‘Forensic 
importance of jealousy’ where the authors examined 200 cases of individuals who had 
been convicted of murder in which jealousy played a role and attempted to draw 
conclusions “which will help in everyday work in forensic psychiatry in the field of 
                                               
48
 Assume that a sample of DNA found at the scene of the crime matches that of the accused; assume also 
that (given the accused is innocent) there is a 1-in-a-million chance of a match.  The fallacy arises when a 
prosecutor argues that this means that there is only a 1-in-a-million chance the accused is innocent.  In 
fact if the total population consists of 10 million then there are 10 possible matches in the whole country 
and thus - in the absence of other evidence – there is a 90% chance the accused is innocent.  This error is 
essentially the same as that made by the physicians in relation to their misinterpretation of mammography 
results: 
The physicians confused ‘the probability of cancer (given a positive test)’ with ‘the probability of a 
positive test (given cancer)’; 
The prosecutor confuses ‘the probability of guilt (given a positive test)’ with ‘the probability of a positive 
test (given guilt)’.  
49
 More accurately, the error is due to a confusion of two conditional probabilities P(A | B) and P(B | A). 
50
 Muzinić (2003).   
 406 
 
 
expertise and in the field of forensic psychiatric treatment”.51  The authors do not advert 
to base rates nor to Bayesian analysis and fail to differentiate between ‘the probability 
that an individual who is jealous will commit murder’ (the question which is of crucial 
significance to the clinician who wishes to assess dangerousness) and ‘the probability 
that an individual who has committed murder, was jealous’.   
Ignoring such distinctions could have extremely serious consequences for the liberty of 
many individuals especially in that some eminent academic psychiatrists [e.g. Maden 
infra] display an almost contemptuous disdain for the subtlety of reasoning required 
when these issues are being discussed [e.g. Szmukler infra]. 
Maden, who is Professor of Forensic Psychiatry at Imperial College, London, has noted 
that “Doctors have little experience of working explicitly with probability and they are 
not very good at it.” 52  McManus, who is Professor of Psychology and Medical 
Education at University College, London, expresses feelings similar to Maden’s: 
It’s not easy. I’m a doctor, I teach multivariate statistics, I set questions such as 
this for postgraduate exams; but even though I can work it out, I still have no 
intuitive sense of what the correct answer is. I’m not the only one. Gigerenzer 
gave questions such as this to experienced clinicians who deal with these matters 
all the time and they had no idea either.  He could see the sweat on their brows as 
they tried to beat these few simple numbers into shape and knew that they were 
failing.  Eventually, most of the doctors told him that there was about a 90 per 
cent probability that a woman with a positive mammogram had breast cancer.  
That answer is very wrong. The correct answer is actually about 10 per cent.53  
There, however, the similarity ends.  Whilst McManus (and Gigerenzer) are deeply 
conscious of the importance of a correct understanding of probability to medical 
decision making, they make serious and sustained efforts to correct the 
misunderstanding of fellow medical practitioners; in contrast, the response by some 
eminent psychiatrists to closely argued, understated criticism of psychiatric 
misunderstanding of probability, is to attack the messenger rather than heed the 
message; Maden (2001), for example, chides Szmukler for pointing out the 
misunderstanding of probability inherent in Dolan & Doyle’s (2000) analysis.  Maden 
(2001) begins: 
I was disappointed by Szmukler’s (2001) negative response to Dolan & Doyle’s 
(2000) excellent review of attempts to measure the risk of violence in psychiatric 
patients.  His pessimism about the practical application of structured risk 
assessment results from a misunderstanding of the way in which these instruments 
may be used.  First, he emphasises the low baseline. Of course, we do not know 
                                               
51
 Ibid.  
52
 Maden (2003a). 
53
 McManus (2002).  
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the baseline, as the information has never been collected accurately in this 
country.  
And concludes: 
Psychiatry must not persist in assuming that violence, an uncommon complication 
of mental disorder, is unimportant because of its rarity. Reforming the Mental 
Health Act (Department of Health, 2001) illustrates that concern about violence 
dominates the thinking of politicians in this area. It is unlikely that they are going 
to lose votes by overstating the level of risk associated with psychiatric patients, 
so the profession is going to have to come up with something better than bland 
reassurance.  
Maden’s response, in that it appears to be more mindful of the concerns of politicians 
than of fellow academics and, coming as it does from one who occupies a prestigious 
teaching post and is thus in a position to influence the education of psychiatrists, bodes 
ill for the practice of psychiatry as an intellectually rigorous – let alone ‘scientific’ – 
discipline. 
Seeking to determine whether Maden’s eschewal of rigor in relation to the use of 
probability is unusual, I consulted two textbooks on the philosophy of psychiatry;54 the 
indices of neither made reference to any probabilistic considerations.  Whilst it is 
understandable that such texts would not include a thorough discussion of probability 
(this being, rightly, the province of texts on Statistics), it might have been expected – 
because the use of probability assessments in psychiatric practice, is so common and the 
fact that their misuse can have such serious consequences – that some of the pitfalls 
associated with the making of such assessments, would be discussed.  
Jaspers held that delusion is the “basic characteristic of madness”55 and assessments of 
probability are intrinsic to the definition of delusion.56 Hence it is necessary that the 
prevalence of beliefs – of a type which commonly feature in psychiatric diagnosis – be 
rigorously established.  As has been shown in Chapter 3, the survey results which 
showed a high prevalence, within the normal population, of paranoid beliefs and of 
‘hearing voices’, came as a complete surprise to psychiatrists practising in these areas; 
yet such accurate estimates are the sine qua non of probabilistic assessments.  In their 
absence, common sense ‘hunches’ rather than science becomes the basis for diagnosis.  
This also appears to be the standard in relation to assessments of dangerousness: 
In clinical practice, assessments of the risk of dangerousness or violence in an 
individual are usually based solely on clinical judgment.  The unstructured clinical 
                                               
54
 Radden (2004); Fulford (2006). 
55
 Jaspers (1997), p.93. 
56
 See, for example, Sedler (1995) supra.  
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judgment approach to risk assessment has been criticised on a number of grounds, 
including low interrater reliability, low validity, …57 
In that a psychiatric diagnosis and incorrect assessment of dangerousness may lead to 
the loss of liberty, ‘common sense’ – irrespective of the guise under which it shelters – 
is surely an inappropriate standard.   
F-4(ii): Magnitude of the errors involved  
Dolan & Doyle’s (2000) article had as its aims “To review the current status of violence 
risk prediction research”; in analysing this article, Szmukler (2001a) commented:  
… they present only one half of the story.  How well do the best instruments 
perform in the real clinical world where prediction leads to action, including 
restrictions on the liberty of patients regarded as dangerous?  False positives are 
very serious from an ethical (including resource allocation) point of view.  Here 
we encounter the ‘base rate’ problem that the authors inexplicably fail to mention.  
The rate at which violent acts occur in the population of interest is critical to the 
predictive abilities of any instrument.  
Szmukler – who is Dean of the Institute of Psychiatry at King’s College , London – is 
being unduly kind; as will be seen from the following tables, Dolan & Doyle’s (2000) 
analysis is akin to describing an iceberg simply in terms of its tip whilst completely 
ignoring the much larger, but hidden, problem underneath. 
Szmukler examines the problem in terms of three possible base rates (i.e. the rates at 
which violence occurs in the general population): 20%, 6% and 1% concerning which 
he says: 
Perhaps a base rate of 20% is appropriate to some forensic populations.  In a 
community mental health service, even an inner-city one, the rate of violent acts, 
of any severity, over a 6-month period is more likely to be around 6%. … , the 
prediction will be wrong almost nine times out of ten.  For very serious violence, 
perhaps at a rate of 1%, the test will be wrong about 97 times out of a 100.  For 
homicides, at around 1 in 10,000 per annum committed by patients with a 
psychosis, prediction is meaningless. 
The following tables are constructed from the data given by Szmukler.58 
Base rate 20% (A): Violent (B): Non-violent Total 
(I): Test Positive 140 240 380 
(II): Test Negative 60 560 620 
Total  200 800 1000 
Table F-2: Predicting Violence with a base rate of 20%.  
 
Base rate 6% (A): Violent (B): Non-violent Total 
(I): Test Positive 42 282 324 
(II): Test Negative 18 658 676 
Total  60 940 1000 
Table F-3: Predicting Violence with a base rate of 6%. 
 
                                               
57
 Dolan & Doyle (2000), p.304. 
58
 To facilitate comparison, the tables are in the same format as Table F-1 (supra). 
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Base rate 1% (A): Violent (B): Non-violent Total 
(I): Test Positive 7 297 304 
(II): Test Negative 3 693 696 
Total  10 990 1000 
Table F-4: Predicting Violence with a base rate of 1%. 
 
Dolan & Doyle’s (2000) contention was that the tests were “better than chance” at 
picking out the violent from the total group of violent (i.e. their analysis focuses on 
column ‘A’ in each table).  Szmukler’s analysis examines row ‘I’ of each table and 
seeks to pick out the ‘innocent’ from all those who tested positive; the respective rates 
are 63% (240/280), 87% (282/324) and 98% (297/304); this last figure, for example, 
means that at a base rate of 1% [i.e. in the general population, 1 in every 100 is violent] 
whereas Dolan & Doyle believed that they were correctly identifying 7 out of every 10 
violent individuals; they were actually correctly choosing 7 violent out of 304 as and 
wrongly identifying 297 ‘non-violent’, as ‘violent’. 
Dolan & Doyle have not responded to Szmukler’s criticism, and his analysis, though 
commented on, has not been challenged; indeed an editorial59 in Psychiatric Bulletin 
written by Maden in response to criticisms such as Szmukler’s, is dismissive and 
disingenuously asks “Why all the fuss?”: 
I have been surprised by the strength of feeling expressed by some opponents of 
standardised risk assessment.  On the face of it, such opposition is a bizarre 
response to what amounts to nothing more than a special investigation.  It is hard 
to imagine taking to the barricades in opposition to the Beck Depression 
Inventory, liver function tests or neuroimaging … The best analogy is with 
intelligence quotient (IQ) testing.  It is moderately useful to know that one’s 
patient is a bit slow in copying a geometric design, but the true power of IQ tests 
lies in ranking his or her performance alongside that of his or her peers.  The same 
is true of risk.  
… The terminology of signal detection theory has been misused to argue that a 
10% risk involves detaining nine false positives for every true one, resulting in the 
test having no value.  But these instruments do not claim to identify offenders in 
advance, only to make statements of probability.  
In that the tests have clearly high prejudicial value and little probative value the 
question surely is “Why use them?” unless the goal of the exercise is to hide prejudice 
under the mask of a spurious scientific respectability.  
Whilst Maden might hold a certain scepticism towards IQ tests and tests of 
dangerousness, it is by no means clear that others who might have access to the results 
of such tests, will do so.  Maden seems to show scant regard for the consequences of 
wrongfully labelling an individual as ‘dangerous’.  One wonders whether he would be 
equally sanguine if, say, some mandatory test was introduced for some rare but serious 
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 Maden (2003a).   
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infectious disease: a test which might be hailed as picking up most of those who 
actually had the infectious disease but which (unfortunately) labelled over 90% of those 
tested as being infectious, when they were not.   
Maden’s argument also displays a certain artfulness:  
Psychiatry has a bad record of detaining patients in excessive security.  All those 
patients who are held inappropriately in high-security were put there by doctors 
exercising unfettered clinical judgement.  Such patients deserve a proper, 
standardised assessment of risk. … Similarly, forensic psychiatry has to take 
seriously the statistical over-representation of patients from ethnic minorities in all 
locked settings and the over-representation of women in high-security.  Most of 
these patients were locked up by White male doctors and any objective evidence 
of risk should therefore be welcomed.  
One can only urge that Maden take his own admonition [“Such patients deserve a 
proper, standardised assessment of risk”] more seriously.  Replacing a patently 
defective system of risk assessment with one which – unjustifiably – dons the cloak of 
scientific rigour, can hardly be termed an advance.   
I wish to draw the following conclusion from the above discussion: 
In that some eminent academic psychiatrists in discussing psychiatric risk 
assessment, appear to be unaware of the necessity to incorporate base rate 
calculations into their analysis and consequently are either unaware of, or 
dismissive of, the high possibility of many standard techniques of risk assessment 
generating false positives, their assessment of the level of dangerousness posed by 
any individual subject should not be assumed to be reliable.  
F-4(iii): Use as a diagnostic tool 
In view of the seemingly widespread inability of medical and psychiatric professionals 
to correctly interpret estimates of probability or to apply Bayesian analysis, it is ironic 
to see the inability to apply probabilistic reasoning and ‘deviations from optimal 
Bayesian inference’ being canvassed as possible diagnostic criteria for mental illness:           
- Hemsley & Garety (1986) argue that their proposal “… makes it possible to 
classify delusional beliefs in terms of deviations from optimal Bayesian inference” . 
- Moritz (2006) reported that their research “… provide further evidence for the 
claim that schizophrenia patients make strong judgments based on little 
information.”  
- Davies & Coltheart (2000) summarise some recent research:   
It is no part of Bentall’s position that deluded subjects suffer from a gross and 
pervasive deficit in logical reasoning.  But, he does draw attention to a body of 
experimental work that indicates that deluded patients perform differently, 
from normal subjects on probabilistic reasoning tasks.  The basic finding from 
this research is that deluded subjects seek less information than normal 
controls do before reaching a judgement.  In short, deluded subjects show a 
tendency to jump to conclusions.  
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… On the other hand, it may seem that this bias in probabilistic reasoning 
cannot be enough, by itself, to explain delusional beliefs.  The performance 
deluded subjects is, on average closer to the Bayesian norms than the 
performance of normal subjects, who tend to be overly cautious.60   
That deluded subjects perform better than do the (statistically) normal subjects in some 
areas echoes a finding by Mele61 which he calls ‘depressive realism’ and which is to the 
effect that depressed people tend to be significantly more accurate about their positive 
and negative attributes than do the (statistically) normal.  One conclusion that might 
tentatively be drawn from both of these results is that (statistical) normalcy and 
pathology are not complementary concepts and that (statistical) normalcy should be 
clearly distinguished from normalcy (understood as an ideal).  
 
                                               
60
 Davies & Coltheart (2000) p.13.  
61
 Mele (2004).   
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Appendix G: The Juklerød case  
In the early 1970s, Arnold Juklerød was compulsorily detained in a Norwegian 
psychiatric hospital and forcibly medicated.  His case became a cause célèbre and was 
the subject of intense media interest for the nearly thirty years for which it lay 
unresolved.   
The case is exceptionally well documented: it has been discussed in the Norwegian 
parliament (where the central facts of the case were set forth) and in academic journals.1  
It has also been the focus of art exhibitions and films in which the psychiatrists have 
detailed the facts upon which they based their clinical decisions.   
A factual outline is given in Subsection G-1.   Juklerød’s diagnosis and committal is 
examined in Subsection G-2.  The diagnostic category ‘paranoia querulans’ is 
discussed in Subsection G-3.  Some observations are made in Subsection G-4.   
G-1: The Juklerød case: The factual background 
[The following account is drawn from a statements made in the Norwegian parliament,2 
transcripts of contemporaneous interviews with various lawyers, academics and 
psychiatrists, as shown in the Sandøy films3 and a newspaper editorial.4]  
In 1968, as part of a wider programme of school amalgamation, the Norwegian 
Department of Education decided to close a school at Holtane5 – a school to which a 
local man, Arnold Juklerød, had intended to send his daughter.  Juklerød was elected by 
the local community to head their campaign against the decision.  He maintained that 
the school closure was in breach of the law.   
Following a family dispute6 he was referred to Gaustad mental hospital7 for 
examination where it was his manner of conducting the school protest – rather than any 
family dispute – that attracted psychiatric attention.  He was forcibly committed, 
medicated, and diagnosed as suffering from ‘kverulantparanoia’.8   
                                               
1
 I have not been able to find any references to the case in the psychiatric literature. 
2
 Stortinget (1995). 
3
 Sandøy (1997), Sandøy (2001), both films have English subtitles. 
4
 Dag og Tid (1996). ‘Redaksjonelt: Juklerød og Stortinget’, Dag og Tid. 30 May. [online], available: 
http://www.dagogtid.no/arkiv/1996/22/leiar.html [accessed: 11 July 2007 ].  Translated by Mette Roche.  
5
 A small costal town 150 km. south of Oslo. 
6
 Of no subsequent relevance. 
7
 Now part of Oslo University Hospital. 
8
 I.e. paranoia querulans also known as ‘Litigious Delusions’ or ‘Litigious Paranoia’.  See Munro 
(1999), p.130.  
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As described in the parliamentary submission: 
This ‘kverulantparanoia’ consisted in Juklerød having delusions, which he would 
not be dissuaded from, regarding the formal breach of the law he argued … 
authorities had committed by closing Holtrane school.9 
Juklerød was released after three months but continued to dispute his diagnosis and, to 
that end, maintained a protest outside the hospital which resulted in his re-committal for 
a further 11 years, during which time he was periodically held in isolation.10   
In a petition to Norwegian parliament, his predicament was identified: “If a person 
protests against this diagnosis it strengthens it.  But if he doesn’t protest, he accepts 
that he is ill.”11  He was discharged in 198512 but renewed his protest and refused to 
leave the hospital.  On being evicted he took up ‘residence’ first in an alcove outside the 
hospital, and later in a tent where he stayed for most of the next ten years.13  
Three months before his death14 the Department of Education wrote to him 
acknowledging that their school closure policy had lacked proper legal authority.  
Juklerød decided to continue his protest until the psychiatrists revoked their diagnosis 
but they refused to comment on the government apology.15 
G-2: Juklerød’s diagnosis  
Juklerød’s diagnosis is examined from the perspective of his psychiatrists [G-2(i)]; 
external reviews [G-2(ii)] and some non-psychiatric academics [G-2(iii)]. 
G-2(i): Juklerød’s diagnosis: his psychiatrists  
Three of Juklerød’s psychiatrists were interviewed:16 Nils Retterstøl,17 Bård Brekke18 
and Ådel Grimsgaard.   
Juklerød had described his diagnosis as being a stain on his character; Retterstøl 
addressed himself to this issue: 
We hold that getting mentally ill is not shameful.  It can happen to the best, when 
problems come up that can’t be managed.  That is not shameful.  Nor is it a shame 
                                               
9
 Stortinget (1995).  Translated by Mette Roche.  
10
 One such period lasted 393 days. 
11
 Sandøy (2001). 
Cf. a convict who protests his innocence and, on being offered parole on condition that he acknowledges 
his guilt, refuses to withdraw his protest. 
12
 Stortinget (1995): “… following an ‘ad-hoc meeting’ of lawyers … only two months after he, according 
to the medical records, was characterised as “strongly in need of treatment”.”  
13
 In winter temperatures as low as -13o C. 
14
 In 1996, aged 71. 
15
 Sandøy (2001). 
16
 All quotations in this subsection were transcribed from Sandøy (2001). 
17
 Director of Gaustad Hospital. 
18
 Chief Psychiatrist at Gaustad Hospital. 
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to have gone through it.  This case gives the impression that this person has been 
stained.  A stain on his reputation.  This attitude is completely strange to us. 
On being asked as to the nature of Juklerød’s illness, Brekke stated: 
He got a very detailed answer in court.  It centres on his ideas relating to the 
school case.  He thought that a number of ministers and civil servants conspired 
against him.  They were trying to get rid of him to avoid publicity which would 
lead to impeachment and a colossal scandal.  This was his basic delusion. 
Retterstøl was more specific: 
Well his diagnosis is “paranoid psychosis”, a mental disease with delusions of a 
type called “paranoia querulans”.  A querulous and delusional disorder. 
… No doubt about it, he had a cause which we can agree with.  But what is 
important is lack of adaption.  Everyone experiences injustice.  Everyone is at 
times unreasonably and unjustly treated.  Then we get sad and feel down, but life 
goes on. 
To the interviewer’s comment that Juklerød: “… seems so sound and in good health 
when talking but is very critical about the psychiatric establishment.”  Retterstøl 
replied: “Not just that. … His aggression is directed against the superior authorities.  
Psychiatry is just a part of it.” 
Asked as to why they would not revoke their diagnosis, Retterstøl commented: 
No, then we would have to write a false declaration.  That’s like asking doctors at 
a cancer hospital to certify that the patient has never had cancer.  That would be 
false.19 
G-2(ii): Juklerød’s diagnosis: external reviews 
Juklerød had attempted to mount a legal challenge but, in the words of his lawyer:   
… the judges put too much trust in the psychiatrists.  When they declared Arnold 
had delusions the judges assumed that he had.  Had the Ministry issued its 
admission prior to the trials the court’s judgement would probably have been 
different.  This shows that psychiatrists have too much power.20 
Subsequent to his being evicted from hospital, the courts had requested a further 
assessment:   
This report concluded that at the time of committal in 1971 and 1974 “it was not 
possible to confirm the basic symptoms of serious mental illness”.  The Medical-
Judicial Council, chaired by Gaustad’s Chief Consultant Nils Retterstøl dissented 
from this report.  A new commission was appointed.  It included two of the three 
                                               
19
 A theme upon which Grimsgaard elaborated [Sandøy (1997)]:  
As has been said several times there is no doubt about the diagnosis.  It is quite typical.  To use a 
comparison easier to understand you may compare it with a patient ill with cancer.  A person with 
an advanced stomach cancer is being operated.  He stipulates that he won’t leave the hospital until 
he gets a declaration that he never had cancer.  It’s obvious that the doctors can’t give him that.  
To us it is just as evident.  We cannot give Juklerød a declaration about not having the diagnosis 
he has got. 
20
 Sandøy (2001). 
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psychiatrists from the first commission.  The new report concluded .. that Arnold 
Juklerød suffered from a ‘symptom-free mental illness’.21  
After Juklerød’s death, a member of parliament proposed an official investigation, 
however:  
 … the Judicial Committee concluded that“… even though the Juklerød case was 
special, the Committee is of the opinion that it would not be natural to suggest an 
extraordinary procedure such as the appointment of an investigative commission 
would be.”22   
 
G-2(iii): Juklerød’s diagnosis: academic critiques 
Per Fugelli (Professor of Social Medicine at the University of Oslo):  
Medicine is like an isolation ward in our democracy.  It’s practised behind closed 
doors. … The doctors can also hide behind professional secrecy.  There are weak 
traditions of democracy for the patients.  Their influence is small.  The medical 
doctor is the absolute expert. … You may ask a medical doctor to make a 
diagnosis concerning a liver disease identified by a blood test.  Concerning mental 
diagnosis, however, the boundaries towards social rebellion and political 
deviation become a grey zone … 23 
Georg Høyer (Professor of Social Medicine at the University of Tromsø):  
A forcible commitment is a major encroachment in a person’s life. … In Norway 
psychiatry confines more people than any other institution.  The intentions of the 
psychiatrists might be good; the argument again is that they act for the patient’s 
benefit, that they know better than the patients what are good for them.  The 
problem is that there is no evidence supporting this.24   
G-3: The psychiatric diagnosis ‘Paranoia Querulans’.  
Though ‘Paranoia Querulans’ is not explicitly mentioned in the DSM-IV-TR (2000), it 
is listed in the ICD-10 (2006) although its diagnostic criteria are rudimentary.25  
Sullivan (1956) gives a case history: 
He was litigious and he had, by means of lawsuits, made it extremely awkward for 
number of people, including at least one very high government official.  Counsel 
for the people against whom he had brought actions were not at all inclined to 
minimize the skill with which he could build up very impressive claims on the 
basis of what a psychiatrist could regard only as paranoid formulations, but which 
a jury might easily regard as an instance of an extraordinarily capable person’s 
                                               
21
 Stortinget (1995). 
22
 Editorial in Dag og Tid (1996); it continued: 
And their reasoning is probably even more astonishing: “The committee points to [the fact] that 
there exists a large number of people in Norway who feel they have been badly treated by official 
bodies and it would be unsafe if the Parliament was to establish a practice whereby some of these 
cases would be followed up in the form of investigating commissions.” 
23
 Sandøy (1997). 
24
 Sandøy (2001). 
25
 WHO (2006) p.97; F22.8 ‘Other persistent delusional disorders’; it states:  
… The delusions are highly variable in content.  Often they are persecutory, hypochondriacal, or 
grandiose, but they may be concerned with litigation or jealousy, or express a conviction that the 
individual's body is misshapen, or that others think that he or she smells or is homosexual. … 
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seeing how he was being gypped by corporations, government officials, and 
various people.26   
Munro (1999) describes the typical case: 
What we are discussing here are people who have a profound and persistent sense 
of having been wronged and who ceaselessly and endlessly seek redress, … 
Doubtless some of these individuals have suffered real grievances and have a 
strong sense of injustice which they are entitled to express, but it is inescapable 
that there are elements of psychiatric illness in at least a proportion of them … 
Many patients with delusional disorder exhibit a peevish, complaintive quality but 
in querulous paranoia this is their most prominent feature, … 27  
He cites a classification made by Goldstein (1987) [“who has had much forensic 
psychiatric experience”]: 
- ‘the hypercompetent defendant’ (who knows the absolute letter of the law 
but nothing of the spirit);  
- the ‘paranoid party in a divorce proceedings’, who is often consumed … a 
sense of having been wronged …; and  
- ‘the paranoid complaining witness’ who incessantly pursues grievances. 
In each case, it may take a ling time to recognise that such individuals are ill, 
unless an experienced psychiatrist becomes involved.28 
__________ 
It is abundantly clear from the above descriptions that the diagnosis ‘paranoia 
querulans’ is so ill defined as to be open to abuse.29  
G-4: The Juklerød Case: Some observations. 
I wish to comment on the Juklerød case under the following headings: diagnosis [G-
4(i)]; misdiagnosis [G-4(ii)]; stigma [G-4(iii)]; the experience of psychotropic 
medication [G-IV(iv)] and, lastly, the choice of default presumptions concerning 
coercive psychiatric intervention [G-4(v)]. 
G-4(i): Juklerød’s diagnosis 
To establish that Juklerød was delusional30 it is necessary for the psychiatrists to 
establish , inter alia, the falsity31 of Juklerød’s belief that the school closure policy was 
not sanctioned by law and that those in authority wished, for whatever reason, to 
conceal this fact.   
                                               
26
 Sullivan (1956), p.306. 
27
 Munro (1999), p.132. 
28
 Ibid. p.133.  
29
 A conclusion with which Munro (1999) agrees:  
There is also a realistic concern that over-ready willingness to diagnose paranoia in an excessively 
litigious person might lead to abuse of psychiatry, such as occurred in Russia in the past. (p.135). 
30
 As claimed by psychiatrist Brekke (supra). 
31
 DSM-IV-TR (2000); alternatively - if the ‘falsity criterion’ be replaced by the ‘justifiability criterion’ - 
to establish that Juklerød could not justify his belief.  [See Chapter 3]. 
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A disinterested observer might well ask as to what conceivable information might have 
been in the possession of the psychiatrists that would have been of such overwhelming 
force as to dispel any doubt that the schools were being closed contrary to law .  Such 
behaviour is not unknown and – even in a democracy such as Norway – a belief that it 
might occur could hardly be judged, on prima facie grounds, to be manifestly false 
especially as the psychiatrists had no particular expertise in assessing the validity of 
legal claims.  Indeed, as subsequent events demonstrated,32 the belief was true.   
However it seems that the acknowledgement of the truth of the claim of one diagnosed 
as having ‘paranoia querulans’ does not dispose of the matter33 in that the wrong at the 
heart of the litigious paranoiac complaint need not be imaginary but may well be valid.  
This suggests that Juklerød’s diagnosis rested not so much on his belief but on the 
manner of asserting his belief;34 not so much in a blind refusal to accept objective 
information but in a refusal to accept superior authority.35   
__________ 
The suggestion that Juklerød suffered from a “symptom-free psychiatric illness” raises 
considerable theoretical problems.  Whereas it may be meaningful to speak of a 
‘symptom-free physical illness’ (i.e. an illness such as cancer that, as yet, presents no 
symptoms perceivable to the subject) such an illness does present symptoms observable 
to the specialist (i.e. physical markers exist which are detectable by objective physical 
tests), to speak of ‘symptom-free psychiatric illness’ is something of an oxymoron36 in 
that a psychiatric illness is defined only in terms of symptoms.37  
The concept of ‘symptom-free psychiatric illness’ enables psychiatric diagnosis to 
become a self-authenticating procedure which clearly invalidates any possible claim to 
scientific status – how could one conceivably set about falsifying such a diagnosis?38  In 
Juklerød’s case the term was used in the context of an external review and appears 
designed – much as the ‘Emperor’s New Clothes’ – to hide that which is clear to a 
disinterested observer.  
                                               
32
 The subsequent apology from the Department of Education (supra). 
33
 Munro (1999) (supra): “Doubtless some of these individuals have suffered real grievances and have a 
strong sense of injustice which they are entitled to express …” 
34
 See Retterstøl (supra): “His aggression is directed against the superior authorities.  Psychiatry is just a 
part of it.” 
35
 See Per Fugelli (supra).  
36
 Though a ‘symptom-free’ psychiatric illness might be classified as a psychiatric illness ‘in remission’; 
this solution however, is only apparent in that it only pushes the problem one level back: i.e. the problem 
then becomes how to distinguish between a ‘psychiatric illness in remission’; a psychiatric illness which 
has been cured and a psychiatric misdiagnosis. 
37
 See infra. 
38
 See the discussion in Chapter 3 on the ‘fallacy of the missing hippopotamus’ [Drury (1996)]. 
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G-4(ii): Juklerød’s diagnosis – was it a misdiagnosis?  
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Juklerød’s original diagnosis was a 
misdiagnosis, then it would seem that Juklerød’s conduct of his campaign to establish 
this fact (as manifested in its extreme tenaciousness) provided grounds39 for a further 
and independent diagnosis of paranoia querulans.  This is an unsettling conclusion and 
suggests that the important question is not as might at first sight appear, ‘Was Juklerød 
misdiagnosed?’ but rather ‘How would one adjudge that Juklerød was misdiagnosed?’ 
The unwillingness of Juklerød’s psychiatrists to accept even the possibility of 
misdiagnosis is striking; the comparison of Juklerød’s diagnosis to that of a person with 
an advanced stomach cancer,40 seeks to shelter the act of making a psychiatric diagnosis 
under the skirts of science; in that psychiatrists (unlike oncologists) have no access to 
definitive biological or other scientific tests41 to validate their diagnostic findings – and 
a fortiori none to definitively diagnose paranoia querulans – the suggested comparison 
is fatuous.  
Aside from the absence of definitive tests, the comparison is also misplaced because the 
factual circumstances which exist at the time of a psychiatric diagnosis cannot be frozen 
in time (unlike those which gave rise to a diagnosis of cancer where biopsy samples and 
X-rays may be preserved) and hence they cannot be revisited for the purposes of 
independent review.  Except in the most unusual circumstances (as happened in the 
Manweiler case42) contemporaneous case notes which unequivocally imply that the 
original diagnosis was erroneous are unlikely to exist.  Thus if psychiatrists treating an 
individual subject come to a consensual diagnosis at any particular moment in time, a 
subsequent challenge to the validly of that diagnosis is, for all practical purposes, 
impossible.  A subsequent psychiatric review of the diagnosis can, at most, determine 
that at the time of the review, the subject does not manifest any symptoms of mental 
illness; this is what occurred in Juklerød’s case.   
                                               
39
 See, for example, Retterstøl (supra):   
No doubt about it, he had a cause which we can agree with.  But what is important is lack of 
adaption.  Everyone experiences injustice.  Everyone is at times unreasonably and unjustly treated.  
Then we get sad and feel down, but life goes on. 
40
 Supra. 
41
 As stated in an editorial in the American Journal of Psychiatry [First & Zimmerman (2006) (supra)]:  
Despite widespread acceptance that most psychiatric disorders are "diseases of the brain", the field 
of psychiatry has thus far failed to identify a single neurobiological marker that is diagnostic of a 
mental disorder.  
42
 See Appendix H. 
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The topic of psychiatric misdiagnosis is discussed in Chapter 4 where some ambiguities 
in the term ‘psychiatric misdiagnosis’ are identified and some distinctions introduced.  
In the present context, the most important of these,  involves distinguishing between: 
- ‘radical misdiagnosis’:  the misdiagnosis of (psychiatric) pathology sufficient to 
warrant a coercive intervention, and  
- ‘technical misdiagnosis’: the misdiagnosis of a specific psychiatric illness [i.e. 
misdiagnosing depression rather than bipolar disorder.] 
The specification of the criteria appropriate to the definition of any particular 
psychiatric diagnostic category are matters that rightly fall to be decided by the 
psychiatric profession; it is they, for example, who decide that for a condition to be 
described as ‘schizophrenia’, certain criteria must be satisfied within a one month 
period rather than, say, a three month period,43 but this is only part of the story: the 
informed public – whilst they may not be competent to adjudge on the specific 
diagnosis – is the rightful judge of whether the behaviour and beliefs manifested by a 
subject are so extreme as to warrant a coercive psychiatric intervention.  I am 
suggesting that whilst the psychiatric profession is the rightful judge of technical 
misdiagnosis, the informed public – and not psychiatrists either individually or 
collectively – are the ultimate judges of whether an individual has been the subject of a 
radical psychiatric misdiagnosis.44   
Lest such a proposal appears extreme, it should be remembered that the power that 
psychiatrists have to initiate a compulsory detention, is not theirs as of right but is given 
to them by the legislature in the name of the general citizenship and it is they who 
should be the final arbiters as to whether the power has been exercised appropriately.  It 
was, after all the power of an informed public that ensured that many of the diagnostic 
categories of past eras – homosexuality being one such45 – that had been used by 
psychiatrists to define mental illness should no longer be regarded as valid; it was the 
power of public opinion (in the face of psychiatric assurances to the contrary)46 that 
ensured the abuse of psychiatry that occurred in the Soviet Union was finally 
acknowledged. 
                                               
43
 See DSM-IV-TR (2000), p.312. 
44
 Contra see Sullivan (1956) supra. 
45
 Time (1974).  
46
 The international psychiatric community had not only been reluctant to criticize their Soviet colleagues 
but, prior to being pressured to change their view, had been openly admiring of the practice of psychiatry 
in the USSR [See Chapter 4]. 
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In relation to the Juklerød case, this implies that in order to adjudge that Juklerød was 
the subject of a radical psychiatric misdiagnosis, it is not necessary to find some 
psychiatric consensus, nor some legal judgement; the court of an informed public 
opinion is sufficient and the weight of informed comment appears to be that Juklerød 
was indeed subjected to a misdiagnosis.  
G-4(iii): Juklerød’s forcible committal, was it a cause of stigma?  
Retterstøl in stating that: “This case gives the impression that this person has been 
stained.  A stain on his reputation.  This attitude is completely strange to us.”47 is 
conflating a number of issues: 
- a moral issue: whether an individual should be blamed (or stigmatised) for 
becoming mentally ill. 
- a personal issue: Retterstøl’s personal belief that an individual should not be so 
blamed or stigmatised. 
- a factual issue: whether, in point of fact, people who have been diagnosed as 
mentally ill are stigmatised.  
Juklerød’s concern was clearly with the third interpretation and it was this that fuelled 
his determination that his diagnosis be recognised as a misdiagnosis.  The existence of 
such stigma is not the subject of contention48 within academic psychiatry but is taken as 
a given and the focus is on how to minimise such stigma.  Retterstøl was the Director of 
Norway’s most prestigious mental hospital, he was widely published and the author of 
textbooks on psychiatry;49 his (implied) denial of the existence of such stigma suggests 
a disingenuousness which ill serves him in relation to the credibility and reliability that 
should be accorded his testimony on other matters germane to the Juklerød case. 
From Juklerød’s perspective, the extreme intensity of the stigma to which he believed 
himself to have been subjected, is eloquently attested to by the persistence with which 
he pursued his campaign to have his diagnosis revoked.  
G-4(iv): Juklerød’s experience of psychotropic medication 
Juklerød remembered his first injection of neuroleptic medication:  
… a paralysis entered my left side, an enemy that I couldn’t fight.  Together with 
the paralysis came a fear and restlessness completely new to me.  I couldn’t fight 
it, but made efforts to behave normally.  [I had] no way to struggle against this 
enemy.  The paralysis went up my left arm.  My fingers stood out like this, 
unmovable.  It went upwards and took my mouth and pulled it up in an awkward 
                                               
47
 Sandøy (1997). 
48
 The literature on the stigma of psychiatric illness is extensive and is discussed in Chapter 6.   
49
 Munro (1999) cites 5 references including a textbook published in the US.  
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position.  I couldn’t speak.  I could hardly talk.  I was terrified and frightened.  
Eventually I got into the office of the section head.  He saw how I had changed. I 
cried and begged them not to give me more shots.  He called the man who had 
given me the shots but was then told to give me a shot against the side effects.50  
The side effects of psychotropic medication are discussed in Chapter 5.  
G-4(v): The Juklerød case and the choice of default presumptions  
A distinction can be drawn between ‘abuse of psychiatry’ and ‘psychiatric abuse’,51 
based on the attitude adopted by the psychiatric profession when the facts underlying 
such cases become known: if an instance of professional wrongdoing is speedily 
condemned by the psychiatric profession then it remains an isolated instance of the 
abuse of psychiatry, however any unwillingness to remedy such abuse transforms the 
case into one of ‘psychiatric abuse’.52   
The attitude to the Juklerød case, of those outside professional psychiatry clearly 
classifies it as an abuse of psychiatry; however, the obfuscation and the obstructive 
attitude shown by the psychiatric profession towards attempts at resolution, suggest a 
case of ‘psychiatric abuse’.   
The prominence of the Juklerød case was achieved despite the efforts of the 
psychiatrists involved and was attributable primarily to the perseverance of the subject 
of the case, Arnold Juklerød.  Without his efforts this case would have vanished into 
obscurity and the psychiatric misdiagnosis would have been undocumented.   
Instances of ‘psychiatric abuse’ – as distinct from ‘abuse of psychiatry’ – undoubtedly 
occur in modern Western  psychiatry.  The extreme difficulty faced by those attempting 
to highlight such cases render it difficult, if not impossible, to estimate their prevalence.  
If a strength of character and determination (such as exhibited by Juklerød) is required 
before incidents of alleged psychiatric abuse can seize the attention of the public then 
the dearth of detailed reports of psychiatric abuse in Western countries may be more 
indicative of the rarity of such individuals rather than the rarity of psychiatric abuse.  
 
                                               
50
 Sandøy (1997).  
51
 Professor Olofsson of the University of Växjö, Sweden makes a somewhat similar distinction between, 
what he terms, “The ‘bright side’ of the professions” and “The ‘dark side’ of the professions.”  He 
considers the use of lobotomy to be an example of the dark side of psychiatry.  [See Olofsson (2007)]. 
52
 A similar distinction may be made in general medicine: e.g. the attempts by the medical profession in 
Ireland to prevent the facts underlying the Neary case becoming public (supra).   
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Appendix H: The Manweiler case  
The Manweiler case came before the Irish courts in 2005 and concerned the wrongful 
psychiatric confinement and treatment of a John Manweiler.  It resulted in an award of 
Euro 3 million damages – the highest award of general damages in Irish legal history.1 
An outline of the factual background to the case prior to committal is given in 
Subsection H-1, and subsequent to committal in Subsection H-2.  Some observations are 
made in Subsection H-3.   
[The following account is based on media reports; a re-enactment of the court 
proceedings and commentaries by psychiatrists Drs. Barry (Clinical Director, Cluain 
Mhuire), Kennedy (Clinical Director, Central Mental Hospital) and Walsh (former 
Inspector of Mental Hospitals).] 
H-1: The factual background prior to committal 
Manweiler entered St. Brendan’s psychiatric hospital as a voluntarily patient in 
September 1984.  He was subsequently certified as an involuntary patient and, in 
December 1984, he was released as an outpatient.  Whilst in hospital his psychiatrist Dr. 
Burke, had prescribed antipsychotic medication which, on his release, was continued for 
a further eleven years.   
At the time of his hospitalisation Manweiler, then aged 43, and had been living with his 
83-year-old mother who suffered from dementia.  His relationship with his married 
sister, Pauline, was poor.2   
In September 1984 a verbal altercation occurred between Manweiler and his mother 
which precipitated his later committal to a mental hospital.  According to Manweiler: 
I asked her if she had moved the tools and she said no, I got a bit annoyed.  … I 
threw the tools into a flower bed.  She was very surprised and said she was afraid, 
that she would report me to one of the family. I couldn’t understand why she 
would be afraid.  I never threatened her, I never threatened anyone.3   
His mother complained to his sister Pauline who told Manweiler that unless he went 
voluntarily to a psychiatric hospital, he would be “committed”; he reluctantly agreed.  
His diagnosis, as recorded by the admitting psychiatrist, was: “Chronic mild 
depression.  Schizoid personality. Short stay only.  Then day care.”4 
                                               
1
 See O’Brien, C. (2005a). ‘€3m psychiatric detention award to be appealed’. The Irish Times, 6 June.   
The damages were subsequently reduced to Euro 500,000 in an out-of-court settlement.  See O’Brien, C. 
(2005b). ‘€3m psychiatric award cut to €500,000’. The Irish Times, 24 August.   
‘General damages’ - in contrast to ‘special damages’ - compensates the claimant for non-monetary harm. 
2
 He had overheard a conversation between his mother, his sister and a solicitor on the redrawing of a will 
to make his sister sole beneficiary.  See O'Brien, C. (2005c). ‘Vindication for a solitary man’. The Irish 
Times. 21 May. 
3
 Ibid.  
4
 Ibid.  
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The Chief Psychiatrist, Dr. Burke, who had been on leave, returned a week later and 
changed Manweiler’s status to ‘involuntary’. 
H-2: The factual background subsequent to committal 
The following aspects are examined:  
- Manweiler’s change of status [H-2(i)];  
- his diagnosis [H-2(ii)];  
- his medication [H-2(iii)]; 
- his experience of antipsychotic medication [H-2(iv)].  
H-2(i): Manweiler’s change of status 
Manweiler’s counsel [John Rogers SC], questioned Burke as to why he changed 
Manweiler’s status to ‘involuntary’: 
Burke:  
He could have walked out giving 72 hours notice … he was constantly 
grumbling about being there and was without enthusiasm.5 
Rogers:  
… There was nothing … to show that he was anything but a very voluntary 
patient or that he would have left. 
Burke:  
There was a serious history of violence that came from the evening before 
when his mother left the house. … He was expressing his unwillingness but 
in his own ambivalent way he wouldn’t make any fuss about it … it was for 
safety’s sake that this had to be done. 
Burke was also questioned on the procedure used to change Manweiler’s status as, in 
the circumstances obtaining, it was not legally permissible. 
Burke 
It was quite usual … that was the practice and I believe that it still is. 
H-2(ii): Manweiler’s diagnosis 
Burke had spoken to Manweiler’s family about him – but not about any family 
circumstances that might have precipitated the altercation – and had heard from a nurse 
colleague of Manweiler’s sister as to the distress of Manweiler’s mother on the day in 
question, but he had not spoken to Manweiler who had remained mute in his presence.   
He had diagnosed Manweiler as schizophrenic.  
Rogers:  
You decided this man was a schizophrenic just because he was silent?6 
                                               
5
 This and all subsequent exchanges between Rodgers and Burke, are transcribed from an archive 
recording of the Browne (2005b) except where stated otherwise. 
6
 Browne, V. (2005a). ‘False imprisonment: The story of John Manweiler’. The Village. 5 May.   
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Burke:  
I didn’t decide then, I saw it as a possibility. 
Rogers:  
So what was the mental illness he had [then]? 
Burke:  
It was the same as he has now.  He has a simple schizophrenia but it is very 
difficult to diagnose. … 
Rogers:  
So you must have diagnosed it even though he didn’t speak to you?... 
Burke:  
I admitted him for safety’s sake and to investigate and prove he had a 
schizophrenic illness. 
Rogers then asked Burke why, knowing of the existence of family problems, he had not 
discussed these with Manweiler’s family. 
Burke:  
Well I didn’t think it appropriate for me to interfere in a family matter like 
that. …  
Rogers:  
Why not? 
Burke:  
Because it has nothing to do with me and could be devised [sic] as being 
difficult, it is not something that I would do lightly. … I wouldn’t dream of 
doing that. 
Manweiler described his first meeting with Burke: 
“Early on in the meeting I was requested to leave the room … I stood outside in 
the main entrance hall … it would be an hour, that length.  I remember Dr. Burke 
came out of the room …[and] said to me ‘You are in deep trouble’.  That’s the 
word he used ‘You are in deep trouble and there’s a few other items we need to 
discuss of a delicate nature’.  That’s about all he said to me.”   
He said there was no further discussion then with Dr. Burke. 
H-2(iii): Manweiler’s medication 
Manweiler (who had never been psychotic) had been prescribed the anti-psychotic 
Clopixol – a drug which may have severe side effects.  Shortly before this, a 
psychologist’s report on Manweiler – which made no mention of his being mentally ill 
– saw poor family communication as being the root of the problem and recommended 
the holding a family conference.   
Burke:  
 … that was the psychologists view, that was not the cause of John 
Manweiler’s illness, the illness was there anyway. 
Rogers: 
 … it appears Clopixol is being prescribed in advance of the meeting the 
psychologist recommended? 
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Burke:  
That was just a test dose… 
______ 
In further cross-examination:7 
Rogers:  
In all the notes … there is no note by anybody that he suffered from 
schizophrenia, including yourself?  
Burke:  
That’s some oversight rather but that is my opinion, that is his illness.  
 
Rogers: 
Do you agree with me that a schizoid personality disorder is not treated with 
antipsychotic drugs?  
Burke: 
Probably not but I had to take into account his history of violence. 
To counteract the side effects of the Clopixol Manweiler was given Cojentin8 which 
caused further side effects.9   
__________ 
Manweiler was discharged on a “trial” basis in December 1984 and met Burke in early 
January 1985.  According to Manweiler: 
… he said “you are suffering from something called nerves” and that there was no 
cure.  Dr. Burke said he would need an injection called Clipoxil but it was too 
technical for him to understand the nature of that drug … Dr. Burke said if he did 
not attend for the injections he could be detained in Unit 8 which is a lockup 
ward, and he would be forcibly administered these injections. 
In his evidence Dr. Burke vigorously denied this exchange occurred.10  
In 1994, a different psychiatrist stopped Manweiler’s antipsychotic medication and a 
sympathetic nurse prompted him to make an official complaint about his earlier 
treatment.11 
H-2(iv): Manweiler: the effects of antipsychotic medication 
Psychiatrists interviewed in Browne (2005a) were asked about the effect of 
antipsychotic medication such as Clopixol: 
McKenna:  
Clopixol is a tranquilising medication that will damp down psychotic 
thinking or disturbed behaviour consequent upon psychotic thinking … 
… were anybody here to … take a dose, it would have a sedating effect.  
                                               
7
 Ibid.  
8
 A drug used in the treatment of Parkinson’s disease. 
9
 Burke at first denied, but later accepted, the existence of such side effects. 
10
 Browne (2005a). 
11
 O'Brien (2005c). 
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[Questioned as to side effect] you were perhaps poorly motivated couldn’t, 
you know, do a lot.  Couldn’t necessarily, you know, think in a creative 
way.  It would have an overall damping down effect.  
… some of these symptoms would actually mimic chronic forms of 
schizophrenia … 
Walsh:  
… there is probably a group of individual psychiatrists … who would be of 
the view that … the possibility of it eventually moving over into florid, 
frank, symptomatic schizophrenia was so great that prophylactically – as a 
preventive measure – such individuals might be given an antipsychotic drug 
… 
They were also questioned12 on its effects on Manweiler’s quality of life: 
Browne:  
… when he came off the drug … suddenly his life became very much better 
he was able to do things he hadn’t been able to do on the ten years he was 
on the drug.  He became interested in his own condition.  He read 
extensively on the disorder that he was said to have had, on the 
schizophrenia that he was wrongly – that, it appears, wrongly – he was said 
to have had and on the drugs that were administered to him.   
Barry:  
But I think it is important equally just to say that people who suffer from 
schizophrenia or from mental illness in general can, you know, be interested 
in their condition. 
Browne:  
My point … is that during the years that he was on this drug he was unable 
to do that.  In other words, this drug blighted his life for ten years and when 
he came off it … the quality of his life improved significantly. 
Barry:  
… in relation to major tranquilisers like Clopixol, if somebody takes the 
medication that might not have reason to do so then it is more likely to be 
… quite profoundly sedated … 
Manweiler described the effects of the drug therapy which was administered by way of 
injection every few weeks:  
“One of the staff came along the ward and he had got a big medical tray 
with a large syringe on and he said ‘I’ve got to give you this’.  Needless to 
say I was a bit reluctant, sort of captive in there in my pyjamas and dressing 
gown along with the rest of them in there, most of the time.  You had not 
much say in the matter.  About an hour after the injection was administered 
I got a feeling of uncontrolled movements in the shoulders and neck area.”  
He was kept on this drug for over 10 years and during that time suffered the 
side effect of uncontrolled movements, particularly of his legs.  He also told 
the court he frequently felt like a “zombie”.13 
                                               
12
 Browne (2005b). 
13
 Browne (2005a). 
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H-3: Some observations on the Manweiler case 
Observations are made under the following headings: 
- the availability of legal redress [H-3(i)];  
- the compliance by psychiatrists with their legal obligations [H-3(ii)];  
- Manweiler’s supposed ‘dangerousness’ [H-3(iii)]; and 
- Manweiler’s diminished personhood. [H-3(iv)].   
H-3(i): The availability of legal redress 
The Freedom of Information Act (1997) permitted Manweiler to seek access to his 
hospital file14 which contained an explicit diagnosis for which Clopixol was not an 
appropriate treatment.  The unequivocal nature of the note provided prima facia 
evidence of inappropriate psychiatric treatment and, presumably,15 enabled Manweiler 
to surmount the obstacle placed by S. 260 of the Mental Treatment Act (1945).16 
H-3(ii): Compliance by psychiatrists with their legal obligations 
The legal obligations placed on psychiatrists by mental health legislation, are far from 
onerous yet scant regard was paid to them:  
- the method used by Burke to certify Manweiler as ‘involuntary’, was unlawful, yet 
it appears to have been common. 
- some eminent psychiatrists defended17 Burke on the ground that such technicalities 
interfered with psychiatrists acting in the best interests of their patients.18   
A related legal matter concerns a patient’s ability to refuse consent to treatment.  Burke 
gave Manweiler’s “unwillingness” and reluctance to consent as a reason19 for changing 
Manweiler’s status to involuntary.  Kennedy gave similar reasons:  
 … the other [reason why involuntary committal procedures would be invoked] is 
expressing your general unhappiness or unwillingness to remain in hospital.  I 
tend to listen to my patients and if they tell me that they are unhappy, I take it that 
they are not consenting.20 
Such an interpretation eviscerates the doctrine of consent and renders it operative only 
in circumstances where the subject agrees with a proposed treatment; any hint of 
                                               
14
 Had Manweiler been treated in a private mental hospital this course of action would not have been open 
to him. 
15
 This is a surmise as I have been unable to access the court papers.  
16
 See Appendix A. 
17
 Browne (2005b). 
18
 There appears to be a widespread, but erroneous, belief amongst psychiatrists that to act ‘in the best 
interests’ of a patient, is an adequate defence to any ethical (or legal) challenge.  [Based on my noting the 
views of psychiatrists whilst attending postgraduate conferences on the philosophy of psychiatry]. 
19
 The question of dangerousness is discussed below. 
20
 Browne (2005b). 
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disagreement becoming evidence of incapacity to consent.21  In that Kennedy is an 
eminent psychiatrist22 and did not appear to see himself as enunciating anything other 
than the general understanding of his professional colleagues, it shows a clear 
divergence between current psychiatric practice and the law which is set out by O’Neill 
(2005).23 
H-3(iii): Manweiler’s supposed dangerousness 
Under cross-examination, Burke stated: “There was a serious history of violence that 
came from the evening before when his mother left the house.”   
As pointed out by Rogers the only evidence for this assertion was that Manweiler had 
been “aggressive in voice” towards his mother.   
In that the jury not only fully accepted Manweiler’s account but also penalised the 
defendants for their manner of defence, it can be concluded that no violence had 
occurred.  Yet in the absence of court proceedings, Manweiler’s file containing the 
damning phrase that he had “a serious history of violence” would be unchallenged and 
unchallengeable and would constitute the basis on which a ‘risk assessment’ of 
Manweiler’s level of dangerousness would be calculated.   
Barry was of the opinion24 that because of the Freedom of Information Act (1997), 
psychiatrists are more reluctant to commit sensitive information to paper; this would 
imply that similar erroneous ‘assessments’ could be operative yet be beyond challenge 
by the patient who would not necessarily even know of their existence.  
If such is the case then vague hearsay and linguistic sleights-of-hand can constitute the 
‘raw data’ on which risk assessments are based; although such assessments might be 
paraded in the raiments of science, they have little in common with that discipline.25   
H-3(iv): Manweiler: a diminished personhood? 
The contrast in the attitudes adopted by Burke towards Manweiler, and towards his 
family is stark: Burke barely spoke to Manweiler yet had an extended discussion with 
Manweiler’s family whilst avoiding matters that might appear to be intrusive.  Yet, on 
                                               
21
 See the comment of the physician in Amy’s case (supra):“… the current test of rationality was often 
concurrence with the opinions of one’s physician”.  
22
 Dr. Kennedy is Clinical Director of the Central Mental Hospital. 
23
 Op. cit., p.264: 
A voluntary patient cannot as a general rule be treated without his/her consent. The only exception 
to this rule is in emergencies where the patient due to unconsciousness is unable to communicate 
… 
Where a voluntary patient is deemed incapable of giving consent by reason of mental disorder 
steps should be taken to admit him/her to hospital as an involuntary patient …  
24
 Browne (2005b). 
25
 See Chapter 6.  
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the basis of such partial information, Burke felt able to precipitate an intervention which 
would have far reaching consequences for Manweiler.  Clearly Manweiler’s personhood 
was diminished to the extent that he did not merit the consideration which Burke readily 
extended to Manweiler’s family.26   
Furthermore, in discussing the events that had befallen Manweiler, the psychiatrists 
interviewed in Browne (2005b) were quite sanguine and – whilst one did acknowledge 
that the case had caused public concern – the only notes of regret expressed were in 
relation to the treatment of Burke in court: “One wonders about the charitableness or 
the fairness of such a cross examination of a man who is retired.”  
Of greater importance to the question of personhood is the fact that Manweiler – by 
virtue of the forcible administration of antipsychotics – had his mental capacities  
reduced to those of a “zombie” for close to ten years.  Barry implicitly acknowledges27 
the possibility of such effects; yet Walsh – a former Inspector of Mental Hospitals – is 
cavalier about the use of such drugs as a preventive measure.   
An aside: ‘treatment’ or ‘damage’ 
The administration of such drugs falls under the broad rubric of ‘treatment’.  Is this the 
appropriate terminology?   
Harry Stack Sullivan, one of the founders of American psychiatry, described some 
psychiatric ‘treatments’ as causing a ‘damage’ which may reduce the occurrence of 
troublesome symptoms: 
… [the patients] are reduced in human capabilities and drop back from a world the 
complexities of which provoked some insoluble conflict of adaptive impulses to 
one simpler and within the range of their surviving human abilities.  Mental 
disorder is thus rectified by acquiring a mental defect, a material alteration in 
functional capacity for living.28  
Which term is more appropriate in relation to the use of neuroleptics?  Barry’s 
comments above and the existence of irreversible effects of long term use of such 
drugs29 provides prima facie evidence that the question is at least worthy of further 
discussion.30  
__________ 
                                               
26
 A possible explanation for this – and for Burke’s dismissal of the psychologist’s report – is that Burke 
saw himself as a scientist who saw Manweiler as having some ‘brain defect’ amenable only to chemical 
treatment, hence neither Manweiler’s views nor family problems nor the psychologist’s report, were of 
any relevance being, at best, a distraction.  If this is indeed the case it presents a stark warning of the 
dangers lurking behind an unquestioning adherence to a scientistic perspective of psychiatry.  See Chapter 
4. 
27
 Supra: “[some of the side effects] actually mimic chronic forms of schizophrenia.” 
28
 Sullivan (1964) at p.171. [Emphasis in original]. 
29
 See Chapter 5. 
30
 Ibid.  
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In discussing the possible damage to Manweiler’s personhood, the nature and 
intrusiveness of the harm that was done to him is of importance. 
Commenting on the quantum of damages awarded to Manweiler, the legal 
correspondent of The Irish Times contrasted it with the damages awarded to a Mr. 
Shortt for wrongful conviction and imprisonment: “… involuntary detention in a 
psychiatric hospital is a very negative experience, it is arguably less onerous than 
detention in prison.” 31  This ignores the forcible medication, the stigma and the damage 
to the sense of self consequent on an involuntary psychiatric committal.  
The Manweiler award can be contrasted with that of a victim of rape.32  The amount of 
damages awarded by a jury – in that it seeks to compensate the plaintiff for his injury – 
provides a rough guide to the level of harm suffered by the plaintiff, as perceived by the 
general public.  It was suggested earlier that, in some circumstances, a coercive 
psychiatric intervention might – in its level of its intrusiveness – be compared to a rape; 
the respective jury awards supports such a comparison. 
                                               
31
 Coulter, C. (2005b). ‘Unsatisfactory damages neither a deterrent nor a punishment’. The Irish Times 13 
October; she continued: 
Also, Mr. Manweiler was not branded a drug-dealer, deprived of his professional standing and 
generally subject to public odium, as was Mr Shortt, whose family was also severely affected by 
what occurred. 
32
 The Irish Times, (2005a). ‘Man awarded €3 million for unlawful detention’. The Irish Times, 29 April: 
…[the Manweiler award] is the highest made by a High Court jury and comes after a €1.7 million 
award made earlier this month to a woman who was sexually and physically abused by her father 
over a number of years. 
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Appendix I: Iatrogenic harm and misdiagnosis in general 
medicine 
The term ‘iatrogenic illness’ refers to illness or harm which has been (unintentionally) 
caused by a medical intervention.  It includes cases of misdiagnosis if they occasion 
harm and cases where the original diagnosis was not mistaken but where subsequent 
interventions have an unforeseen1 adverse effect on a subject.   
As used in general medicine, the term ‘iatrogenic harm’ is usually restricted to physical 
harm and does not cover, for example, the psychological distress which  
may have resulted from a diagnosis of cancer which was incorrect, or the stigma which 
may befall one wrongly diagnosed as having an infectious disease such as AIDS.  Thus, 
in so far as it is applied to the practice of psychiatry, ‘iatrogenic harm’ would generally 
be restricted to harm – other than foreseen but unintended ‘side effects’ – resulting from 
inappropriate pharmacological interventions2 and would not cover any stigma or 
damage to personhood even if such stigma or damage flowed from an erroneous 
psychiatric diagnosis.   
As discussed in Chapter 4, the term ‘misdiagnosis’ is – in the context of psychiatry – 
ambiguous; furthermore the incidence of that type of misdiagnosis which (erroneously) 
precipitates a coercive psychiatric intervention is, for reasons explained in the main 
body of the text, difficult to estimate, yet it is of considerable importance to the 
argument being proposed in this dissertation.  The global level of misdiagnosis that 
occurs in general medicine provides a possible – albeit crude – estimate; hence the 
discussion in this appendix will focus not only on general estimates of iatrogenic harm 
but also on general estimates of misdiagnosis. 
Contrary to what might be expected, iatrogenic harm is not restricted to those suffering 
from the most serious physical illnesses but extends throughout the medical health care 
system; estimates of this background level of iatrogenic harm are relevant to assessing 
the levels of iatrogenic harm that may be expected to flow from a psychiatric 
intervention.  Furthermore, a substantial portion of the iatrogenic harm that occurs in 
general medicine is due to medication errors and – since pharmaceutical treatment 
                                               
1
 Thus excluding foreseen but unintended ‘side effects’. 
2
 Pharmacological interventions being the most common psychiatric treatment. 
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constitutes a major part of psychiatric treatment – levels of iatrogenic harm due to 
pharmaceutical intervention are of an especial relevance.3  
The most influential studies on iatrogenic harm have been undertaken in the US and 
these will be discussed in Subsection I-1; some UK studies will be examined in 
Subsection I-2 and some Irish sources, in Subsection I-3.  
Some conclusions concerning the levels of iatrogenic harm and misdiagnosis occurring 
in general medicine are drawn in Subsection I-4; and concerning the levels of iatrogenic 
harm occasioned by psychiatric intervention,4 in Subsection I-5. 
I-1: US estimates of iatrogenic harm and general misdiagnosis  
The extent of misdiagnosis in general medicine is discussed in I-1(i); that of iatrogenic 
harm, in I-1(ii); that of iatrogenic harm occasioned by pharmacological intervention, I-
1(iii). 
I-1(i): Misdiagnosis (US) 
In 1999 the Institute of Medicine issued a report entitled To Err is Human: Building A 
Safer Health System5 and, although the primary focus of this report was on the level of 
iatrogenic harm, it did make one reference to misdiagnosis:  
Unexpected findings at autopsy are an excellent way to refine clinical judgment 
and identify misdiagnosis.  Lundberg6 cites a 40% discrepancy between 
antemortem and postmortem diagnoses.7 
Shojania (2003) was a meta-analysis of earlier international studies and had as its 
objective: “To determine the rate at which autopsies detect important, clinically missed 
diagnoses, and the extent to which this rate has changed over time.”   
It concluded that: 
The median error rate was 23.5% … for major errors8 and 9.0% … for class I 
errors9. … we estimated that a contemporary US institution … could observe a 
major error rate from 8.4% to 24.4% and a class I error rate from 4.1% to 6.7%.10 
                                               
3
 The nature, and extent, of the ‘side effects’ of pharmacological psychiatric treatments are discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
4
 Estimates of psychiatric misdiagnosis are discussed in Chapter 4. 
5
 Institute of Medicine (1999).  
6
 I.e. Lundberg (1998). 
7
 Institute of Medicine (1999), p.269.  
8
 ‘Major errors’ were defined as clinically missed diagnoses involving a principal underlying disease or 
primary cause of death.  [Op. cit., p.2850.] 
9
 ‘Class I errors’ were major errors that, had they been detected during life, "would," "could," "possibly," 
or "might" have affected patient prognosis or outcome (at a minimum, discharge from the hospital alive).  
[Ibid., p.2850.] 
10
 Ibid., p.2849; The authors noted (p. 2849) that the autopsy rate had decreased from 30-40% in the 
1960’s to 6% in 1994; they also noted that: “For many physicians, interest in the autopsy as a means of 
detecting clinically missed diagnoses is undoubtedly offset by concerns over litigation
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Dessmon (2001) examined the incidence of misdiagnosis in an ICU (Intensive Care 
Unit), in all patients admitted over a two year period and concluded that: 
The discordance between the clinical cause of death and postmortem diagnosis 
was 19.8%.  In 44.4% of the discordant cases, knowledge of the correct diagnosis 
would have altered therapy. 
I-1(ii): Iatrogenic harm (US) 
Steel (1981) estimated the incidence of iatrogenic harm at a university hospital and 
concluded that: 
… 36% of 815 consecutive patients … had an iatrogenic illness.  In 9% of all 
persons admitted, the incident was considered major in that it threatened life or 
produced considerable disability. In 2% of the 815 patients, the iatrogenic illness 
was believed to contribute to the death of the patient.  Exposure to drugs was a 
particularly important factor in determining which patients had complications.11  
The study made a single reference to psychiatry:  
If no documentation of any sort was available, no iatrogenic illness was recorded 
despite suspicions of the project staff that one had occurred.  This problem was 
particularly common in cases of apparent psychiatric disturbances.12  
This suggests: 
- firstly, that the incidence of iatrogenic harm in relation to cases with a psychiatric 
dimension is much more opaque than in purely medical illness and,  
- secondly, that the estimates of iatrogenic harm are underestimates.   
Any attempt to extrapolate the study findings to psychiatric interventions is fraught with 
difficulties, the most obvious consideration being that the seriousness of the medical 
illness might be thought to have a direct bearing on the level of iatrogenic harm.  On 
this point, the Steel (1981) study is of particular interest in that it excluded patients 
suffering from cancer;13 commenting on the study, Morris (2004) noted that:  
As expected, the intensive care settings accounted for more of the iatrogenic 
illness than did the others.  However, when subjected to a logistic analysis, the 
unit in which the patient received care was not a determinant of iatrogenic illness; 
… it is more likely that iatrogenic illness … are linked to limitations in human 
decision making and to defects in the healthcare delivery system. 
If the soundness of clinical decision making and the quality of health care management 
are indeed the crucial factors in determining the level of iatrogenic harm then a 
comparison of these factors between psychiatric and non-psychiatric medical facilities, 
might permit a tentative estimate of iatrogenic harm due to psychiatric intervention.  
                                               
11
 Op. cit., p.76. 
12
 Ibid., p.77. 
13
 Op. cit. p.638: “… medical floor that is predominantly reserved for patients with cancer was excluded 
from the study because of the recognized high risk of iatrogenic complications in these patients.”   
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The most cited14 study dealing with iatrogenic harm is known as the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study which analysed hospitalisations in New York during 1984.   
It was published in two parts (the first15 concerned the incidence and the second16 the 
cause, of the iatrogenic harm). 
I-1(ii)(a): Harvard Medical Practice Study: Incidence of iatrogenic harm 
Brennan (1991) concluded that: 
The Adverse events occurred in 3.7% of the hospitalizations … and 27.6% of the 
adverse events were due to negligence … Although 70.5% of the adverse events 
gave rise to disability lasting less than six months, 2.6% caused permanently 
disabling injuries and 13.6% led to death. … There were significant differences in 
rates of adverse events among categories of clinical specialties but no differences 
in the percentage due to negligence.17  
More recent reports from the US covering the years 2002-2007, found that the incidence 
of iatrogenic harm had not decreased over time.18 
I-1(ii)(b): Harvard Medical Practice Study: Type of intervention that 
caused iatrogenic harm 
Leape (1991) concluded that: 
Drug complications were the most common type of adverse event (19%), …  
The proportion of adverse events due to negligence was highest for diagnostic 
mishaps (75%), noninvasive therapeutic mishaps (“errors of omission”) (77%), 
and events occurring in the emergency room (70%). Errors in management were 
                                               
14
 See BioInfoBank Library [online], available: http://lib.bioinfo.pl/meid:86786 [accessed: 24 March 
2007].   
15
 Brennan (1991). 
16
 Leape (1991). 
17
 The figure of 13.6% causing death appears unduly high when compared with the figure of 2.4% 
reported by Grady (2010) infra and suggests that it might have been a typographical error for 1.36%.  In 
the online HTML version of Brennan (1991), the figure 13.6% is omitted [“2.6 percent caused 
permanently disabling injuries and percent led to death”] whilst present in the online pdf version.  An 
examination of the full text however, shows that there was no such typographical error: 
However, 2.6±0.4 percent of the adverse events gave rise to permanent total disability, and 
13.6±1.7 percent caused death. Extrapolating to the state of New York in 1984, we estimated that 
2550 patients suffered permanent total disability and that 13,451 died at least in part as a result of 
adverse events. [ibid. p.371] 
Furthermore when the rate of fatal iatrogenic harms as a percentage of admissions, is compared the 
apparent disparity vanishes [Harvard (0.037 x 0.136 = 005 which is 0.5%); Grady (0.18 x 0.026 =0.0047 
which is 0.47%)]. 
18
 Grady (2010): 
The study, conducted from 2002 to 2007 in 10 North Carolina hospitals, found that harm to 
patients was common and that the number of incidents did not decrease over time. … It is one of 
the most rigorous efforts to collect data about patient safety since a landmark report in 1999 found 
that medical mistakes caused as many as 98,000 deaths and more than one million injuries a year 
in the United States. … But instead of improvements, the researchers found a high rate of 
problems. About 18 percent of patients were harmed by medical care, some more than once, and 
63.1 percent of the injuries were judged to be preventable. Most of the problems were temporary 
and treatable, but some were serious, and a few — 2.4 percent — caused or contributed to a 
patient’s death, the study found.  
Grady, D. (2010). 'Study Finds No Progress in Safety at Hospitals'. New York Times. 24 Nov. 
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identified for 58% of the adverse events, among which nearly half were attributed 
to negligence. 
Of the interventions that caused iatrogenic harm, two – ‘diagnostic mishaps’ and ‘drug 
therapy’ – would appear to be of most relevance to psychiatry.  Estimates of iatrogenic 
harm due to inappropriate use of drugs – whether incorrectly prescribed, dispensed or 
administered – are given later in this appendix.  
The studies cited above, relate to the mid 1980’s, the Institute of Medicine’s report 
(supra) relates to the late 1990s and, whilst it did not explicitly advert to iatrogenic 
harm caused by psychiatric intervention, it did estimate the general level of iatrogenic 
harm based on two studies19: 
In both of these studies, over half of these adverse events resulted from medical 
errors and could have been prevented.  When extrapolated … the results of the 
[first] study … imply that at least 44,000 Americans die each year as a result of 
medical errors.  The results of the [second] suggest the number may be as high as 
98,000.   
Even when using the lower estimate, deaths due to medical errors exceed the 
number attributable to the 8th leading cause of death.  More people die in a given 
year as a result of medical errors than from motor vehicle accidents (43,458), 
breast cancer (42,297), or AIDS (16,516).20  
The above estimates were garnered by the medical profession; patient groups provide an 
alternative – and possibly more authoritative21 – perspective: a survey22 conducted by 
the National Patient Safety Foundation – a group affiliated to the American Medical 
Association – on the public experience of patient safety issues, found that 33% of the 
respondents had personally experienced a medical23 mistake, the most common being 
‘misdiagnosis/wrong treatment’ (40%) followed by ‘medication error’ (28%).  One in 
three respondents (32%) reported that the medical mistake had a permanent negative 
effect on their health.  
                                               
19
 Institute of Medicine (1999), p.1: 
Two large studies, one conducted in Colorado and Utah and the other in New York, found that 
adverse events occurred in 2.9 and 3.7% of hospitalizations, respectively.  In Colorado and Utah 
hospitals, 6.6% of adverse events led to death, as compared with 13.6% in New York hospitals. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 See Basch (2010):  
The current drug-labeling practice for adverse events is based on the implicit assumption that an 
accurate portrait of patients’ subjective experiences can be provided by clinicians’ documentation 
alone. Yet a substantial body of evidence contradicts this assumption, showing that clinicians 
systematically downgrade the severity of patients’ symptoms, that patients’ self-reports frequently 
capture side effects that clinicians miss, and that clinicians’ failure to note these symptoms results 
in the occurrence of preventable adverse events. (p.865) 
… Patients’ reports are more highly concordant with overall health status than clinicians’ reports. 
(p.867) 
22
 NPSF (1997). 
23
 The survey made no reference to psychiatry or to mental illness. 
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I-1(iii): Iatrogenic harm due to pharmacological intervention (US) 
Lazarou (1998) was a meta-analysis of earlier studies on the incidence of adverse drug 
reactions (ADRs) in hospitalised patients; it found the level of ADRs to be “extremely 
high” and concluded that: 
… the overall incidence of serious24 ADRs was 6.7% and of fatal ADRs was 
0.32% … [it] estimated that in 1994 overall 2,216,000 … hospitalized patients 
had serious ADRs and 106,000 … had fatal ADRs, making these reactions 
between the fourth and sixth leading cause of death. 
These are underestimates because the study “… excluded errors in drug administration, 
noncompliance, overdose, drug abuse, therapeutic failures, and possible ADRs”. 
In 2006, following its earlier report on medical errors, the Institute of Medicine released 
a study on medication errors in American hospitals; amongst its findings25 were that: 
- At least 1.5 million Americans are sickened, injured or killed each year by errors 
in prescribing, dispensing and taking medications … drug errors cause at least 
400,000 preventable injuries and deaths in hospitals each year, more than 800,000 
in nursing homes … and 530,000 … in outpatient clinics.   
- Mistakes in giving drugs are so prevalent in hospitals that, on average, a patient 
will be subjected to a medication error each day he or she occupies a hospital bed, 
… 
The report urged the adoption of computerised systems for prescribing drugs, a proposal 
– which despite having been routinely made since 1999 – has been followed in less than 
10% of hospitals.26 
I-2: The United Kingdom  
The extent of misdiagnosis in general medical practice is discussed in I-2(i) and the 
extent of iatrogenic harm, in I-2(ii). 
I-2(i): Misdiagnosis (UK) 
Although I have been able to source statistics on the rate of misdiagnosis for various 
medical conditions, for example: 
- epilepsy: estimates vary between 20-31%.27 
- PVS: estimates vary between 18-43%.28 
I have been unable to locate global estimates of medical misdiagnosis.   
                                               
24
 I.e. those that required hospitalization, were permanently disabling or resulted in death. 
25
 Kaufman, M., (2006). ‘Medication Errors Harming Millions, Report Says’.  The Washington Post, 21 
July.   
26
 McNeil Jr., D. (2007), ‘Medication Errors Are Studied’, The New York Times, March 7.   
27
 NICE (2004b).   
28
 Andrews (1996) found a misdiagnosis rate of 43%; Tresch (1991) found that 18% of patients who were 
diagnosed as PVS, were aware; for a further discussion of these, and other, sources see Roche (2000). 
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In the UK, The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) is charged with monitoring and 
overseeing patient safety, a search of its online reports for ‘misdiagnosis’ elicits 4 
results, none of which is relevant.  The NPSA, however, does provide estimates of 
iatrogenic harm.  
I-2(ii): Iatrogenic harm (UK) 
NPSA (2001) contained the following table: 
 Harvard (1991) Australian (1995) UK pilot 
Percentage of inpatient episodes 
leading to harmful adverse events 
 
3.7% 
16.5% 
(8.25% preventable) 
 
10% 
Implication for English NHS 
hospitals (based on 8.5 million in-
patient episodes) 
314,000 
Adverse Events 
1,414,000 
Adverse Events 
850,000 
Adverse Events 
                  Table I-1: Frequencies of adverse events in UK hospitals 
NPSA (2001) also highlighted the statistic that for every major injury or death there are 
10-50 minor injuries and 300-600 related near misses – a statistic which is of interest in 
that deaths due to pharmacological causes are recorded in Irish psychiatric hospitals and 
it may permit a tentative estimate of non-fatal adverse reactions; the statistic that 10% of 
hospital admissions lead to patient harm is also of interest. 
A 2005 report by the National Audit Office found that 10.8% of patients experienced an 
adverse event; it found that 2,081 deaths were attributed to the errors of staff, but said:  
It is widely acknowledged there is significant under-reporting of deaths and 
serious incidents.  Other estimates of deaths range from 840 to 34,000.  In reality, 
the NHS simply does not know.29 
The finding that, in a third of NHS hospitals, there is no requirement on clinicians to 
report unexpected complications or unexpected events, further emphasises the extent of 
underreporting.30 
A 2006 report from the NPSA noted that : 
International research suggests that there is significant under-reporting of 
incidents. … [and] biases in what types of incident are reported. 
… [though] reports from mental health … services have increased rapidly.31  
This report also noted that no reports from patients have been included in their analysis 
but that a system was being implemented to permit such reports.32  This issue is of 
special importance in psychiatry because – as is the case in relation to the concept 
‘illness’ – the defining, the measuring and the assessing of ‘harm’ is much more 
                                               
29
 Carvel, J., (2005).  ‘More than 1m patients fall victim to mistakes in NHS hospitals’, The Guardian, 3 
Nov.   
30
 NPSA (2001). 
31
 NPSA (2006a).  
32
 Ibid., p.3. 
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problematic33 than in general medicine.  The ability of patients, ex-patients or 
‘survivors’34 to influence the perception of harm should – in the light of past practices 
such as lobotomy – be readily apparent. 
In a further report35 the NPSA specifically addressed the issue of patient safety in 
mental hospitals.  It does not refer to misdiagnosis but is informative in relation to 
adverse reactions to psychotropic medications. 
I-3: Ireland 
I have been unable to source specifically Irish statistics on general rates of 
misdiagnosis.   
Some indicators as to the extent of iatrogenic harm occurring in Irish medical practice, 
are discussed in I-3(i); and of iatrogenic harm occasioned by pharmacological 
intervention, in I-3(ii). 
I-3(i): Iatrogenic harm (Irl.) 
In 2003, seeking to investigate the extent of iatrogenic harm occurring in Ireland, an 
RTE Prime Time programme,36 found that research in this area was non-existent; it 
incorporated interviews with, amongst others, Professor Fitzgerald (Dean of Medicine, 
UCD) and Professor Leape (author of one37 of the Harvard studies supra).   
Fitzgerald accepted that the result of the Harvard study applied to Ireland  
and that the problem was of a seriousness sufficient to warrant an independent 
investigation because the number of deaths due to iatrogenic harm exceeded, for 
example, those due to road accidents. 
Leape, in discussing the estimate that should apply to Ireland, noted that the Harvard 
finding that iatrogenic harm occurred in 4% of hospitalisations related to the US and 
that estimates from other countries were considerably higher: 13% (Australia), 10% 
(UK) and 9% (Denmark).  He suggested 10% as an initial estimate for Ireland  however 
                                               
33
 See Chapter 4. 
34
 The term ‘survivor’ is the preferred usage of those former patients who are critical of their experience 
at the hands of psychiatry.  See, for example, Rissmiller & Rissmiller (2006) and a response by Emerick 
(2006): 
… more than 60% of ex-patient groups support antipsychiatry beliefs and consider themselves to 
be "psychiatric survivors."  Many in the "mad liberation" movement believe they are victims of 
psychiatric treatments that harmed them. … Given the extensive critical literature on the concept 
of "mental illness" and the size of the ex-patient movement, the objective observer might conclude 
that psychiatry is less scientific and more political than the Rismillers (sic) suggest and that the ex-
patient movement is more scientific, more antipsychiatry, and a more important social movement 
than most people understand it to be.  
35
 NPSA (2006b).   
36
 RTE (2003).   
37
 Leape (1991). 
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the informality of the discussion was such that the only conclusion that can reasonably 
be drawn is that the rate of iatrogenic harm in Ireland is at least comparable to that 
found in the United States.  
The Deputy Chief Medical Officer for England was also interviewed; he emphasised the 
importance of first determining the extent of the problem because, in the absence of 
such information, the prevalence of iatrogenic harm is likely to be denied38 – a response 
eloquently demonstrated by the response of the spokesman for the Irish Hospital 
Consultants Association who was also interviewed.   
A spokesperson for Patient Focus (a patients’ rights group) emphasised the importance 
of access to the courts in uncovering the extent of iatrogenic harm; in that, in Ireland, 
such access is effectively denied39 to those who seek redress for harm caused by 
negligence psychiatric practice, it follows that an important avenue for estimating the 
prevalence of psychiatric iatrogenic harm, is not available.  
I-3(ii): Iatrogenic harm due to pharmacological intervention (Irl.) 
Interviewed on RTE (2003), the chief pharmacist of Tallaght Hospital described the 
effect of installing a system to monitor the extent of pharmacological errors occurring in 
the hospital.  Prior to the introduction of this system40 the extent of reporting amounted 
to 12 drug errors41 per year; subsequent to the introduction, it rose to 500 per year.   
Indicators to the extent of underreporting of ADRs can also be gleaned from the 
submissions42 made to, and the report43 of an Oireachtas Sub-Committee especially 
constituted to examine the adverse effects of pharmaceutical products.  
I-3(ii)(a): Submissions relating to the reporting of ADRs 
The chairman of the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland, stated: 
The incidence of reporting of adverse events by all practitioners — medical, 
pharmaceutical, dental and nursing in the Republic — is low by European and 
international standards.  
                                               
38
 A spokesperson for a US patient group, also interviewed in the programme, stated “What gives us 
power is that we already have the data – if you don’t have the information they will say what 
information?  What evidence?” 
39
 See Mental Health Act (2001), S. 73. 
40
 The system sought to encourage rather than punish those who reported errors and which, in an Irish 
context, was novel. 
41
 This relates to errors missed by ward pharmacists who detect c.1,000 errors per month. 
42
 Oireachtas Sub-Committee on the Adverse Side Effects of Pharmaceuticals (2006). 
43
 Oireachtas Joint Committee on Health and Children (2007). 
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… Pharmacists … do not currently have a legal obligation to report adverse 
effects.44 
This picture was confirmed by the Medical Director of the Irish Pharmaceutical 
Healthcare Association, who stated that the annual number of reported ADRs was “… 
approximately 2,500 … of which more than 60% are reported by pharmaceutical 
companies.”  This implies that only 1,000 ADRs were reported by medical practitioners 
directly to the IMB.45  In acknowledging the low level of reporting, he related his own 
experience: 
… I did some research on this issue 14 or 15 years ago when I was working in St. 
James’s Hospital.  The junior hospital doctors … were given a small financial 
incentive to report adverse events when they occurred.  Within a three-month 
period doctors … reported more adverse events than had been reported in the 
previous eight years. 
As mentioned above, the Harvard estimates as applied to Ireland suggest that iatrogenic 
harm accounted for 4,000 deaths; of which 19% (i.e. 760) were attributable to 
pharmaceuticals.  In relation to ADRs, the ratio of serious adverse events to fatal 
adverse events  was in the ratio 21:146 which suggests that the total number of ‘serious 
ADRs’47 occurring annually in Ireland is 15,906.48  Whilst many of these ADRs are 
attributable to inappropriate prescription or administration of drugs, it is clear that a 
proportion are attributable to the side effects of medication.  Given that knowledge of 
the nature and extent of ADRs is an obvious prerequisite to remedial action, it is 
difficult to comprehend why the Committee did not pursue the reasons for the low 
reportage of ADRs more forcefully. 
I-3(ii)(b): The Report: Extent and Seriousness of ADRs 
The Committee found that underreporting of ADRs was common and noted that  
whilst no comprehensive studies existed of the prevalence of ADRs in Ireland,  
some studies relating to individual hospitals, had been made:  
  [one such] study … identified prescribing errors of 31.1% for in patients in a 
Dublin teaching hospital and another … reported an error rate of 25% in the out 
patients department.   
                                               
44
 Oireachtas Sub-Committee on the Adverse Side Effects of Pharmaceuticals (2006), submissions of 10 
Oct.  
45
 The Irish Medicines Board (IMB) is the competent authority.  
Lexchin & O'Donovan (2010) report a possible conflict of interest between the IMB and the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
46
 Lazarou (1998) (supra) “ …the overall incidence of serious ADRs was 6.7% and of fatal ADRs was 
0.32%” [GR: 6.7/0.32=20.93] 
47
 ‘Serious ADRs’ were defined as those that required hospitalization, were permanently disabling, or 
resulted in death. 
48
 This figure relates to those ADRs deemed ‘serious’; the total number of ADRs is clearly of a higher 
order of magnitude. 
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… two medical insurers calculated that 25% and 19% respectively of claims 
against GPs in Ireland were for medication errors.  
… [ a study of] 600 geriatric patients … at the Cork University Hospital found 
that 52% were given inappropriate medicines.49  
I-3(ii)(c): The Report: The Role of Pharmaceutical Companies 
The FDA … points out that most drugs are approved on the basis of trials on 
subjects totaling not more than 1,500. … the form of drug trials is such that ADRs 
are likely to be overlooked.  Indeed, companies can structure tests with that 
objective in mind.  Furthermore … drug companies are not obliged, or do not, 
make available all studies to regulators.50  
Some of the Report’s strongest criticisms relate to psychiatric medication and these are 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
I-4: Conclusions relating to the levels of iatrogenic harm and 
misdiagnosis in the practice of general medicine in Ireland. 
The conclusions relating to general medical practice, concerning levels of misdiagnosis 
are given in Subsection I-4(i); those relating to iatrogenic harm, in Subsection I-4(ii); 
and those relating to ADRs, in Subsection I-4(iii).  
I-4(i): Misdiagnosis 
Leape (supra) suggested 10% as an initial estimate of the rate of iatrogenic harm in 
Ireland; a figure considerably in excess of the US rate at 4% however as stated earlier 
this was an estimate given informally and without accompanying evidence.  The only 
conclusion that was drawn was that the rate of iatrogenic harm in Ireland is at least 
comparable to that found in the United States; similarly it would seem reasonable to 
conclude that, in the absence of authoritative studies, the rate of misdiagnosis in Ireland 
is at least as high that those found in the US which are summarised in Table I-2 (infra).   
Study Rate Type 
Lundberg (1998) 40% Postmortem 
Shojania, K. et al (2003) Major error rate: 8.4% – 24.4% 
Class I: 4.1% – 6.7% 
Meta-analysis of autopsy 
studies on misdiagnosis 
Dessmon, Y. et al (2001) 19.8% Direct study of the rate of 
misdiagnosis in an ICU 
                               Table I-2: Estimates of misdiagnosis in general medicine 
Based on such considerations, it may be concluded51 that a conservative estimate of the 
rate of misdiagnosis in general (i.e. non-psychiatric) medical practice in Ireland, is in 
the region of 25%. 
                                               
49
 Op. cit., Para 3.5. 
50
 Ibid., Para 4.4.  See also Chapter 5. 
51
 The ‘Precautionary Principle’ (supra) adds independent support to this conclusion.  
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I-4(ii):Iatrogenic harm  
US and UK estimates of the rates of iatrogenic harm and ‘major’ or ‘fatal’ harm are 
shown in the following table: 
Study Rate Major or Fatal Comments  
Steel (1981)  36% - of which 25% 
major 5% fatal 
Exposure to drugs was a particularly 
important factor 
Harvard (1991)  3.7% - of which 13.6% 
fatal 
Drug complications were the most common 
type of adverse event (19%) 
Institute of 
Medicine (1991) 
2.9% to 
3.7% 
- of which 6.6% to 
13.6% fatal 
 
Australian (1995) 16.5%   
UK (2005) 10%   Significant under-reporting of deaths and 
serious incidents. 
                        Table I-3: Estimates of iatrogenic harm in general medicine 
 The studies summarised in Table I-3, suggest 10% as a tentative estimate of the 
proportion of iatrogenic harms that result in fatalities; inappropriate pharmaceutical 
treatments being a common source of such harms.52 
I-4(iii): Medication errors and level of reporting of ADRs in Ireland 
The report of the Oireachtas sub-committee cited estimates of the levels of medication 
errors occurring in individual Irish hospitals ranging from 25% to 52%; in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary,53 these can be taken as generally representative.  
Furthermore, based both on the evidence given to the sub-committee and on its own 
conclusions, ADRs are grossly underreported in Ireland.54 
I-5: Iatrogenic harm in Irish psychiatric practice55  
Had the iatrogenic consequences of psychiatric interventions (including medication) 
received the same level of scrutiny as has non-psychiatric interventions, then the 
excursus into discussing the general levels of iatrogenic harm (such as has been 
undertaken in earlier sections of this chapter) would not have been necessary; but such 
studies do not exist and it is only by means of such a circuitous route that estimates of 
harm caused by psychiatric intervention can be made.   
It is clear that the uncovering of iatrogenic harm due to drug errors can only occur in an 
environment where there is an obligation to maintain accurate and detailed records.  As 
                                               
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 In a letter to The Irish Times [22 October 2009] Dr. Orla O’Donovan of the Department of Applied 
Social Studies, University College Cork, stated: “In 2007, the IMB received only 206 ADR reports from 
GPs, indicating that fewer than one in 10 GPs on average submit one ADR report a year to this voluntary 
reporting system.” 
55
 The following discussion is restricted to pharmaceutical treatments [see supra]. 
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evidenced by the reports of the Inspector of Mental Hospitals, Irish psychiatric practice 
is deeply remiss in this regard: 
… drug prescribing in some locations is often arbitrary and made without regard 
to appropriate clinical diagnosis.  …  In some instances, the prescriptions had not 
been reviewed for some considerable time.  …  There appeared to be an 
increasing number of sudden deaths in psychiatric hospitals, some of which were 
attributed to drug-related effects.56 
This raises the question as to the default presumptions that should be decreed in cases 
where full information on the level of harm consequent on psychiatric intervention, is 
unavailable: should examples of such harm be regarded as isolated [the “few bad 
apples” scenario] or as indicative of a considerably more extensive problem [the “tip of 
the iceberg” scenario].  The problem is discussed infra.  
Two case histories are discussed [Subsection I-5(i)]; the first [the Cromer Case] 
provides a window into institutional attitudes towards the reporting of adverse patient 
events in a psychiatric institution; the second [the Neary Case] is indicative of the 
unwillingness of the medical professional bodies, at the highest levels, to actively 
uncover and resolve cases of serious and sustained iatrogenic harm.   
Some of the Oireachtas Sub-Committee’s conclusions concerning psychiatric 
medications are discussed in Subsection I-5(ii); and some conclusions are drawn in 
Subsection I-5(iii) concerning the extent of iatrogenic harm occurring in Irish 
psychiatric practice.  
I-5(i): The Cromer and Neary cases 
The Cromer case concerns an inquiry into the death of an elderly psychiatric patient, a 
Ms. Hannah Cromer, who, having been originally diagnosed as schizophrenic, had been 
hospitalised for 35 years.  Ms. Cromer choked to death whilst restrained to a chair by a 
belt;57 but was reported by hospital staff as having “passed away” and the information 
relating to the exact circumstances of the death was not recorded in case notes.  Staff 
removed Ms Comber’s body and “dressed her in new clothes ‘for her dignity’.”58 
                                               
56
 Walsh (1998), pp.3–4; and also: 
The Inspectorate is concerned about the adequacy and quality of medical note taking in some 
mental health services.  This relates particularly to consultant inputs both on, or shortly after, 
admission to hospital and subsequent clinical reviews and progress.  
57
 O’Riordan, S. (2007) “Gardaí ‘made me change my statement on patient’s death’ ” The Irish Examiner, 
5 April.   
Roche, B. (2007), ‘Hospitals urged to examine rules on restraint’, The Irish Times, 5 April.   
58
 O’Riordan (2007) (supra).  
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Ms. Cromer’s GP regarded the death as unexpected and reported it to the Garda 
Síochána.  A post mortem “… was emphatic that Ms. Comber died from asphyxia as a 
result of her neck becoming entangled in the restraining belt of her chair.”59   
In their initial statements to the guards, the two nursing staff who had been present, 
stated that Ms. Comber had slipped down in her chair and the belt became entangled 
around her neck and she became asphyxiated.  These statement were withdrawn at the 
inquest with one nurse claiming that she had been coerced by the guards into making 
her statement.  A verdict of misadventure was returned. 
The Comber case is not an isolated example of the concealment of iatrogenic harm in 
Ireland:60 the investigations61 consequent on the disciplinary hearings relating to the 
obstetrician Dr. Neary62 provide ample evidence to the existence in Ireland of a culture63 
amongst medical professionals – not only of unwillingness to highlight medical errors – 
but to actively conceal64 such errors.  (It should be noted that the Lourdes Inquiry found 
no evidence of bad faith on the part of Dr. Neary and – had the events in question 
occurred in a psychiatric setting – the absence of male fides would be a substantial bar65 
to a patient taking a civil action against Dr. Neary.)  
                                               
59
 Roche (2007) (supra).  
60
 See also Chapter 6 concerning a report [MHC (2009)] into allegations of ill-treatment of patients in two 
mental hospitals in County Tipperary.  The inquiry had been prompted by reports of high levels of 
fractures being suffered by patients and this had led to suspicions of staff abuse of patients and calls for a 
Garda inquiry.  The reports first came to light in 2004 and were not discussed by the regional authorities 
until 2005 and then not fully investigated. 
61
 Harding-Clarke (2006).   
See also the reports of the Medical Council of Ireland investigation into the behaviour of Dr. John 
Murphy, Dr. Bernard Stuart and Professor Walter Prendiville who had, in an earlier inquiry, exonerated 
Dr. Neary.  [Online], available: 
https://www.medicalcouncil.ie/news/publicationsarticle.asp?NID=182&T=N [accessed: 9 April 2007 ].   
62
 Harding-Clarke (2006).  Dr. Neary had performed a number of caesarean hysterectomies on patients 
which were not justified on medical grounds and some of which had been performed against the patients’ 
express wishes.  
63
 In that subsequent to events leading to the establishment of the Lourdes Inquiry becoming public, Dr. 
John Murphy – one of the three consultants who had exonerated Dr. Neary – was elected as President of 
The Royal College of Physicians in Ireland though he subsequently resigned this position.   
See Wall, M. (2007) ‘RCPI president resigns after Neary inquiry’, The Irish Times, 22 February.   
64
 A report commissioned by the Medical Council of Ireland found that some complaints made to the 
Council against Neary, were not acknowledged or not recorded and investigations were subject to long 
delays.   
See Bowers, F. ‘Lessons from Neary controversy’ Irish Health.com [online], available: 
http://www.irishhealth.com/index.html?level=4&id=5111 [accessed: 9 April 2007 ].   
One of the consultants who had exonerated Neary, did so with the words: “ … it is my view that the 
mothers of the North Eastern Health Board are fortunate in having the service of such an experienced 
and caring obstetrician.”  [See Harding-Clarke (2006) p.13]. 
65
 See Appendix A.    
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I-5(ii): Oireachtas Sub-Committee66 on psychiatric medications67 
- Submissions::  
Executive Summary:  
4.  … It was asserted that these medicines had dangerous, even fatal side 
effects, yet were prescribed extensively.   
4.1. … submissions made a number of points:  
• … the drugs are often prescribed on the basis of very limited 
observation of the patient; 
• they generate side effects which are misdiagnosed as causal, leading 
to further medication;  
• the side effects include, behavioural disorders, physical illness, 
dependence, suicidal ideation and even suicide;  
• … even where the risks of these side effects are well known they seem 
not to be fully appreciated or are ignored by prescribers;  
• … even setting aside the risk of side effects, some of the drugs are of 
doubtful benefit.  
 
4.12.  ADRs may arise because practitioners have an exaggerated view of 
the benefit of the drugs in relation to its drawbacks. 
- Conclusions:: 
5.3. … the influence of the pharmaceuticals industry … is unhealthy and 
needs to be counterbalanced. 
5.5. … need to assign a higher priority to pharmacovigilance activities, 
including reporting of ADRs. 
5.23. … the excessive use of medication prescribed by health care 
professionals and excessive use of psychiatric drug therapies in particular.  
Some of the responsibility for this lies in the promotional activities of the 
drug companies … 
I-5(iii): Conclusions relating to the levels of iatrogenic harm in Irish 
psychiatric practice 
The extent of iatrogenic harm in Ireland is being uncovered by a haphazard process – 
the circumstances surrounding the death of Ms. Cromer were uncovered despite the 
efforts of the psychiatric medical professionals, a series of fortuitous circumstances lead 
to the uncovering of Dr. Neary’s malpractice – other countries have adopted a much 
more proactive stance.68  
In the absence of such institutions in Ireland – and, therefore, in the absence of reliable, 
detailed statistics in relation to iatrogenic harm – how should the risk of such harm be 
                                               
66
 Oireachtas Joint Committee on Health and Children, (2007). 
67
 The Oireachtas subcommittee report did not consider errors in diagnosis.  [Op. cit., Para. 4.10.] 
68
 For example:  
- in the UK, the establishment of the NPSA (supra),  
- in Sweden, the ‘Lex Maria’ – which was enacted as early as 1937 – sought to ensure mandatory 
reporting of any serious patient injury, or even risk of serious injury, and extends to the psychiatric 
services.  [See Ödegård (1998)]. 
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incorporated into discussion of medical decision making?  When it is known that 
iatrogenic harm does indeed occur, can any conclusions be drawn in relation to the 
prevalence of such harm?  What should the ‘default’ presumption be?  
At the extremes, two conclusions are possible: 
(i) that, cases such as the Neary, Cromer and other cases, are isolated cases; i.e. 
adverse events occur to an extent commensurate with their reporting [the “few 
bad apples” scenario]. 
(ii) that such cases are indicative of a pervasive laxity towards the reporting of 
adverse events in Irish hospitals and, in particular, Irish psychiatric hospitals; i.e. 
adverse events occur to an appreciably greater extent than is reported [the “tip of 
the iceberg” scenario].  
The principles underlying the choice of default assumptions have been examined in 
Chapter 1 and the conclusion drawn that the Precautionary Principle is applicable and 
favours the adoption of the second option.  Furthermore, the adoption of the first of the 
above options, would tend towards an acceptance of the status quo and its lax practices 
in relation to patient safety, whereas adopting the second create a momentum towards 
uncovering adverse events and consequently minimising harm; I suggest that the 
conclusion must be drawn that, in the absence of robust evidence to the contrary, the 
default presumption should be that adverse events occur in Irish Hospitals and, in 
particular, Irish psychiatric hospitals, to an extent appreciably greater than is reported.     
__________ 
As an indicator of the extent of underreporting, I will attempt (by using statistics 
discussed in earlier section of this chapter) to estimate the number of deaths that might 
by expected to occur in one year in Irish Psychiatric Hospitals because of iatrogenic 
effects of pharmaceutical treatments, and then compare it with the estimate made by the 
Inspector of Mental Hospitals.   
[For the purposes of analysis I have taken the year 1998 as a base principally 
because statistics for the number of sudden deaths attributable to psychotropic 
medication have been made available by the Inspector of Mental Hospitals for that 
year.]  
 
(i) The total number of admissions to Irish psychiatric hospitals in 1998 was 
21,895.69   
(ii) The Harvard Study (supra) estimated the number of adverse events for the US (as 
a percentage of total hospitalisations) as 3.7%;70 Leape, one of the authors of the 
                                               
69
 Walsh (1998), Table 4. 
70
 Brennan (1991) (supra): “Adverse events occurred in 3.7% of the hospitalizations …”  
 447 
 
 
report, suggested 10% as an appropriate estimate for Ireland71 however, as stated 
above, this was an estimate given in informal circumstances and the conclusion that 
was drawn (supra) was that the rate for Ireland was at least comparable to the United 
States. 
(iii) Assuming the level of iatrogenic harm in psychiatric hospitals equates72 with 
that of non-psychiatric hospitals, this suggests that  810 patents suffered iatrogenic 
harm in Irish psychiatric hospitals in 1998.  
(iv) Removing all non-pharmacologically related iatrogenic harm73 from 
consideration so that the focus is placed solely on ‘drug complications’, permits the 
number of psychiatric admissions likely to suffer iatrogenic harm due to medication, 
to be estimated; this figure is 154.74 
(v) Of these 154,75 15 would be expected to suffer fatal complications.  
(vi) The Inspector of Mental Hospitals has only identified seven deaths in 1998 
relating to the ‘side-effect of psychotropic drug administration’;76 in that the 
Inspector makes no reference to deaths due to incorrect administration or prescription 
of medications, it appears that this figure should be interpreted as being the total 
number of iatrogenic fatalities due medication.  
I wish to draw the conclusion that the level of fatal iatrogenic harm caused to 
psychiatric inpatients by psychiatric medications exceeds, by orders of magnitude, that 
reported by the Inspector Of Mental Hospitals.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
71
 Supra 
72
 Because certain procedures - such as surgery – which may be thought to incur a higher risk of 
iatrogenic harm (though see the earlier discussion for an alternative point of view) are far more common 
in non-psychiatric hospitals than in psychiatric hospitals, this presumption may be questioned; though it 
should be noted that the estimate in the following paragraph omits 81% of such harm from consideration 
which may be thought to err in the opposite direction. 
73
 Which constitutes 81% of iatrogenic harm; see Leape (1991) (supra): “Drug complications were the 
most common type of adverse event (19%) …” 
74
 3.7% of 21,895 equals 810; 19% of 810 equals 154. 
75
 Institute of Medicine (1999), p.1. (supra): “In Colorado and Utah hospitals, 6.6% of adverse events led 
to death, as compared with 13.6% in New York hospitals.” 
I have taken the mean of 6.6% and 13.6 % (i.e. 10.1%) as an estimate. 
76
 Walsh, D. (1999). ‘Letters to the Editor: Deaths in Mental Hospitals.’ The Irish Times. 26 Nov.   
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Appendix J: Pharmaceutical company influence on 
psychiatric research 
The economic importance of the pharmaceutical industry (and of psychiatry to the 
pharmaceutical industry) is sketched in Subsection J-1.  Some methods of uncovering 
pharmaceutical company influence on research results are discussed in Subsection J-2; 
some studies on the pervasiveness of such influence are discussed in Subsection J-3.  
Conclusions are summarised in Subsection J-4. 
J-1:The financial importance of psychiatry to the pharmaceutical 
industry 
The magnitude of global sales of pharmaceutical products [$664 billion]1 gives an 
indication both of the importance of the pharmaceutical industry to the global economy 
and of the importance of the key market leading drugs to individual pharmaceutical 
companies. 
The importance of psychiatric pharmaceutical treatments to the global pharmaceutical 
industry is shown by the fact that of the ten top selling drugs, numbers six, seven and 
eight were psychiatric treatments; all were atypical antipsychotics2 and these three 
accounted for 23% of the sales of top ten global pharmaceutical products.3   
The importance of the pharmaceutical industry to the Irish economy is shown by the 
fact that it accounted for 40% of exports in 2006;4 in that year only two Irish companies 
                                               
1
 Total global sales of pharmaceutical products in 2007 amounted to $664 billion of which the top ten 
products accounted for $64 billion.  IMS Global Healthcare, [online], available: 
http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/Content/StaticFile/Top_Line_Data/Top10Glo
balProducts.pdf [accessed: 22 December, 2008].   
2
 Zyprexa (olanzapine), Risperdal (risperidone) and Seroquel (quetiapine). 
3
 See also Barber(2008): 
And today’s psychiatry really is corporate.  A large proportion, arguably the largest portion, of the 
major pharmaceutical companies’ extraordinary profits in recent decades has come from 
psychiatric drugs.  The medical historian Carl Elliott has written that antidepressants were one of 
the most profitable products in the most profitable industry in the world over the course of the 
1990s.  
4
 Irish Pharmaceutical Healthcare Association (2006), Press release, 19 July: 
The industry has made a very significant contribution to the economy with corporate tax payments 
of over €3 billion annually. The high-value and knowledge-intensive nature of the industry is 
reflected in the level of exports, which now account for over 40% of total manufacturing exports 
from Ireland. 
[online], available: 
http://www.ipha.ie/htm/mediacentre/download/pressreleases/InnovationForfasReport.pdf [accessed: 9 
February 2009].    
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were listed in the ‘Forbes Global 500’5, one of which – Elan – was a pharmaceutical 
company. 
These figures show the deep interconnection between the pharmaceutical industry and 
the finance and banking industries and helps explain why the development of new 
pharmaceutical treatments is often reported on the financial pages of newspapers rather 
than on those dealing with health. 
Elan provides an example of the sensitivity of financial markets not only to the results 
of drug trials, but to the categorisation of individual adverse events occurring during 
those trials:  
The makers of a promising new drug for multiple sclerosis abruptly pulled it off 
the market Monday after one patient died of a rare central nervous system 
disorder.  Biogen Idec Inc. and Elan Corp. saw massive drops in their share prices 
and lost nearly $18 billion in market value combined.6 
That such extreme financial consequences could be precipitated by the clinical  decision 
to categorise the death of a single patient as being due to the side effects of a drug rather 
than to some extraneous cause, clearly makes it difficult to prevent the values of the 
market place from intruding into clinical research.  It is self evident that in the presence 
of such market volatility, the pharmaceutical industry will seek to exercise its influence 
both on the reporting of clinical trials (the precondition for drug sales) and on the 
prescribing of the drugs themselves.    
J-2: The uncovering of pharmaceutical company influence   
The distortion of psychiatric research by pharmaceutical companies has been revealed 
principally7 through litigation [J-2(i)] and the uncovering of previously undisclosed 
financial links to researchers [J-2(ii)].   
J-2(i): Drug trial data uncovered during litigation 
Of the trial data found to have been withheld, the most relevant to this dissertation 
concern antidepressants [J-2(i)(a)] and antipsychotics [J-2(i)(b)].   
J-2(i)(a): Antidepressants 
Documentation concerning the negative effects of the antidepressant Paxil came to light 
when the New York State attorney general, Eliot Spitzer, sued8 the manufacturers 
                                               
5
 Finfacts Ireland (2007). ‘R&D Scorecard Global Top 1,000 Companies’.  19 December. [online], 
available: http://www.finfacts.com/irelandbusinessnews/publish/article_10003718.shtml [accessed: 9 
February 2009].   
6
 Girion, L. & Gellene, D. (2005). ‘Patient’s Death Halts New MS Drug.’ Los Angeles Times. 1 March.     
‘Tysabri’ was the drug being tested. 
7
 It has also been revealed by ex-employees and ‘whistle-blowers’; see, for example, Fugh-Berman & 
Melnick (2008) and Kesselheim (2010). 
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(GlaxoSmithKline) for withholding data concerning its use in the treatment of 
adolescent depression.  At the time Paxil was the second most widely prescribed 
antidepressant for children.9   
The data which had been withheld, had shown that the drug had not only failed to 
confer any benefit over placebo treatment but had lead to an increase in suicidal 
ideation.  The research paper which had originally been published10 and which had 
advocated Paxil for the treatment of adolescent depression, had been ‘ghostwritten’11 
and the data had been manipulated to give the impression of efficacy.12    
J-2(i)(a): Antipsychotics 
The documentation concerning the negative effects of the antipsychotic Zyprexa came 
to light during a civil action claiming that the drug’s manufacturers – Lilly – had 
withheld information about the drugs links to obesity and diabetes.13  The plaintiffs 
made the documents publically available in contravention to the order of the court.14   
Lilly who had been threatened with criminal proceedings, offered $1billion in addition 
to $1.2 billion already paid in settlement of 30,000 lawsuits.15   
The case also highlighted the use of ‘off-label’ marketing.16   
- Antipsychotics prescribed for children  
The number of American children and adolescents diagnosed with bipolar disorder 
increased 40-fold from 1994 to 2003.  A report in the New York Times stated that: 
The children’s treatments almost always included medication.  About half 
received antipsychotic drugs like Risperdal from Janssen or Seroquel from 
Astrazeneca, both developed to treat schizophrenia.  
… The spread of the diagnosis is a boon to drug makers, …17   
                                                                                                                                          
8
 Harris, G. (2004). ‘Spitzer Sues a Drug Maker, Saying It Hid Negative Data.’ The New York Times. 3 
June.  
9
 Friedman (2008). 
10
 Nine studies on the effectiveness of Paxil had been undertaken but only one had been published. 
[Keller (2001)].  
11
 That is it was originally written by the pharmaceutical company and then published under the names of 
the putative researchers.  
12
 Friedman (2008); Grohol (2008) provides links to the original documents. 
13
 See Walsh, M. (2008). ‘Judge to Unseal Documents on the Eli Lilly Drug Zyprexa.’  The New York 
Times. 5 September.  
14
 The Court, though giving access to the documents to the plaintiffs’ lawyers, held that they were 
confidential to the pharmaceutical company and had ordered that they be withheld from the public. 
15
 Berenson, A. (2008a). ‘Lilly Considers $1 Billion Fine to Settle Case.’ The New York Times. 31 
January. 
16
 Ibid.  Whereas ‘off-label’ prescribing by doctors is legal, off-label marketing by pharmaceutical 
companies is not.   
17
 Carey. B. (2007). ‘Bipolar Illness Soars as a Diagnosis for the Young.’ The New York Times. 4 
September.  
Harris (2008a) noted that: “More than a quarter of the prescriptions for Risperdal were for children and 
adolescents.” 
Harris, G. (2008a). ‘Research Center Tied to Drug Company’, The New York Times. 24 November 
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The health risks associated with the drug are considerable and had been poorly 
researched.18 
The increase in the diagnoses of bipolar disorder in children is widely credited19 to Dr. 
Joseph Biederman20 of Harvard University and one of the most influential researchers in 
child psychiatry.21  Biederman advocated Risperdal for the treatment of childhood 
bipolar disorder.  
A court case between parents of children harmed by Risperdal and the drug’s 
manufacturers [Johnson & Johnson] resulted in the release of emails between 
Biederman and the manufacturers concerning the financing of a proposed research 
center: 
… with a goal to “move forward the commercial goals of J.& J.”… “The 
rationale of this center,” the message stated, “is to generate and disseminate data 
supporting the use of risperidone in” children and adolescents.”22 
Other emails concerned a study that was to be presented under the name of Biederman, 
to the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry; Dr. Pandina (a company 
executive) wrote to Biederman:  
“We have generated a review abstract but I must review this longer abstract 
before passing this along.”  One problem with the study, Dr. Pandina wrote, is 
that the children given placebos and those given Risperdal both improved 
significantly. “So, if you could,” Dr. Pandina added, “please give some thought to 
how to handle this issue if it occurs.”   
The draft … stated that only the children given Risperdal improved, while those 
given placebos did not.23 
Commenting on these disclosures a New York Times editorial wondered whether 
Biederman was “… a paid shill for the drug industry.”24 
                                               
18
 Harris (2008b): 
From 1993 through the first three months of 2008, 1,207 children given Risperdal suffered serious 
problems, including 31 who died.  Among the deaths was a 9-year-old with attention deficit 
problems who suffered a fatal stroke 12 days after starting therapy with Risperdal.  At least 11 of 
the deaths were children whose treatment with Risperdal was unapproved by the F.D.A.  Panel 
members said they had for years been concerned about the effects of Risperdal and similar 
medicines, but F.D.A. officials said no studies had been done to test the drugs’ long-term safety. 
Harris, G. (2008b) ‘Use of Antipsychotics in Children Is Criticized.’ The New York Times, 18 November. 
Also see Harris (2008a): “Although many of his studies are small and often financed by drug makers, Dr. 
Biederman has had a vast influence on the field largely because of his position at one of the most 
prestigious medical institutions.” 
19
 See, for example, Harris (2008b). 
20
 The findings of the Senate subcommittee concerning undisclosed pharmaceutical company funding to 
Biederman is discussed infra.  
21
 Harris, G & Carey, B. (2008). ‘Researchers Fail to Reveal Full Drug Pay.’ The New York Times. 8 
June.  
22
 Harris (2008a).  
23
 Ibid. 
24
 New York Times (2008). ‘Editorial: Expert or Shill?’. The New York Times. 29 November. 
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J-2(ii): Undisclosed financial links between psychiatrists and 
pharmaceutical companies  
The extent of the financial links between psychiatrists and pharmaceutical companies – 
though long suspected – were uncovered, in the US, by virtue of the passing of the 
Physician Payments Sunshine Act (2007)25 sponsored by Senators Grassley and Kohl.   
Prior to these developments two states – Minnesota and Vermont – had required 
disclosure of pharmaceutical company payments to physicians and this provides an 
alternative source of data.  No comparable system of disclosure exists in the UK26 or 
Ireland.. 
Payments fall into two broad categories:27  
- inducements offered to individual clinicians with a view to influencing their 
individual prescribing patterns [J-2(ii)(a)];  
- payments to academics and researchers which may influence research results [J-
2(ii)(b)].  
J-2(ii)(a): Individual inducements 
Although most physicians deny that receiving free lunches, subsidized trips, or other 
gifts from pharmaceutical companies has any effect on their practices, Campbell (2008) 
oppugns the validity of such claims, by asking:  
After all, if these relationships didn't affect physician behavior in such a way as to 
increase sales, companies wouldn't spend $19 billion each year establishing and 
maintaining them.28 
In relation to psychiatry, the Senate subcommittee: “… found an orchard of low-
hanging fruit.”29  Though psychiatrists earn less in base salary than any other 
specialists, their total remuneration tops all others when consulting arrangements are 
taken into account.30  In Vermont, for example: 
                                               
25
 So named because it aims to "… shine a much needed ray of sunlight on a situation that contributes to 
the exorbitant cost of health care".  [Campbell (2007), p.1796] 
26
 Where pharmaceutical company payments to doctors have been described as being “… far from 
transparent.”  [See Boseley, S. & Evans, R. (2008). ‘Drug giants accused over doctors' perks’. The 
Guardian. 23 August.]. 
27
 Payment have also been made to patient advocacy groups, see, for example, Harris (2009): 
Earlier this year, Mr. Grassley sent a similar letter to the National Alliance on Mental Illness.  In 
response, the group told the senator that more than two-thirds of its donations come from the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
Harris, G. (2009). ‘Senator Grassley Seeks Financial Details From Medical Groups.’ The New York 
Times. 7 December.  
28
 Campbell (2007), p.1796. 
29
 Carey, B. & Harris, G. (2008) ‘Psychiatric Group Faces Scrutiny Over Drug Industry Ties’ The New 
York Times. 12 July.  
30
 Ibid. 
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 … psychiatrists earn more money from drug makers than doctors in any other 
specialty. … the more psychiatrists have earned from drug makers, the more they 
have prescribed a new class of powerful medicines known as atypical 
antipsychotics to children, for whom the drugs are especially risky and mostly 
unapproved.31   
An analysis of data from Minnesota yielded similar conclusions.32   
An indicator of the amount of money involved can be gleaned from the fact that “… 
more than 250 Minnesota psychiatrists together earned $6.7 million in drug company 
money — more than any other specialty.”33 and from payments to a psychiatrist member 
of a Minnesota Drug Formulary Committee who had earned more than $350,000 from 
Eli Lilly and AstraZeneca between 2004 and 2006 in honoraria, speaker's and 
consulting fees,34 though he denied that his clinical decisions had been influenced.35   
__________ 
In assessing the effect of such undeclared payments, an analogy might be provided by 
considering the case of a judge, who having decided a court case, was found to have 
received payments from an interested party.  An appropriate rule in such situations, is to 
the effect that even where there is an absence of direct evidence that gifts influenced a 
decision, the fact that a gift is undeclared is sufficient to ‘shift the burden of proof’ and 
to warrant the conclusion that verdicts are to be regarded as tainted unless the contrary 
be clearly proved.36   
The application of such a rule to undeclared pharmaceutical contributions to clinical and 
research psychiatrists would imply that all such contributions should be regarded as 
tainting any research or other decision unless and until the contrary be proved.  
J-2(ii)(b): Financial links to academics and researchers 
The Senate subcommittee investigations proceeded by way of obtaining details from the 
pharmaceutical companies, as to their payments to individual psychiatrists and then 
comparing this data with the declarations of funding made by the psychiatrists 
themselves either to their universities or to academic journals when submitting articles 
for publication; two examples are given:  
- Dr. Biederman (supra) a psychiatrist at Harvard University;  
                                               
31
 Harris, G. (2007). ‘Psychiatrists Top List in Drug Maker Gifts.’ The New York Times. 27 June. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Harris, G. & Roberts, J. (2007). ‘Doctors’ Ties to Drug Makers Are Put on Close View.’ The New York 
Times. 21 March.  
34
 Lohn, M. (2007). ‘Minn. Law Sheds Light on Drug Companies.’ The Washington Post. 21 August.  
35
 Yet, as noted by Lohn, (2007): “The top drugs for Minnesota Medicaid patients covered by the panel's 
advice in recent years have been schizophrenia treatments from Eli Lilly & Co. and AstraZeneca … ” 
36
 See, for example, Urbina, I. & Hamill, S. (2009). ‘Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for 
Profit.’ The New York Times. 12 February.  
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- Dr. Nemeroff, a psychiatrist at Emory University.   
A further example concerns undeclared payments to a prominent media psychiatrist (Dr. 
Goodwin) and the final example details financial links between the pharmaceutical 
industry and the American Psychiatric Association.  
- Biederman37 
Since the mid 1990s Biederman (supra) promoted the aggressive diagnosis of childhood 
bipolar disorder and advocated the use of antipsychotics in its treatment.  In 2008, 
Senator Grassley reported that: 
Biederman, a renowned child psychiatrist at Harvard Medical School, and a 
colleague … had reported to university officials earning several hundred thousand 
dollars each in consulting fees from drug makers from 2000 to 2007, when in fact 
they had earned at least $1.6 million each. … Another member of the Harvard 
group … reported earning at least $1 million after being pressed by Mr. 
Grassley’s investigators.38 
- Nemeroff 
Nemeroff who has been described as “one of the nation’s most influential research 
psychiatrists”,39 was editor of Neuropsychopharmacology which had printed a review of 
a device for the treatment for depression40 but had omitted to reveal the financial ties of 
the reviewer – and of the editor – to the company (Cyberonics) marketing the device.  
Because the device’s licensing by the FDA had been controversial:41  
                                               
37
 See the earlier discussion on documents released during litigation which evidenced the nature of the 
relationship between Biederman and the makers of an antipsychotic drug used in the treatment of 
childhood bipolar disorder.  
38
 Carey & Harris (2008) supra. 
39
 Carey, B. (2006). ‘Correcting the Errors of Disclosure.’ The New York Times. 25 July. 
40
 The ‘vagus nerve stimulator’ is a device surgically implanted in the upper chest which stimulates a 
nerve leading to the brain. 
41
 Carey (2006): 
The treatment … was approved for depression in 2005 after intense debate over its effectiveness. 
… In a bitter debate over the interpretation of these results, more than 20 experts at the Food and 
Drug Administration opposed the approval of the device for depression before being overruled by 
a senior official, according to a Senate Finance Committee investigation.  
Even though the vagus nerve stimulator had been shown to be no more effective than a placebo as a 
treatment for depression, its proponents had urged that it should be licensed as a treatment for patients 
whose depression had previously proved intractable.  An advisory panel having heard testimonials from a 
number of patients, approved the device; its chairwoman Dr. Kyra Becker stated "The feeling was that 
anything that gives these people hope is potentially worthwhile."  
[Carey, B. (2005) ‘F.D.A. Considers Implant Device for Depression.’ The New York Times. 21 May.]. 
A later report gives an indication of the magnitude of the financial interests involved:  
… more than 550 Americans have undergone surgery to have a vagus nerve stimulator (VNS) 
implanted … Another 7,000 people … are seeking approval from their insurance companies for 
the $25,000 operation.  More than 3,700 psychiatrists … have been trained in the use of VNS, …. 
[Boodman S. (2006). ‘Mood Machine: Now There's a Device to Treat Depression. If Only There Were 
Solid Evidence That It Works’. Washington Post, 21 March.] 
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The device begged for some more public analysis.  But few if any outside experts 
knew the data well enough to raise questions. And the scientists who did know the 
science and the data were all on the company’s payroll.42 
The publication of the review was criticised by Emory University, its associate dean 
stating: “I can’t believe that anyone in the public or in academia would believe 
anything except that this paper was a piece of paid marketing.”43  
Letters written by Nemeroff to the university which surfaced during congressional 
hearings shows that the university itself was not a disinterested party:  
“Surely you remember that Smith-Kline Beecham Pharmaceuticals donated an 
endowed chair to the department and that there is some reasonable likelihood that 
Janssen Pharmaceuticals will do so as well,” he wrote.   
“In addition, Wyeth-Ayerst Pharmaceuticals has funded [an] … Award program 
in the department, and I have asked both AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals and 
Bristol-Meyers [sic] Squibb to do the same.“44 
__________ 
In 2008, Senator Grassley revealed that Nemeroff: 
… earned more than $2.8 million in consulting arrangements with drugmakers 
from 2000 to 2007, failed to report at least $1.2 million of that income to his 
university and violated federal research rules.45 
- Goodwin 
Dr. Goodwin, a psychiatrist who had written an influential textbook on bipolar disorder 
and was an adjunct professor at George Washington University, had hosted a 
prestigious US National Public Radio programme46 which had: 
… more than one million listeners in more than 300 radio markets.  The program 
has received major underwriting from the National Institutes of Health and the 
National Science Foundation …47 
Goodwin had earned at least $1.3 million from 2000 to 2007 giving marketing lectures 
for drugmakers, income not mentioned on the program, nor declared to his employers.48  
His weekly radio programs had often touched on subjects important to the commercial 
interests of the companies for which he consulted: 
… he warned that children with bipolar disorder who were left untreated could 
suffer brain damage, a controversial view.  ''But as we'll be hearing today,'' Dr. 
                                               
42
 Carey (2006) supra.  
43
 Harris, G. (2008c). ‘Top Psychiatrist Didn’t Report Drug Makers’ Pay.’ The New York Times. 3 
October. 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Harris, G. (2008d). ‘Drugmakers Paid Radio Host $1.3 Million for Lectures.’ The New York Times. 22 
November. 
46
 Harris (2008d): ''The Infinite Mind'' has won more than 60 journalism awards over 10 years and bills 
itself as ''public radio's most honored and listened to health and science program.'' 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Ibid: ''The fact that he was out on the stump for pharmaceutical companies was not something we were 
aware of, … It would have violated our agreements.'' 
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Goodwin told his audience, ''modern treatments – mood stabilizers in particular – 
have been proven both safe and effective in bipolar children.''  That same day, 
GlaxoSmithKline paid Dr. Goodwin $2,500 to give a promotional lecture for its 
mood stabilizer drug, Lamictal, … In all, GlaxoSmithKline paid him more than 
$329,000 that year for promoting Lamictal, records given to Congressional 
investigators show.49  
- The American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
The APA, in response to a request50 from Senator Grassley’s subcommittee, reported 
that pharmaceutical companies provided about 30% of its $62.5 million in revenues in 
2006, the most recent year for which financial data were available.51  
The APA is the publisher of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(the ‘DSM’) which is currently in its fourth edition with the fifth edition in the 
consultative stage.52  The proposal of new categories of illness – e.g. ‘hypersexuality’, 
‘binge eating’ – are clearly of interest to the pharmaceutical industry in that the 
treatment of such proposed categories may provide an additional use for an existing or 
planned pharmaceutical product; the term ‘disease mongering’ has been coined to 
describe the proactive role taken by pharmaceutical companies in the creation of 
diseases for which they anticipate being able to provide treatment.53   
In such circumstances, it is self-evident that the influence of the pharmaceutical 
companies on the consultative panels needs to be minimised54 and to that end the  
psychiatrists working on such panels “agreed to limit their income from drug makers 
and other sources to $10,000 a year for the duration of the job.”55  In view of the 
magnitude of the financial interests involved, this appears to be a less than onerous 
burden.  
                                               
49
 Ibid. 
50
 The request stated: “I have come to understand that money from the pharmaceutical industry can shape 
the practices of nonprofit organizations that purport to be independent …” 
[Carey & Harris (2008) supra].  
51
 Ibid. 
52
 See the discussion on the DSM-V [draft] in Chapter 4. 
53
 See, for example, Moynihan (2002) and Kumar (2006).  
54
 See, for example, New York Times editorial: 
The pharmaceutical industry, in particular, doles out lots of money to doctors and academic 
experts in the form of speaking fees, consultancies, research grants and other financial benefits. 
And many of these recipients end up on federal advisory committees.  
… In one egregious example, a panel that favored marketing the controversial painkillers Bextra 
and Vioxx would have made the opposite recommendation if the experts with industry ties had 
been excluded from voting.  
The New York Times (2007) ‘Editorial: A Cleaner Food and Drug Agency.’ The New York Times. 23 
March 
55
 Carey, B. (2008). ‘Psychiatrists Revise the Book of Human Troubles.’ The New York Times. 17 
December.  
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Cosgrove (2006), noting that no earlier study had been made of the financial links 
between pharmaceutical companies and advisory panel members, examined the 
financial links of panel members involved in the DSM-IV process and concluded that: 
The connections are especially strong in those diagnostic areas where drugs are 
the first line of treatment for mental disorders. … 100% of the members of the 
panels on ‘Mood Disorders’ and ‘Schizophrenia and Other Psychotic Disorders’ 
had financial ties to drug companies.56 
It was not within the ambit of the study to determine whether these interests had been 
declared nor whether they had constituted a conflict of interest. 
J-3: The pervasiveness of pharmaceutical industry influence on 
medical research. 
Lest it be imagined that the above examples were unrepresentative, editorials from 
leading medical journals also attest to the corrosive influence of the pharmaceutical 
industry on both medical research and its reporting: a Journal of the American Medical 
Association editorial is quoted in J-3(i); a New England Journal of Medicine, in J-3(ii); 
a British Medical Journal J-3(iii) and an American Journal of Psychiatry, in J-3(iv). 
J-3(i): Journal of the American Medical Association 
An editorial entitled “Impugning the Integrity of Medical Science: The Adverse Effects 
of Industry Influence” began: 
The profession of medicine, in every aspect – clinical, education, and research – 
has been inundated with profound influence from the pharmaceutical and medical 
device industries.  This has occurred because physicians have allowed it to 
happen, and it is time to stop.57 
The editorial then discussed two articles published in that issue of the journal which 
detailed how in the marketing of its drug Vioxx, the manufacturers (Merck), in 
submissions to the FDA, misrepresented the mortality risk of the drug;58 and how it “… 
apparently manipulated dozens of publications to promote one of its products.”59  One 
of the articles illustrated how clinical trial articles and review articles had been ‘ghost–
written’ and their authorship attributed: “… to academically affiliated investigators who 
either had little to do with the study or review or who did not disclose financial support 
from the company.”60  The editorial clearly regards Merck’s behaviour as not being 
                                               
56
 Cosgrove (2006), p.154. 
57
 DeAngelis & Fontanarosa (2008), p.1833. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Ibid. 
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unusual: “But make no mistake – the manipulation of study results, authors, editors, and 
reviewers is not the sole purview of one company.”61  
J-3(ii): The New England Journal of Medicine 
An editorial entitled “Is Academic Medicine for Sale?” recounts how the journal wished 
to commission an editorialist to review an article on antidepressants, but found very few 
who did not have a possible conflict of interest:  
The ties between clinical researchers and industry include not only grant support, 
but also a host of other financial arrangements.  Researchers serve as consultants 
to companies whose products they are studying, join advisory boards … agree to 
be the listed authors of articles ghostwritten by interested companies, promote 
drugs and devices at company–sponsored symposiums, and allow themselves to 
be plied with expensive gifts and trips to luxurious settings.  Many also have 
equity interest in the companies.62 
The editorial went on to note that academic medical institutions are also compromised. 
J-3(iii): British Medical Journal (BMJ) 
The BMJ dedicated a full issue63 to the topic of pharmaceutical industry influence with 
an editorial asking:  
How did we reach the point where doctors expect their information, research, 
education, professional organisations, and attendance at conferences to be 
underwritten by drug companies?64 
In support, it referred to research which found that “… studies sponsored by 
pharmaceutical companies are four times as likely to have outcomes favouring the 
sponsor than are studies funded by other sources”.65   
A 2005 editorial revisited the same issues and referred to a House of Commons  report66 
on the influence of the pharmaceutical industry, which: 
 … found an industry that buys influence over doctors, charities, patient groups, 
journalists, and politicians, and whose regulation is sometimes weak or 
ambiguous. … Over half of all postgraduate medical education in the UK, and 
                                               
61
 Ibid. 
See also: Associated Press (2006). ‘Medical Journal Says It Was Again Misled’. The New York Times. 13 
July: 
For the second time in two months, The Journal of the American Medical Association says it was 
misled by researchers who failed to reveal financial ties to drug companies. … The latest incident 
… involves a study showing that pregnant women who stop taking antidepressants risk slipping 
back into depression.  Most of the 13 authors have financial ties to drug companies including 
antidepressant makers, but only two of them revealed their ties when the study was published in 
February.  Antidepressant use during pregnancy is controversial, and some studies have suggested 
that the drugs could pose risks to the fetus. 
62
 Angell (2000), p.1516. 
63
 British Medical Journal (2003); 326: 7400, entitled “Time to untangle doctors from drug companies.” 
64
 Abbasi & Smith (2003).  
65
 Ibid., citing Lexchin (2003). 
66
 House of Commons Health Committee (2005).   
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much education of nurses, is funded by the pharmaceutical industry from its 
annual marketing budget of £1.65bn.67 
The conclusions of the House of Commons report were mirrored those of an Oireachtas 
Joint Committee on Health and Children (2007) which also made some trenchant 
criticism of the pharmaceutical industry especially in relation to psychiatric drugs.68  
J-3(iv): The American Journal of Psychiatry (AJP)  
Although the AJP has published editorials69 on conflicts of interest, which noted failures 
in relation to academic psychiatry, these were – in contrast to the journals discussed 
above – essentially aspirational in tenor and curiously reticent about other possible 
examples of misconduct of which there appeared to be no shortage in academic and 
research psychiatry: for example, a study70 which had been published in the journal but 
a year earlier and which was “one of the first recent examinations of conflict of interest 
specifically in the psychiatric literature”71 had found:  
Results:  Among 397 clinical trials identified, …60% reported receiving funding 
from a pharmaceutical company … and … 47% included at least one author with 
a reported financial conflict of interest.   
… those that reported conflict of interest were 4.9 times more likely to report 
positive results; 
Conclusions:  Author conflict of interest appears to be prevalent among 
psychiatric clinical trials and to be associated with a greater likelihood of 
reporting a drug to be superior to placebo.72 
The reticence of the AJP stands in stark contrast to the observations of Tim Kendall, 
deputy director of the Royal College of Psychiatrists' Research Unit: 
In mental health 85% of all published trials are funded by the drug industry, … 
Allowing for the unsuccessful trials the industry does not publish, the figure is 
probably nearer 95%.73 
__________ 
The above discussion related to the influence of the pharmaceutical industry on 
researchers and academics, but it has also been suggested that both academic journals 
themselves74 and the FDA75 have also been compromised.  
                                               
67
 Ferner (2005).  
68
 See Appendix I (supra).  
69
 For example, Lewis (2006) and Freedman (2006). 
70
 Perlis (2005). 
71
 Ibid., p.1959. 
72
 Op. cit., p.1957. 
73
 Quoted in Boseley, S. (2009). ‘British doctor faces action over claims of 'ghost writing' for US drug 
company.’ The Guardian. 18 September. 
74
 See Smith (2006); Smith, who was a former editor of the British Medical Journal, relates how the New 
England Journal of Medicine was compromised in its reporting of both the original Vioxx study and 
subsequent evidence that the original Vioxx data had been incomplete.  He details how the owners of the 
journal had “ … grown fat on the profits and is keen not only to keep the profits coming but also to exploit 
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J-4: Summary of methods used to exert influence 
Listed below is a summary of some of the mechanisms – many of which have been 
mentioned in earlier discussion – which have been used by the pharmaceutical industry 
to exert influence on both psychiatric research and academic and clinical psychiatry: 
- design of drug tests; 
- commissioning of drug tests; 
- selective reporting of results of drug tests; 
- ‘targeting’ of academic critics;76 
- non–performance of follow-on tests;77 
- non–proactive monitoring of side-effects; 
- ghostwriting of journals articles;78 
- influence of academic journals;79 
- influence on diagnostic editorial committees; 
- ‘disease mongering’; 
- publication bias; 
- influence on academics; 
                                                                                                                                          
the brand.” which lead to conflicts with two editors who resigned and subsequently “published books 
bemoaning the excessive influence of the drug industry”.   
75
 A report issued by the Institute of Medicine on the FDA stated: 
“Some also have serious concerns that the regulator has been ‘captured’ by industry it regulates, 
that the agency is less willing to use the regulatory authority at its disposal,” the report said, 
criticizing the agency’s regulatory tools as “all-or-nothing.” 
See Harris, G. (2006). ‘Study Condemns F.D.A.’s Handling of Drug Safety’.  The New York Times. 23 
September. 
See also Shuchman (2007) who details the controversy surrounding the licensing by the FDA of the vagus 
nerve stimulator (supra).  
76
 Marks & Verkaik (2010): 
Merck also drew up a "hit list" of doctors and academics who needed to be "neutralised" or 
"discredited", according to company emails, because they had criticised the drug.  It paid nurses to 
rifle patient records for potential candidates for Vioxx, and it persuaded the world's largest medical 
publisher, Elsevier, to produce several issues of what appeared to be an independent scientific 
journal, without disclosing that it was funded by Merck. 
Marks K. & Verkaik, R. (2010). ‘Vioxx ruling gives hope for payouts to British ‘victims’’. The 
Independent. 6 March. 
77
 I.e. further tests which had been requested by the regulator at the time of approval but which were 
never completed.  See, for example, Perrone (2009): 
The Food and Drug Administration … has never pulled a drug off the market due to a lack of 
required follow-up about its actual benefits – even when such information is more than a decade 
overdue, according to a report due out Monday from the Government Accountability Office.  
Perrone, M. (2009). ‘GAO: FDA fails to follow up on unproven drugs.’ The Washington Times. 26 
October.  
78
 See supra and also, for example, Boseley (2009):  
The General Medical Council will call Professor Richard Eastell in front of a fitness to practice 
committee. Eastell, a bone expert at Sheffield University, has admitted he allowed his name to go 
forward as first author of a study on an osteoporosis drug even though he did not have access to all 
the data on which the study's conclusions were based. An employee of Proctor and Gamble, the 
US company making Actonel, was the only author who had all the figures. 
79
 See, for example, Marks & Verkaik (2010) (supra). 
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- influence on academic institutions; 
- sponsorship of undergraduate and postgraduate psychiatric education; 
- influence on drug regulators; 
- influence on formulary committees; 
- influence on clinical psychiatrists; 
- payments to clinical psychiatrists;80 
- off–label promotion;81 
- sponsorship of professional meetings; 
- funding of patient advocacy groups; 
- media consumer advertising; 
- ‘gag-orders’ against disclosure;82 
- other exercise of economic power. 
                                               
80
 Harris (2009) details a pharmaceutical company’s antidepressant drug marketing plan which had been 
made public during Senate subcommittee investigations:  
It is illegal to pay doctors to prescribe certain medicines to their patients.  It is not illegal to pay 
doctors to educate their colleagues about a medicine.  In recent years, federal prosecutors have 
accused many drug makers of deliberately crossing that line. … Under “Rep Promotional 
Programs,” the document said the company planned to spend $34.7 million to pay 2,000 
psychiatrists and primary care doctors to deliver 15,000 marketing lectures to their peers in one 
year.  “These meetings may be large-scale dinner programs with a slide presentation, small 
roundtable discussions or one-on-one advocate lunches,” the document states. … Under “Lunch 
and Learns,” the company intended to spend $36 million providing lunch to doctors in their 
offices. 
Harris, G. (2009). ‘Document Details Plan to Promote Costly Drug.’ The New York Times. 1 September. 
A New York Times report details how a pharmaceutical company was fined $81 million for illegally 
promoting an epilepsy drug for psychiatric uses:  
… under a program called Doctor-for-a-Day.  The program hired outside physicians who joined 
sales representatives in visits to health care providers … about prescribing Topamax for 
unapproved uses. 
Associated Press (2010), ‘Drug Makers to Pay Fine of $81 Million.’ The New York Times. 29 April.  
81
 The extent of the profits to be gained from off-label promotion are indicated by the fact that fines of 
$1.9billion levied of Pfizer were still not a sufficient deterrence: 
For this new felony, Pfizer paid the largest criminal fine in U.S. history: $1.19 billion.  On the 
same day, it paid $1 billion to settle civil cases involving the off-label promotion of Bextra and 
three other drugs with the United States and 49 states.  "At the very same time Pfizer was in our 
office negotiating and resolving the allegations of criminal conduct in 2004, Pfizer was itself in its 
other operations violating those very same laws," … 
The total of $2.75 billion Pfizer has paid in off-label penalties since 2004 is a little more than 1% 
of the company's revenue of $245 billion from 2004 to 2008.  
Evans, D. (2010). ‘When drug makers' profits outweigh penalties.’ The Washington Post. 21 March. 
82
 Hari (2009): 
In 1996, Dr. Nancy Olivieri was commissioned at her university to study a drug developed by 
Apotex Inc that treats a rare blood disorder.  She discovered a serious side-effect.  When she tried 
to inform her patients, the company brought the study to a sudden halt, and told Dr Olivieri that 
she could be sued.  
Hari, J. (2009). ‘Peter Mandelson's assault on science.’ The Independent. 17 November. 
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Based on the preceding discussion the following conclusion can be drawn: 
The influence of the pharmaceutical industry on the nature, conduct and reporting of 
psychiatric research is pervasive, often hidden, and is of such a magnitude as to cast 
doubt on the impartiality, objectivity and evidence base of much published research.  
Consequently individual psychiatric research studies on matters touching on the 
interests of the pharmaceutical industry and which purport to be objective and 
evidence-based, should not be regarded as such unless their independence from such 
interests, can be explicitly demonstrated.  
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Appendix K: Problematic aspects of antidepressant 
research  
Note: As mentioned at the commencement of Chapter 5, the discussion of 
psychiatric treatments in this Appendix is not intended to provide a 
comprehensive, objective and balanced overview of research into antidepressants.  
The goal is much more circumscribed: it is – by examining the published work of 
academic commentators and researchers in this area – to establish a prima facie 
case that clinical psychiatric practice in the use of antidepressants, often lacks 
(and, on occasion, conflicts with) a robust evidence-base.   
 
Doubts as to the validity of clinical trials of antidepressants had, by the late 1990s, 
become prevalent and led the American Journal of Psychiatry to commission a study 
[Quitkin (2000)] to examine the evidence cited for assertions that: 
… antidepressants are no better than placebo treatment and that their illusory 
superiority depends on methodologically flawed studies and biased clinical 
evaluations.   
… that the blind in randomized trials is penetrable.1 
The authors concluded that:  
… studies cited as supporting the questionable validity of antidepressant trials fail 
upon closer examination to support assertions that these trials are invalid.2 
A subsequent editorial in the British Journal of Psychiatry adopted a more nuanced 
perspective:  
Adverse physical effects of antidepressant treatment are well known, but the 
psychological effects are rarely discussed.  The prescription of medication for 
depression conveys the powerful message that we are passive victims of our 
biology. … The pharmaceutical industry is an obvious beneficiary of this situation 
and psychiatry must be wary of being swept along by this juggernaut. … it is 
necessary at least to raise questions about the efficacy of antidepressants.3 
A response was subsequently published which stated:  
The efficacy argument at the head of her critique, based on individual, often old 
and poor-quality, studies flies in the face of consistent findings of antidepressant 
efficacy in systematic reviews and meta-analyses.4 
Some clarity and focus was brought to the debate by Kirsch (2002) who under a 
‘Freedom of Information’ request, obtained : 
… the medical and statistical reviews of every placebo controlled clinical trial for 
depression reported to the FDA for initial approval of the six most widely used 
antidepressant drugs approved [between 1987 and 1999]. 
                                               
1
 Op. cit., p.327. 
2
 Quitkin (2000), p.327. 
Quitkin appends no declaration of interests to his article, yet in a subsequent letter to the British Medical 
Journal [Quitkin (2005)] he declares numerous competing interests.  These interests may, of course, have 
arisen post 2000.  
3
 Moncrieff (2002), p.194. 
4
 Anderson & Haddad (2003).   
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An analysis of the data revealed: 
… a small but significant difference between antidepressant drug and inert 
placebo. … its clinical significance is dubious …5 
Kirsch (2002) also noted that the criteria used by the FDA in approving antidepressant 
medications required “positive findings from at least two controlled clinical trials, but 
the total number of trials can vary.”6  The implementation of this criterion had the 
surprising consequence that if two positive trials existed, other negative trials may be 
disregarded even if these had been more numerous.7  
Antonuccio (2002), commenting on Kirsch (2002), posed a rhetorical question: 
Does the small advantage of antidepressants over placebo justify the risks and side 
effects associated with these medications?  How have we come to think of 
antidepressants as powerful, even "life-saving" treatments in the face of such 
weak outcome data? 
The title to his article – “Antidepressants: A Triumph of Marketing Over Science?” – 
suggested his answer.8  
__________ 
Evidence subsequently began to emerge not only as to the lack of effectiveness of 
antidepressants, but as to their lack of safety.  Parker (2003) opined that the then recent 
warnings that the dangers of treatment of adolescent depression with SSRI’s9 
outweighed the benefits, “ … should focus our minds on the evidence on which clinical 
practice is based.”  Noting that “about 50% of negative trials go unpublished,” Parker 
(2003) wondered whether such clinical trials should be abandoned because they “are 
producing meaningless results.”  In view of studies such as Quitkin (2000) (supra), the 
simple posing of this question is worthy of note.   
A further milestone occurred with the publication of Whittington (2004).  Having noted 
inconsistencies between the published studies and the advice of regulatory agencies in 
relation to the use of SSRIs in the treatment of adolescent depression, Whittington 
(2004): “… contacted all the pharmaceutical companies who manufacture 
antidepressants requesting unpublished data.  None was forthcoming.”10  The authors 
then obtained details of the trials which had been submitted to the regulatory agencies.   
                                               
5
 Kirsch (2002); the first usage of the term ‘significant’ refers to statistical significance.  
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Kirsch (2002) gives examples of such occurrences.   
8
 It should be noted that the Kirsch (2002) meta-analysis has been criticized on methodological grounds 
by Cipriani (2009) and that other meta-analyses – such as Melander (2008) and Khan & Khan (2008) – 
have reached conclusions different to Kirsch (2002). 
9
 Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors [SSRIs] are antidepressants; examples are Seroxat and Paxil. 
10
 Op. cit., p.1345. 
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The authors concluded that, though the published studies indicated that the medications 
were safe and effective: “When we got the unpublished data and put it in with the 
published data, something happened.  Instead of being safe and effective, the risk-
benefit reversed.”11  An accompanying editorial commented: 
The idea of that drug's use being based on the selective reporting of favourable 
research should be unimaginable. … where evidence-based practice is seen as the 
gold standard for care, these failings are a disaster. … This process is made 
entirely redundant if its results are so easily manipulated by those with potentially 
massive financial gains.12 
The philosopher Simon Blackburn has spoken of how the pharmaceutical industry has 
“… led to the institutional corruption of science by the billions involved in the 
manufacture and selling of drugs.”13  In support, he cited the questioning of the FDA by 
a US congressional sub-committee: 
… who pointed out that nearly all studies of antidepressants in children and 
teenagers had failed to show that they were effective for depression.  With no 
benefit to recommend them and a risk for suicidal behaviour the members said 
that they could not understand why the agency did not ban the drugs.14  
The director of the FDA had responded:  
… that just because the trials had failed to show an effect did not mean that the 
medications were not working. “More than 50% of all trials in adults fail too” he 
said. “We don’t know why”.15 
To which Blackburn commented “I find that pretty scary as well.”16 
The focus was beginning to shift towards a scrutiny of the evidence base for the adult 
use of antidepressants.   
__________ 
                                               
11
 Kendall, joint author of Whittington (2004) in an interview to the New Scientist. [online], available: 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn4920-unpublished-data-reverses-riskbenefit-of-drugs.html 
[accessed: 2 March 2009].  
He also stated that:  
Of the five SSRIs reviewed - fluoxetine, paroxetine, sertraline, citalopram, and venlafaxine, only 
fluoxetine (Prozac) offers more benefits than risks in children. Unpublished studies of venlafaxine, 
for example, suggested the drug increased suicide-related events such as suicidal thoughts or 
attempts by 14 times compared with placebo. 
"This data confirms what we found in adults with mild to moderate depression: SSRIs are no 
better than placebo, and there is no point in using something that increases the risk of suicide," 
says Kendall.  "The key point is, can we trust the published evidence now?" 
12
 Lancet (2004) which commented: 
It is hard to imagine the anguish experienced by the parents, relatives, and friends of a child who 
has taken his or her own life.  That such an event could be precipitated by a supposedly beneficial 
drug is a catastrophe. 
13
 Blackburn, S. (2004). Lecture entitled ‘Trust me I’m a Scientist’ given to a Cambridge Philosophy 
Society on 23 September.  
14
 Harris, G. (2004). ‘Warnings Called Likely On Drug Risk For Suicide.’ The New York Times. 24 
September.  
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Op. cit. 
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In 2004 the National Institute for Clinical Excellence issued guidelines [NICE (2004a)] 
on the pharmaceutical treatment of adult depression and recommended that SSRIs be 
“first line treatment for moderate or severe depression.”17   
Moncrieff & Kirsch (2005) argued that the data on which the guidelines had been based, 
did not support the recommendation: 
… methodological artefacts may account for the small effect seen. … In children, 
the balance of benefits to risks is now recognised as unfavourable. We suggest 
this may also be the case for adults, given the continuing uncertainty about the 
possible risk of increased suicidality as well as other known adverse effects.18 
The House of Commons Health Committee (2005) addressed the use of SSRIs as a 
treatment for adult depression; it found that – although there had been long-standing 
concerns that the drugs were addictive19 and could induce “suicidal and violent 
behaviour”20 – the clinical trials of SSRIs “… were not adequately scrutinised … [and] 
have been indiscriminately prescribed on a grand scale.”21  The report stated that 
although SSRIs, had been licensed for 15 years and in spite of several earlier reviews of 
the same drug problems, the UK regulatory agency “had received no convincing 
evidence” relating to efficiency in mild depression nor or the incidence of withdrawal 
reactions.22 
The poor reliability of published research into the efficacy of antidepressants was 
address by Turner (2008)23 who found that although an analysis of published data 
suggested that 94% of the trials conducted were positive, the inclusion of unpublished 
data, reduced this to 51%.    
The Kirsch (2008) study was a meta-analysis of four new-generation antidepressants for 
which full datasets were available and found that:  
                                               
17
 Moncrieff & Kirsch (2005), p.155.  
18
 Op. cit., p.157. 
19
 Op. cit., p.85: “…some users found it impossible to stop taking SSRIs because of severe withdrawal 
symptoms.” 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid., p.100.  [Emphasis in original]. 
22
 Ibid., p.79.   
The report quoted (p.83) evidence from Professor Healy that “In actual fact here in the UK we track the 
fate of parcels through the post one hundred times more accurately than you track the fate of people who 
have been killed by SSRI or other drugs.”  
It also quoted (p. 54) the evidence the editor of The Lancet:  
… this whole story surrounding SSRIs … is probably the best example where the companies have 
been very clever at seeding the literature with ghost-written editorials and review papers that 
promote off-label use of these drugs … that is how you had two and a half million scripts a couple 
of years ago for SSRIs in under-18s with no licensed indication for it. 
23
 Appendix J supra. 
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… the researchers conclude that there is little reason to prescribe new-generation 
antidepressant medications to any but the most severely depressed patients unless 
alternative treatments have been ineffective.24 
Mathew & Charney (2009) writing in the American Journal of Psychiatry, addressed  
Kirsch’s (2008) and Turner’s (2008) conclusions: 
The first study contends that publication bias … results in an inaccurate 
characterization of antidepressant efficacy, while the second study argues that 
even when registration trials are positive, antidepressant efficacy is modest and of 
doubtful clinical significance.  Although these reports offer a sober perspective on 
the benefit of our most commonly prescribed antidepressant medications, the 
trials suffer from poor generalizability to "real-world" patients.25  
Mathew & Charney (2009) then discussed the results of the STAR*D trial which had 
been designed to have more clinical relevance than trials designed to satisfy the 
requirements of licensing authorities: 
… the landmark NIMH-funded STAR*D trial examined the acute and longer-term 
effectiveness of antidepressants and augmentation strategies (including cognitive 
therapy) … Although the acute and longer-term remission rates were 
disappointing, patients who completed all phases of the study had an overall 
cumulative remission rate of 67%.26  
A summary of the results of the STAR*D trial in The Lancet was more critical:  
“STAR*D showed that virtually all antidepressant strategies had low and similar 
efficacy in major depression.”27  Cipriani (2009) [discussed supra] reviewed all trials of 
second-generation antidepressants performed before 2007 and rated them as “… 
adequate, unclear, or inadequate, according to the adequacy of the random allocation 
concealment and blinding.”28   
Of a total of 117 trials only 12 were rated as adequate.   
__________ 
At the beginning of this appendix a special article commissioned by the American 
Journal of Psychiatry was cited to the effect that criticisms of antidepressants trails 
could not be substantiated.  Less than a decade later, a highly regarded29 study 
[Cipriani(2009)] which was free of pharmaceutical industry funding, found that the 
methodology of more than 89.7% of all 117 trials on antidepressants conducted in the 
previous 16 years, to be less than adequate.  
Cipriani (2009) also found that the design of the trials (being as they were of short 
duration) rendered the results of limited use in clinical psychiatric practice.  The limited 
                                               
24
 Kirsch (2008), p.268. 
25
 Op. cit., p.140. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Parikh (2009), p.700. 
28
 Cipriani (2009), p.747. 
29
 See Parikh (2009) (supra). 
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duration of trials would have the effect of minimising the perceived side effects of 
medications.  Cipriani (2009) did not investigate either the nature or incidence of such 
harms.30  Where clear evidence of harms did materialise – as in the case of the 
pharmaceutical treatment of adolescent depression (supra) – clinicians appear to have 
adopted a somewhat cavalier attitude to evidence of such harm as evidenced by the 
answer to a British parliamentary question which elicited the information that in 2006, 
one in three antidepressants prescribed for children are prescribed against the advice of 
the regulatory authority.31   
Dr. Andrew Nierenberg, an associate professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School 
interviewed by the New York Times – and described as having “consulted with drug 
makers”32 – was reported as responding to an FDA warning on the prescribing of 
antidepressants for adolescent depression:   
… that he did not expect the findings to have any immediate effect on prescribing 
the medication.  "You have to ask the question, 'What's the alternative for people 
who are depressed and in pain?'".33 
Nierenberg’s response was reminiscent of that of the chairwoman of the FDA advisory 
panel which licensed the use of the vagus nerve stimulator34 as a treatment for 
depression despite evidence both of its lack of efficacy and of its propensity to cause 
harm on the basis that “… anything that gives these people hope is potentially 
worthwhile."35  A dissenting member of the panel, considered this argument to be 
specious:  
Pancreatic cancer is a hopeless condition … with a much higher death rate than 
chronic depression … and we have as much evidence that this works for 
pancreatic cancer as it does for depression.  Why not use it for that? … This 
almost has a feel of 18th-century psychiatry …”36   
The preceding discussion enables the following conclusions to be drawn: 
1. Subsequent analyses of earlier research into the efficacy and safety of 
antidepressants which resulted in the uncovering of serious methodological flaws, 
in addition to disclosures concerning the influence of pharmaceutical industry on 
the publication of trial data, undermines – in the absence of compelling evidence 
                                               
30
 Cipriani (2009), p.753: “… we did not investigate important outcomes, such as side-effects, toxic 
effects, discontinuation symptoms, and social functioning.” 
31
 In a response to a Parliamentary Question set down by the MP Paul Burstow, in February 2006.  
[online], available: http://paulburstow.org.uk/news/624.html?PHPSESSID=801ceb21 [accessed: 27 
November 2006].   
32
 Carey, B. (2006). ‘Antidepressants increase suicide risk in young adults, study finds.’ The New York 
Times. 6 December. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 See discussion in Appendix J. 
35
 Carey, B. (2005) ‘F.D.A. Considers Implant Device for Depression.’ The New York Times. 21 May. 
36
 Ibid. 
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to the contrary – the claims of published research on antidepressants to being 
evidence-based and to being either efficacious or safe.  
 
2. Some treatments for depression, despite lack of evidence as to their efficacy 
and despite concerns as to their safety, are administered on such spurious 
grounds as that “they give these people hope.” 
 
3. In that antidepressants are the most widely used psychiatric medication, doubts 
as to the efficacy or safety of such medications should by virtue of the 
‘Precautionary Principle’ and in the absence of compelling evidence to the 
contrary, be regarded as being applicable to other pharmaceutical psychiatric 
treatments and, in particular, to those administered coercively.  
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Appendix L: Problematic aspects of antipsychotic research  
Note: As mentioned at the commencement of Chapter 5, the discussion of 
psychiatric treatments in this Appendix is not intended to provide a 
comprehensive, objective and balanced overview of research into antipsychotics.  
The goal is much more circumscribed: it is – by examining the published work of 
academic commentators and researchers in this area – to establish a prima facie 
case that clinical psychiatric practice in the use of antipsychotics, often lacks (and, 
on occasion, conflicts with) a robust evidence-base.   
 
The goal of this appendix is to answer the following questions:  
(i) Does robust evidence for the efficacy and safety of antipsychotics exist?  
(ii) Do clinical psychiatrists manifest a sensitivity to the degree of harm sometimes 
occasioned by antipsychotics? 
(iii) Do clinical psychiatrists show a responsiveness to changing evidence on the 
efficacy and safety of antipsychotics?  
The distorting influence of the pharmaceutical industry on psychiatric research has been 
discussed in Appendix J ; consequently independently funded research into psychiatric 
pharmaceutical treatments attains a heightened importance; the CATIE Study (2005) 
and the CUtLASS 1 Study (2006) (infra) are examples of such independently funded 
studies. 
Adopting the methodology used in discussing antidepressants (Appendix K), this 
appendix is in the nature of a decade-long ‘timeline’ showing how radical was the 
change in attitudes wrought by the advent of independently funded research; it is 
structured as follows: 
- Some preliminary matters [Subsection L-1]; 
- Brief outline of the development of antipsychotics [Subsection L-2]; 
- Some research findings: 1998-2005 [Subsection L-3]; 
- The CATIE Study (2005) [Subsection L-4]; 
- A note on minimal drug treatment [Subsection L-5]; 
- The CUtLASS 1 Study (2006) [Subsection L-6]; 
- Interim conclusions [Subsection L-7]; 
- Some research findings from 2007 [Subsection L-8]; 
- Some research findings from 2008 [Subsection L-9]; 
- Antipsychotic use in the treatment of children [Subsection L-10]; 
- Some research findings from 2009 [Subsection L-11]; 
- Some examples of industry manipulation of test results [Subsection L-12]; 
- Conclusions [Subsection L-13]. 
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L–1: Some preliminary matters 
The Oxford dictionary considers the terms ‘neuroleptic’, ‘major tranquilliser’ and 
‘antipsychotic’ to be synonyms as does Webster’s dictionary which also gives the 
speciality (health) definition of ‘neuroleptic’ as: 
A term coined to refer to the effects on cognition and behaviour of antipsychotic 
drugs, which produce a state of apathy, lack of initiative, and limited range of 
emotion and in psychotic patients cause a reduction in confusion and agitation and 
normalization of psychomotor activity.1 
Writing in the Lancet, Yawar (2009) sketches the history of these drugs: 
In the 1950s, the chemical lobotomy, or “hibernation therapy” was introduced.  
Patients were given a drug that rendered them immobile and semiconscious for 
days, on the assumption that they would emerge improved.  The drug was called a 
“neuroleptic”, or brain restrainer.  Its name? Chlorpromazine.  Since marketed as 
an antipsychotic, it is used, at lower doses, today. 
Yawar (2009) also discusses some of the side effects of neuroleptics: 
Antipsychotics are, at times, cruel drugs.  Some cause shaking, salivation, 
restlessness, infertility, stiffness, agitation, and frail bones; others cause obesity, 
somnolence, and increase the risk of heart attack, diabetes, and stroke.  
The side effects of one of the older antipsychotics Haldol (haloperidol) were described 
by Leonid Plyushch, a Soviet mathematician and dissident: 
I was prescribed haloperidol in small doses.  I became drowsy and apathetic. It 
became difficult to read books. 
… I was horrified to see how I deteriorated intellectually, morally and 
emotionally from day to day.  My interest in political problems quickly 
disappeared, then my interest in scientific problems, and then my interest in my 
wife and children. … My speech became jerky, abrupt.  My memory deteriorated 
sharply.2 
Though Haldol is an older drug (a ‘typical’ antipsychotic) it is still in use both as an 
antipsychotic and as a ‘chemical cosh’.3   
                                               
1
 Online available at: http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/ne/neuroleptic.html [accessed: 7 March 
2009].   
2
 The New York Times (1976). ‘Excerpts from statement by dissident on his detention in Soviet mental 
hospital’. The New York Times, 4 February. 
See also Bloch & Reddaway (1984).  In discussing Plyushch’s case the authors attempt (p. 27-8) to 
distinguish the use of Haldol by western psychiatrists [“conscientious psychiatrist’s caution … scrupulous 
attention to .. dosage …”] from that by Soviet psychiatrists [“… indiscriminate use of these drugs”].  It is 
of note that Plyushch’s statement contradicts these assertions and makes reference to being given “small 
doses” of haloperidol. (Supra)  
3
 The term ‘chemical cosh’ refers to the use of medications (especially antipsychotics) to subdue 
individuals where the primary purpose is not to advance the interests of the individual subject, but for the 
convenience of others; see, for example: Ballard (2005) which is entitled: “Drugs used to relieve 
behavioral symptoms in people with dementia or an unacceptable chemical cosh?”. 
See also reports of the use of Haldol by the US immigration service:  
Senate testimony last month revealed that 56 deportees were given psychotropic drugs … between 
Oct. 1, 2006, and April 30, 2007.  Thirty-three of them had no history of psychological problems, 
but were given the medicine because of "combative behavior," … Soeoth's medical records show 
he received an injection of Haldol and Cogentin, a medicine given with the anti-psychotic drug to 
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Plyushch’s description of the effects of antipsychotics is not unusual: John Manweiler4 
described the effects of such medication (administered over a period of ten years) as 
making him feel like a “zombie”;5 Arnold Juklerød6 described his first injection of 
neuroleptic medication thus:  
… a paralysis entered my left side … [then] came a fear and restlessness 
completely new to me. … The paralysis went … upwards and took my mouth and 
pulled it up in an awkward position.  I couldn’t speak.  I could hardly talk.  I was 
terrified and frightened.7  
__________ 
The harms occasioned by the use of psychiatric medications can be divided into two 
broad categories: 
- those physical harms such as diabetes or tardive dyskinesia,8  
- those harms which trespass deeply onto the psyche of an individual e.g. the harm 
done to Plyushch which has been described as being: “a threat to 'the precious 
inner life of man'.”9   
The harms caused by antipsychotics are of both types.   
Harms of the first category will be discussed in this appendix.  
Harms of the second type may occur with all psychoactive medications but in the case 
of antipsychotics – especially if they have been administered coercively – such harms 
may be of a level of invasiveness and intensity such that they dominate all other harms; 
they will be discussed in Chapter 7 where it will be argued that they constitute harms 
which may diminish or destroy the personhood of a subject. 
L–2: Brief outline of the development of antipsychotics10  
Chlorpromazine (supra) came into clinical use as an antipsychotic in 1952 but within 
two years the severity of the side effects (EPS)11 became apparent.  Although 
                                                                                                                                          
reduce the facial spasms it can cause, said his attorney, Ahilan Arulanantham, of the American 
Civil Liberties Union.  "He has no history of violence of any kind, no disciplinary problems at all. 
He didn't resist in any way, whatsoever, … “ 
[Associated Press (2007). ‘American Civil Liberties Union seeks to prevent forcible drugging of 
deportees.’ International Herald Tribune. 10 October]. 
4
 See Appendix H. 
5
 Browne (2005a). 
6
 See Appendix G. 
7
 Sandøy (1997). 
8
 US National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke: 
Tardive dyskinesia is a neurological syndrome caused by the long-term use of neuroleptic drugs. 
… [it] is characterized by repetitive, involuntary, purposeless movements.  Features of the disorder 
may include grimacing, tongue protrusion, lip smacking, puckering and pursing, … 
[online], available: http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/tardive/tardive.htm [accessed: 7 March 2009].   
9
 Campbell (1976). 
10
 The information in this subsection is drawn from Shen (1999).   
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chlorpromazine remained the most prescribed antipsychotic in the 1960s and 70s, a 
number of similar drugs (such as haloperidol) with different chemical and side-effect 
profiles, were introduced.  The presence of EPS was originally regarded as an indicator 
of the efficacy of the antipsychotic medication but in 1971 a drug, Clozapine, which 
appeared to cause minimal EPS, was believed to be effective.  Clozapine was 
introduced into the US market in 1990: 
… and rapidly destroyed the general conviction that the efficacy and EPS profile 
were linked, and led to an emerging concept of "atypical" antipsychotic drugs.  
Although no precise definition of this concept has ever been established, a drug 
with the property of "atypicality" shows a clinical profile with a low propensity to 
induce EPS …12 
Clozapine's success quickly led to the development of other atypical antipsychotic drugs 
and by 1999 five others had been released onto the US market. 
__________ 
In the late 1990s, the possibility that the adverse effects of antipsychotics might be so 
serious as to cause death was known; a Dublin coroner’s inquest, for example, was told 
that these drugs had been the cause of death and that: “ … there had been an increase in 
the number of ‘sudden unexplained deaths’ in previously healthy patients taking normal 
dosages of antipsychotic drugs …”13   
In the O’Donnell case [see supra Chapter 4], a year after having been convicted 
Brendan O’Donnell died from the side effects of an antipsychotic medication.14   
L–3: Research findings on antipsychotics: 1998-2005 
Thornley & Adams (1998) – noting that: “Drug treatments are the bulwark of treatment 
of schizophrenia”15 – sought to evaluate the quality of studies supporting such 
treatments.  It was a particularly comprehensive study in that it examined 3181 
                                                                                                                                          
11
 Acute Extrapyramidal Symptoms (EPS) including parkinsonism, dystonias, and akathisia and tardive 
dyskinesia. 
12
 Shen (1999), p.410.  
13
 Haughey, N. (1997). ‘Woman died after reaction to drug.’  The Irish Times. 11 November.  
14
 Haughey (1997): 
Dr. Smith said O'Donnell's dosage of the anti-psychotic drug Thioridazine was "definitely within 
the known and accepted safety range".  He had received the same drug six months before without 
any recorded side-effects. 
Dr. Harbison said O'Donnell died of heart failure caused by the fatal intoxication of Thioridazine. 
The level of the drug in his blood during the post-mortem was just above the therapeutic range. 
Thioridazine had been found previously to have caused sudden unexplained deaths at levels below 
those detected in O'Donnell's blood.  There was an element of "idiosyncracy" in the reaction of 
people to this type of drug. 
Haughey, N. (1997) ‘O'Donnell died of cardiac failure linked with drug, inquest jury says’. The Irish 
Times, 27 November.   
15
 Op. cit., p.1183. 
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publications (c. 2500 trials); drug trials (involving 437 different drugs) predominated16 
of which 1187 involved antipsychotics.17   
The study concluded that: 
The quality of reporting in this large sample of trials was poor … 1% (20) of the 
2000 trials achieved a maximum quality score of 5.  Just under two thirds (1280) 
scored 2 or less, … We found little evidence that the quality of trial reporting 
improved with time. … As low quality scores are associated with an increased 
estimate of benefit, schizophrenia trials may well have consistently overestimated 
the effects of experimental interventions.18  
The study also noted that the drug trials commonly used haloperidol as the control drug 
which has “obvious side effects that render successful blinding difficult, if not 
impossible.”19   
The distortions caused by the use of haloperidol as the control, was confirmed by 
Geddes (2000a) which was a meta-analysis of trials which compared atypical 
antipsychotics with conventional antipsychotics.  Geddes (2000a) found that: 
The dose of haloperidol significantly affected outcome in the 23 trials in which it 
was used. … The observed advantage in favour of the atypical drug disappeared 
as the dose of haloperidol decreased. …  suggesting that many of the perceived 
benefits of atypical antipsychotics are really due to excessive doses of the 
comparator drug used in the trial.20 
Geddes (2000a) noted that the trials were of limited clinical value by virtue of, inter 
alia, their short duration21 and recommended the use of conventional antipsychotics 
over atypical antipsychotics as a medication of first choice.22  The data on adverse 
effects of antipsychotics was so limited that it was not included in the report.23  
Commenting on Geddes (2000a), an editorial24 in The Lancet began by noting that: 
An infectious optimism has infused the field of schizophrenia with the availability 
of the new "atypical" antipsychotics. … prescription data suggest that atypical 
antipsychotics account for nearly three out of four new prescriptions for 
antipsychotics in North America.  So, how can we reconcile this large shift in 
                                               
16
 Thornley & Adams (1998), p.1183: “Drug treatments are the bulwark of treatment of schizophrenia, so 
it is not surprising that drug trials dominate the sample.”  
17
 Ibid., p.1182.  
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid., p.1183 and continues: 
 … In addition, because haloperidol is also a potent cause of adverse effects, most drugs to which 
it is compared will have favourable side effect profiles.  Therefore, so long as the new 
experimental drug has moderate antipsychotic properties, favourable outcomes can be expected. 
20
 Op. cit., pp.1373-4. 
21
 Ibid., p.1375. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid., p.1372: “There were few data on quality of life, specific side effects, or cost effectiveness, and we 
have therefore not included these outcomes in this report.”; see also (p.1375): 
With the exception of extrapyramidal side effects, there is little consistent reporting of adverse 
events.  There are few data on quality of life or clinically relevant functional outcomes and few 
reliable data on the cost effectiveness of atypical antipsychotics - none in the United Kingdom.  
24
 Kapur & Remington (2000). 
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prescribing practices … with the sobering evidence provided by Geddes et al?  Is 
this shift largely a victory of clinical hope and marketing hype over hard evidence, 
…?  
The editorial commented that whilst the atypical antipsychotics might have new side 
effects such as diabetes, the “gain on extrapyramidal effects is unequivocal”25 – a 
considerably more robust conclusion than that drawn by Geddes (2000a).26 
The British Medical Journal published a number of responses27 to Geddes (2000a) 
many of which took issue with the fact that Geddes (2000a) felt enabled to draw such 
firm conclusions from what was admitted to be poor quality research; others were 
concerned with the intensity of EPS [“profoundly traumatic to be rendered rigid, 
trembling, unable to rest, or obese by drug treatment”] and with their underreporting.  
In reply, Geddes reiterated the view that “Unfortunately, the benefits on extrapyramidal 
side effects achieved by atypical antipsychotics are relatively modest.”   
The seriousness of some of the side effects associated with atypical antipsychotics had 
begun to emerge in the late 1990s; Hickey (1999) reported on a case of ‘Neuroleptic 
Malignant Syndrome’ (NMS)28 which the authors believe, had been exacerbated by the 
use of an atypical antipsychotic and which resolved within a day of the antipsychotics 
being discontinued.  
Wieden & Miller (2001) discussed the rating scales used to assess the adverse effects of 
antipsychotics and noted that: “Most research on the assessment of antipsychotic side 
effects has focused on EPS, … Few scales assess for non-EPS side effects.”29 and that 
scales “emphasize objective severity at the expense of subjective distress.”30  They urged 
caution in relation to assessing the severity of non–EPS side effects and noted that:  
… the EPS caused by conventional antipsychotics were initially thought to be 
minor and that it took many years to fully understand the terrible burden caused 
by EPS.31   
They cited research by one of the authors which found “no significant correlation 
between subjective distress ratings and concurrent objective findings on the …[EPS 
Rating Scale].”32  The implication of such research is that assessments of adverse 
effects of antipsychotics were limited in scope and that even within their restricted 
                                               
25
 Ibid., p.1360. 
26
 Geddes (2000a), p.1374. 
27
 BMJ (2001). 
28
 Hickey (1999): “Neuroleptic malignant syndrome (NMS) is a serious adverse reaction to neuroleptic 
drugs. It is characterized by muscle rigidity and elevated temperature …” 
29
 Op. cit., p.41. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid., p.46. 
32
 Ibid., p.43. 
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ambit, they were unreliable measures of the distress as experienced by the user of the 
antipsychotics.  Stalman (2002) gives an indication of the severity of EPS: 
The extrapyramidal symptom of akathisia (internal restlessness) is the most 
difficult for patients to tolerate.  Akathisia causes patients to stop their medication 
and can clinically mimic psychosis.33 
An editorial in the British Medical Journal addressed some of the findings on non-EPS 
side effects of antipsychotics and, in particular, the question of whether they could be a 
cause of cardiac deaths:  
… whether cardiac deaths are related to the illness itself or to the drugs used to 
treat it has remained unclear.  Data from a very large American cohort of almost 
100,000 outpatients with schizophrenia who were treated with antipsychotics were 
published recently and begin to suggest an answer: the drugs play a major part, 
…
34
 
Mortimer (2005) – having studied the prescribing of antipsychotics in secondary care 
and found it “unsatisfactory” – examined antipsychotics prescribing in primary care and 
concluded: 
… most is unsatisfactory. … Half the regimes failed one or more audit criteria, 
leaving diagnosis aside. … [and] adds to concerns regarding high levels of off–
licence use of potentially harmful medication.  
… community pharmacists reported insurmountable difficulty in establishing the 
diagnosis of patients prescribed antipsychotic drugs by their GPs even when case 
notes were scrutinized and personal enquiries made of the GPs. 
They concluded: 
Our patients' experience of worsening of symptoms and antipsychotic withdrawal 
syndromes is of particular concern. …  This excessive reliance on 
pharmacotherapy may bring with it irrational combinations of drugs35 in 
inadequate doses for long periods: clearly contrary to the principles of rational 
evidence-based therapy. 
Concerned about the lack of authoritative data on the safety and efficacy of atypical 
antipsychotics and the spiralling cost36 and popularity of such drugs, the US National 
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) published, in 2005, the results of a study [Lieberman 
(2005) – known as the CATIE37 study] comparing the safety and efficacy of all existing 
                                               
33
 [Emphasis added]; thus hindering the uncovering of possible misdiagnosis.  
34
 Herxheimer & Healy (2002), p.1253. 
35
 Mortimer (2005):  
For instance another primary care audit of 170 patients prescribed atypical antipsychotics drugs 
found nearly all were subject to psychotropic polypharmacy, over a third had no licensed 
indication. 
36
 Carey (2005): “The new drugs account for $10 billion in annual sales and 90 percent of the national 
market for antipsychotics;” Carey also reported that a months supply of the conventional antipsychotic 
used in the study cost $60 whereas the atypical antipsychotics cost between $250 - $520.  
Carey, B. (2005). ‘Little Difference Found in Schizophrenia Drugs.’ The New York Times. 20 September. 
37
 Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness (CATIE). 
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atypical antipsychotics with a conventional antipsychotic.38  This study was regarded as 
a landmark study in that it was the most comprehensive comparative study into 
antipsychotics ever conducted and which, furthermore, had been funded by the US 
government independently of pharmaceutical industry finance.39  
L–4: The CATIE Study (2005) [Lieberman (2005)] 
Because of the difficulty in specifying criteria for judging a treatment to be ‘successful’, 
the study adopted as its primary outcome measure ‘duration to discontinuation of 
treatment for any cause’; hence the longer the subject continued on the treatment the 
more successful it was judged.40  The main conclusion was that: “The majority of 
patients in each group discontinued their assigned treatment owing to inefficacy or 
intolerable side effects or for other reasons.”41   
Not only did the study find that the side effects of antipsychotics were sometimes so 
severe as to be “intolerable”42 but it also found that, in relation to EPS, there were no 
significant differences between the atypical antipsychotics and the conventional 
antipsychotic.43  Their final conclusion was that though one of the atypical 
antipsychotics (Olanzapine) was moderately superior to the other drugs in terms of the 
rates of discontinuation and rate of hospitalisation “for an exacerbation of 
schizophrenia”,44 it had more severe side effects; the results for the other atypical 
antipsychotics were similar to the conventional antipsychotic in most respects.45 
An editorial46 accompanying the study noted that: “The results could be viewed as 
discouraging.  No drug provided the majority of patients a treatment that lasted the full 
18 months of the study.”47 and that whilst two atypical antipsychotics did appear to be 
more effective : 
                                               
38
 Lieberman (2005), p.1215: “Although haloperidol is the first-generation agent most commonly used for 
comparison, we chose to use perphenazine because of its lower potency and moderate side-effect profile.” 
39
 Vedantam, S. (2005b). ‘New Antipsychotic Drugs Criticized; Federal Study Finds No Benefit Over 
Older, Cheaper Drug.’ The Washington Post. 20 October; also: 
"The study has vital public health implications," said Thomas Insel, director of the National 
Institute of Mental Health, which funded the study. "It is the largest, longest and most 
comprehensive, independent trial ever done to examine existing therapies for this disease." 
40
 Op. cit., p.1211. 
41
 Ibid., p.1209. 
42
 Ibid., p.1218: “The times to discontinuation because of intolerable side effects were similar among the 
groups …”  
43
 Ibid.: 
In contrast to previous studies, the proportion of patients with extrapyramidal symptoms did not 
differ significantly among those who received first-generation and second-generation drugs in our 
study.  
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Ibid., p.1209; p.1218. 
46
 Freedman (2005a).  
47
 Ibid., p.1287. 
 478 
 
 
… both drugs induce a significantly greater number of serious side effects. Even 
the most feared side effect of first-generation drugs, tardive dyskinesia, seems less 
troubling than potentially fatal metabolic problems.48  
Interviewed subsequently, one of the authors of the study commented: “Many 
psychiatrists, in fact, were so certain the new drugs were better that they questioned the 
need to pit the new medications against an older drug”49 
The lead author stated that: 
Probably the biggest surprise of all was that the older medication produced about 
as good an effect as the newer medications, three of them anyway, and did not 
produce neurological side effects at greater rates than any of the other drugs, … 50 
The categorisation of the side effects of antipsychotics as being “intolerable” raises 
profound ethical questions in relation to the coercive administration of such drugs for 
extended periods of years to patients such as Manweiler or Juklerød (supra) who do not 
have the liberty to “vote with their feet”.  The seriousness of the side effects of 
antipsychotics in addition to their ‘intolerability’ raises the question as to whether a 
non– or minimal drug treatment for schizophrenia might not be preferable.  
L–5: A note on non- or minimal drug treatment for schizophrenia  
Davis (2006) which was an editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine, was 
adamant on the need for the lifetime use of drugs in the treatment of schizophrenia; it 
stated, inter alia, that: 
(i) Schizophrenia is a serious chronic illness that requires lifelong medication.  
(ii) We have known for 30 years that a delay in initiating treatment with 
antipsychotic medication may increase the need for hospitalization over the 
subsequent five years.  
(iii) … medication is typically needed for the rest of the patient's life.  Patients 
who stop taking antipsychotic medications have a relapse rate of about 10 percent 
per month, until eventually almost all patients have a relapse.51 
Of these three statements, authority is cited only for the second and in that case both of 
the studies cited52 were circa 30 years old and had been primarily concerned with a 
comparison between drug therapy and psychotherapy.  The author of the second study 
                                               
48
 Ibid. 
49
 See Vedantam, S. (2005). ‘Psychiatric Drugs' Use Drops for Children.’ The Washington Post. 8 
October.  
50
 See Carey (2005) (supra). 
51
 Op. cit., p.520. 
52
 Davis (1978) and May (1976); the abstract of the latter states: 
Patients who had been originally treated in hospital with psychotherapy alone stayed longer in 
hospital over the follow-up period than those who had received electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), 
drug alone, or drug plus psychotherapy. … 
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summarised his findings in a later paper53 which provide a less than adequate 
foundation for the unequivocal interpretation placed on them some thirty years later.   
In view of the CATIE findings which showed that a previous near unanimity amongst 
the psychiatric profession on the superior efficacy and safety of atypical antipsychotics, 
was ill founded, the near unanimity on the necessity of drug treatment loses some of its 
authority.  
Some months after the publication of Davis (2006), The New York Times reported54 on 
responses to a then recently published study [Bola (2006a)]55 which sought to directly 
examine the possibility of drug free treatment for schizophrenia and which “exposes 
deep divisions in the field that are rarely discussed in public”:  
… some doctors suspect that the wholesale push to early drug treatment has gone 
overboard and may be harming patients … Other experts warned that the new 
report's conclusions were dangerous, and represented only one interpretation of 
the evidence.56  
Lieberman – lead author of the CATIE study (supra) – was reported as stating:  
I am usually a pretty moderate person, but on this I am 110 percent emphatic: If 
the diagnosis is clear, not treating with medication is a huge mistake that risks the 
person's best chance at recovery.  It's just flat-out nuts.57 
Bola (2006a) – who had found that previous reviews concluding that drugs provided 
significant benefits included many studies that did not have a comparison group of 
people who were not on medication – reviewed six long–term studies involving 623 
people who had symptoms of psychosis; in the studies, roughly half of the patients were 
promptly treated with antipsychotic drugs while the other half went without the 
medication for periods ranging from three weeks to more than six months.  Two studies 
found that after a year or more, the patients on a full course of medication performed 
better on measures of social interaction, work success and the risk of rehospitalization 
                                               
53
 May (1981) the abstract of which states: 
Two hundred twenty-eight first-admission schizophrenic patients were randomly assigned to the 
following five treatments: psychotherapy alone, drug alone, … The drug alone and ECT groups 
tended to have the best outcome and the psychotherapy alone group the worst.  The positive effect 
from prior drug treatment began to dissipate after three years postadmission.  For the in-hospital 
treatment successes, the advantage from drug treatment and the disadvantage from psychotherapy 
were less apparent.  Overall, the follow-up outcome is far from reassuring, …  
54
 Carey, B. (2006a).  ‘Revisiting Schizophrenia: Are Drugs Always Needed?’ The New York Times. 21 
March.  
55
 The study found that [Carey (2006a)]: 
 … when some people first develop psychosis they can function without medication — or with far 
less than is typically prescribed — as well as they can with the drugs. And the long-term 
advantage of treating first psychotic episodes with antipsychotics, the report found, was not clear.  
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Ibid. 
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than those who were initially drug–free, whereas the other four studies found the 
opposite.  The most important conclusion, however, related to the lack of research:   
The most striking observation in this review is the dearth of good-quality evidence 
that addresses the long-term effects of initial treatment with antipsychotic 
medication compared with short-term medication postponement in early episode 
schizophrenia research.58 
Bola (2006b) discussed how the Declaration of Helsinki59 had been interpreted to imply 
a categorical prohibition against research into the medication-free treatment of 
schizophrenia; he advocated that the prohibition be reconsidered; it also discussed how 
programmes in Finland and Sweden have helped subjects manage psychotic symptoms 
with either no, or minimal, use of medication.  Due to methodological difficulties, the 
results of such programmes could not be incorporated into his results, nonetheless the 
results are worthy of note: 
… researchers in Finland found that intensive family therapy helped more than 
40% of patients with early symptoms of psychosis recover significantly without 
antipsychotics — and they have remained off the drugs, for more than two years. 
… Another program, in Sweden, also has found that many people do well when 
treated with low doses of antipsychotic medications, or none at all, after their first 
psychotic break.60    
__________ 
Indirect support for the non or minimal use of antipsychotics in the treatment of 
schizophrenia may also be found from studies which have found that the course and 
outcome of schizophrenia is better in so-called ‘third world’ countries – where the use 
of antipsychotics is less prevalent – than in ‘developed’ countries.61   
Kuipers (2007) also offers limited support for the use of psychological therapies in the 
treatment of schizophrenia.62  
L–6: The CUtLASS 1 Study63 [Jones (2006)] 
The CUtLASS 1 study was funded by the UK National Health Service with no financial 
support from the pharmaceutical industry; it sought to test the hypothesis that the use of 
                                               
58
 Bola (2006a), p.292. 
59
 World Medical Association (2008).  
60
 Carey (2006a). 
61
 See Cohen (2008), p.229: 
That schizophrenia has a better course and outcome in countries of the developing world has 
become an axiom in international psychiatry.  This belief emerges from a long history of cross-
national research, with the most often cited evidence coming from 3 studies by World Health 
Organization (WHO) … These studies have been cited as ‘‘arguably the greatest achievements in 
psychiatric epidemiology,’’  and their results as constituting ‘‘the single most important’’ finding 
in crosscultural psychiatry.  
62
 Kuipers (2007) begins: “The present state of research provides sound evidence for the efficacy of 
psychological therapy in the treatment of schizophrenia.” 
63
 Cost Utility of the Latest Antipsychotic Drugs in Schizophrenia Study (CUtLASS 1). 
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second generation atypical antipsychotic drugs [‘SGAs’] in the treatment of 
schizophrenia, would lead to better quality of life64 when compared with the older and 
cheaper first–generation drugs [‘FGAs’].  Despite the authors initial belief65 that SGAs 
were superior,66 their conclusion was a clear refutation of the hypothesis67 with 
indications that the FGAs were actually the superior treatment.68 
The study also noted the continuing emergence of information concerning the extent 
and seriousness of adverse effects caused by the use of antipsychotics.69  
Two editorial commentaries accompanied the publication of Jones (2006).  The first 
[Lieberman (2006)] was by the lead author of the CATIE study who noted that the 
results of the CUtLASS 1 were “virtually identical” to those obtained in the CATIE 
study and were:  
… a conclusion that runs counter to the impressions of many clinicians and 
previous studies suggesting marked superiority of the SGAs and that belies the 
huge advantage in market share enjoyed by the SGAs in the United States and 
other parts of the world.70 
Lieberman (2006) then asks as to how “the disconnect between the exuberant claims of 
the superiority of the SGAs and their disappointing performance”71 could have arisen.  
He offers two reasons: the short-term nature of industry funded trials and secondly: 
 … by an overly expectant community of clinicians and patients eager to believe 
in the power of new medications.  At the same time, the aggressive marketing of 
these drugs may have contributed to this enhanced perception of their 
effectiveness in the absence of empirical evidence.72 
                                               
64
 In contrast to the CATIE study which used ‘time to discontinuation’ as its primary measure. 
65
 Vedantam (2006):  
The results are causing consternation.  The researchers who conducted the trial were so certain 
they would find exactly the opposite that they went back to make sure the research data had not 
been recorded backward. 
Vedantam, S. (2006). ‘In Antipsychotics, Newer Isn't Better. Drug Find Shocks Researchers.’ The 
Washington Post. 3 October.  
66
 A belief that was widespread in clinical psychiatry [see infra]. 
67
 Jones (2006), p.1085: “We emphasize that we do not present a null result; the hypothesis that SGAs are 
superior was clearly rejected.” 
68
 Ibid., p.1083: “Statistical precision was limited, but the ITT analysis indicated that true effects may 
have been in the opposite direction for this primary outcome and for the main symptom assessments”. 
69
 Ibid., p.1086: 
These trials provide benchmark data on adverse effect burden, but this may represent an 
underestimate.  Furthermore, a range of adverse effects of FGAs and SGAs is emerging.  Serious 
weight gain, diabetes mellitus, and hyperlipidemia may all adversely affect quality of life. 
[GR: Hyperlipidemia is the presence of raised levels of lipids in the blood and is a risk factor for 
cardiovascular disease] 
70
 Lieberman (2006), p.1069. 
71
 Ibid. 
72
 Ibid., p.1070. 
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He described the results as “sobering” especially as: “there were no differences in the 
rates of extrapyramidal symptoms and TD between FGAs and SGAs in CUtLASS 1 and 
CATIE.”73 
The second commentary [Rosenheck (2006)] noted that, in response to promises of 
reduced side effects: 
 … first–line use of SGAs has been advocated by guidelines from the American 
Psychiatric Association, the United Kingdom's National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence, … and the Expert Consensus Guideline Series in the 
Treatment of Schizophrenia, which observed as early as 1999 that SGAs were 
rendering conventional antipsychotics obsolete.74 
Rosenheck (2006), in noting the extreme discordance between the results of the CATIE 
and CUtLASS 1 studies and “previously held certainties”,75 commented: 
A basic assumption of clinical research is that the results of carefully conducted 
clinical trials of the same agents in the same illness should not be grossly 
inconsistent.76 
Rosenheck (2006) also noted that the risk of tardive dyskinesia with SGAs may have 
been underestimated.77 
The lead author of CUtLASS 1 was asked to explain how, despite the evidence, the 
prescribing of SGAs had become so prevalent:  
“'Duped' is not right," he said. "We were beguiled."… "Why were we so 
convinced?" he asked, … "I think pharmaceutical companies did a great job in 
selling their products. …  It became almost a moral issue on whether you would 
prescribe these dirty old drugs," he added.78 
L–7: Some interim conclusions 
The question arises as to whether the results of the CATIE and CUtLASS 1 changed the 
prescribing habits of clinical psychiatrists.  Rosenheck (one of the authors of the CATIE 
study) stated: “… the belief in the newer drugs was so ingrained that many psychiatrists 
insisted that the results could not be extrapolated to other old drugs,…”79 – a belief 
which appears to have been shared by the Director of Research at the American 
Psychiatric Association who was reported80 to have cautioned against drawing broad 
                                               
73
 Ibid. 
74
 Rosenheck (2006), p.1074. 
75
 Ibid., p.1075. 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 Ibid., p.1076: “… a meticulous replication of a 1985 study of TD at 1 community mental health center 
found no overall reduction in TD prevalence in 2003 in spite of widespread use of SGAs.” [TD= Tardive 
Dyskinesia] 
78
 Vedantam (2006) (supra). 
79
 Ibid. 
80
 Ibid. 
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conclusions from the CUtLASS 1 findings, stating that "a thoughtful and prolonged 
process" is needed before treatment guidelines are changed.   
The author of the Cutlass 1 study has responded to such beliefs by stating that 
“educated clinicians as well as their patients should begin to take into account the 
results of such trials.”81  Urging the importance of trusting the data rather than clinical 
intuition and drawing on the analogy of his hobby of hill walking, he said:  
Sometimes the compass tells you go straight in front of you, but you somehow 
know it is wrong and that north is behind you,… I have learned to follow the 
compass.82 
__________ 
Heres (2006) sought to determine if pharmaceutical industry funding of research could 
account for the extreme divergence in the research findings; he found: 
… a clear link between sponsorship and study outcome … as 90.0% of the 
abstracts were rated as showing an overall superiority of the sponsor’s drug. … 
different comparisons of the same two antipsychotic drugs led to contradictory 
overall conclusions, depending on the sponsor of the study.  
… reporting of adverse events seems to be selective … Information on side 
effects that are very likely to occur … may be lacking.83 
__________ 
The underreporting of antipsychotic adverse effects was also discussed by Kane (2006) 
in an editorial in the American Journal of Psychiatry.  The author had co-authored an 
earlier study which concluded that though tardive dyskinesia was still a risk with 
atypical antipsychotics it was substantially lower than with conventional antipsychotics.  
He sought to review these conclusions in light of the CATIE, and other findings.  In the 
course of his editorial, Kane (2006) had noted that in relation to tardive dyskinesia: 
… it took many years before its prevalence, incidence, and long-term course were 
well investigated.  At first there was resistance and skepticism from many quarters 
as to the risk of this condition … Some might argue that it was not until the threat 
of litigation became more and more a reality that clinical practice included 
adequate consideration of and monitoring for tardive dyskinesia.84 
This conclusion has an especial relevance to Ireland in that the provisions of the Mental 
Health Act (2001) effectively preclude litigation in relation to, inter alia, harm cause by 
the negligent prescribing of antipsychotics. 
The extreme seriousness of the possible side effects of antipsychotics was highlighted 
by Lehtinen (2006) which was a 17 year follow up study of Finnish subjects who had 
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 Jones (2007). 
82
 Vedantam (2006). 
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 Heres (2006), p.189. 
84
 Kane (2006), p.1316. 
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been diagnosed with schizophrenia and treated with antipsychotics.  It found that such 
subjects were 2.5 times more likely to die and that this risk was proportionately related 
to the amount of neuroleptic that had been prescribed.  Lehtinen (2006) concluded that: 
There is an urgent need to ascertain whether the high mortality in schizophrenia is 
attributable to the disorder itself or the antipsychotic medication.85 
__________ 
The discordances between the results of independent and industry funded studies, the 
reluctance of clinical psychiatrists to change their beliefs in the face of new evidence, 
the underestimation of the harm caused by antipsychotics, are so great as to permit the 
drawing of some interim conclusions.86  
(i) The incontrovertible conclusion to be drawn from the existence of grossly 
inconsistent results in relation to trials of first and second generation 
antipsychotics, is that many supposedly evidence-based studies supporting the 
psychiatric use of antipsychotics, are deeply flawed.  
(ii) There is clear evidence of a reluctance amongst clinical psychiatrists to change 
their beliefs in relation to the appropriate prescribing of antipsychotics, in the face 
of authoritative, independently funded, studies such as CATIE and CUtLASS 1.  
(iii) There are substantial grounds for holding that both the extent and the severity 
of harms associated with the use of both first and second generation antipsychotics, 
have been grossly underestimated both by researchers and by clinical psychiatrists. 
L–8: Some research findings from 2007  
Marder (2007) which was an editorial in the American Journal of Psychiatry spoke87 of 
mild forms of extrapyramidal symptoms which, though difficult to detect for trial raters 
or treating psychiatrists, “can be tormenting if a person experiences it all of his or her 
waking hours.”88  He suggested that: “It would not be surprising if the raters from 
CATIE were not sensitive to these mild manifestations.”89 – a comment which, in itself, 
indicates both the underreporting of the adverse effects of antipsychotics and the 
extreme discordance between raters’, and subjects’, perceptions of the seriousness of 
side effects.90 
Bick (2007) also revisited the CATIE study but from a different perspective – that of 
underlying, and possibly causative91 – physical illness: 
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 Op. cit., p.122. 
86
 These conclusions will be revisited at the end of this appendix. 
87
 In discussing a CATIE follow-on trial which is not of interest in the present context. 
88
 Marder (2007), p.376. 
89
 Ibid. 
90
 Which should also be viewed in the light of a similar discordance found in early reports of tardive 
dyskinesia [See supra].  
91
 See Chapter 4. 
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- The most stunning finding was that psychiatrists tend to ignore life-threatening, 
treatable medical conditions in patients presenting for treatment with 
schizophrenia.  Of patients entering the study, 45% had untreated diabetes, 89% 
had untreated hyperlipidemias and 62% had untreated hypertension. … 
- [CATIE] did expose a woeful standard in the medical management of 
schizophrenia offered by psychiatrists.92 
L–9: Some research findings from 2008 
Kahn (2008), which was industry funded, sought to compare the effectiveness of 
second-generation antipsychotic drugs with that of a low dose of haloperidol in first-
episode schizophrenia.  They found – in contrast to CATIE – that ‘time to 
discontinuation’93 was greater for the second generation antipsychotics than for 
haloperidol,94 but that: 
… we cannot conclude that second-generation drugs are more efficacious than is 
haloperidol, since discontinuation rates are not necessarily consistent with 
symptomatic improvement.95 
Kahn (2008) noted that even in short term studies of less than 8 weeks: “… fewer than 
50–60% of patients continue to take their drugs before the study is complete.”96 – 
eloquent testimony to either the ineffectiveness of the drugs or the severity of their side 
effects or both. 
A more telling result concerning the side effects of antipsychotics was mentioned in an 
interview with the psychiatrist Nancy Andreasen:97     
The big finding is that people with schizophrenia are losing brain tissue at a more 
rapid rate than healthy people of comparable age.  Some are losing as much as 1 
percent per year.  That's an awful lot over an 18-year period.  And then we're 
trying to figure out why.  Another thing we've discovered is that the more drugs 
you've been given, the more brain tissue you lose.98  
                                               
92
 Bick (2007), p.465. 
93
 The criterion used by CATIE. 
94
 Kahn (2008) suspected (p. 1095) that the distinctive side effects of haloperidol could have led to the 
‘breaking of the blind’. 
95
 Ibid., p.1085.  
96
 Ibid. 
97
 Andreasen is also a neuroscientist and was one of the first to use neuroimaging techniques in the study 
of psychiatric disorders. 
98
 Dreifus, C. (2008). ‘A Conversation With Nancy C. Andreasen: Using Imaging to Look at Changes in 
the Brain.’ The New York Times. 15 September.  
Asked as to the implications of this finding she said: 
(i) That these drugs have to be used at the lowest possible dose, which often doesn't happen now.  
There's huge economic pressure to medicate patients very rapidly and to get them out of the 
hospital right away.  
(ii) We need to find other drugs that work on other systems and parts of the brain.  
(iii) Whatever medications we use need to be combined with more nonmedication–oriented 
treatments, like cognitive or social therapies. 
This interview drew a critical response from some other psychiatrists: “The fact that ‘the more drugs 
you've been given, the more brain tissue you lose’ may be explained by the fact that individuals with more 
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__________ 
The May 2008 issue of the journal Psychiatric Services focused on the CATIE results 
and the implications that should be drawn from them.  A number of the contributors 
argued for a preservation of the status quo ante.99  However, the issue’s editorial – in 
acknowledging that “We professionals share the human tendency to embrace fads” – 
argued that the appropriate response to CATIE was: 
… we must share the uncertainties with our patients.  Informed consent helps to 
ensure that patients are aware of their options for treatment, including no 
treatment, and of how their preferences and individual characteristics might 
influence their quality of life.  Increasing patients' participation in informed 
decision making empowers both patients and their clinicians and respects patients' 
autonomy.100 
Whilst the embracing of such uncertainties is to be welcomed, they are hardly 
compatible with the coercive use of such antipsychotics. 
L–10: Antipsychotic use in the treatment of children and 
adolescents 
Further articles examined the ever widening ‘consumer-base’ for antipsychotics.  
Domino & Swartz (2008), for example, found that the substantial increase in the use of 
antipsychotics did not occur amongst individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia but for 
other conditions such as bipolar disorder and a “a high, constant rate of off-label use.”  
Their conclusion was that: “The rapid diffusion of second-generation antipsychotic 
medications was achieved by large increases in the rate of use in certain 
subpopulations, most notably youths.”  Because of the limited efficiency and the risks 
associated with antipsychotics, “the dramatic increase in use warrants attention.”101  
The increase in the rate of antipsychotic prescribing for children and adolescents was 
also discussed in Kalverdijk (2008) who examined Dutch statistics and found that:  
                                                                                                                                          
severe schizophrenia are given more drugs.” [Torrey, E. & Chase, C. (2008). ‘Letters: Schizophrenia's 
Toll’. The New York Times. 23 September.] 
A later study by Andreasen et al [Ho (2011)] found that the progressive brain volume changes in those 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, that had been previously attributed to the disease, can, in part, be attributed 
to the use of antipsychotics.  See also Goff (2011) who discusses how the brains of animals given 
antipsychotics for “ 17 to 27 months lost roughly 10% of their total brain volume”.  
99
 Swartz (2008): “Although the CATIE results are controversial, they are broadly consistent with most 
previous antipsychotic drug trials and meta-analyses.” 
Owens (2008) concludes that CATIE’s achievement lay in  “ … reinstating to physicians their key skill in 
expert, individualized prescribing.” 
Franks (2008) urges caution on use of CATIE as the cornerstone of new formulary policies. 
100
 Sutton (2008).  
101
 Domino & Swartz (2008), p.507. 
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From 1997 to 2005, prevalence increased from 3.0 to 6.8 per thousand. Prevalence 
was highest among ten-year-olds to 14-year-olds (11 per thousand), especially 
among boys (17 per thousand).102 
A high and increasing level of antipsychotic prescribing for children and adolescents 
was also evident in the US where atypical antipsychotics prescriptions for children rose 
from 600 (per 100,000 doctor visits) in 1998 to 2,450 in 2004 with 80% of the 
prescriptions for conditions other than schizophrenia, 49% being for disruptive 
behaviour.103  These levels of prescribing of atypical antipsychotics for children raised 
concerns about the increased risk of adverse effects.  Two studies [Findling (2008), 
Sikich (2008)] in the American Journal of Psychiatry sought to address these concerns, 
which were also the focus of an editorial [Sikich (2008)]. 
Findling (2008) was a 6-week study of Aripiprazole104 as a treatment for adolescent 
schizophrenia.  Having commented that there was a “paucity” of other relevant 
studies,105 it found that: 
The most common adverse events associated with aripiprazole were 
extrapyramidal disorder, somnolence and tremor … The rates of serious 
treatment-emergent adverse events were low for all groups …106 
It concluded that: “Aripiprazole … was more efficacious in ameliorating the symptoms 
of schizophrenia than was placebo … Although considerable improvement was also 
observed with placebo, …”107 and recommended that longer-term trials were necessary 
to confirm the drugs efficacy and safety.108 
Sikich (2008) – which was a publicly funded study (TEOSS)109 – was designed to 
compare the safety and efficacy of two atypical antipsychotics [olanzapine (Zyprexa) 
and risperidone] with a first generation antipsychotic [molindone] in the treatment of 
children and adolescents.  The authors noted that atypical antipsychotics are considered 
the “standard treatment” even though their superiority over first generation 
antipsychotics had never been demonstrated.110  The belief in the superiority of atypical 
antipsychotics amongst clinical psychiatrists was so great as to raise “… significant 
ethical concerns about utilizing any first-generation antipsychotic in comparison with 
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 Kalverdijk (2008), p.554. 
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 Carey, B. (2008). ‘Risks Found for Youths in New Antipsychotics.’ The New York Times. 15 
September. 
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 An atypical antipsychotic licensed for the treatment of adult schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. 
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 Findling (2008) mention a 4-week study of 75 adolescents and an 8-week study of 107.  
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 Ibid., p.1438. 
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second-generation antipsychotics.”111 and to preclude using a drug-free arm which the 
study authors had considered.112  
In relation to efficacy the study concluded that: 
… only small differences among treatments emerged, which was not what we 
predicted.  We did not find any evidence of superiority of the two second-
generation antipsychotics … over the first-generation antipsychotic,113  
However: 
Across all three treatments, more than half the participants failed to achieve an 
adequate response after 8 weeks of therapy.  The mean reductions in psychotic 
symptoms were modest, … Furthermore, 10 participants (8%) required 
hospitalization during the acute trial, primarily as a result of increased psychotic 
symptoms.”114 
In relation to side effects: 
Adverse effects led to premature treatment discontinuation in eight patients in the 
molindone group, six patients in the olanzapine group, and five patients in the 
risperidone group … Frequent adverse events included sedation, irritability, and 
anxiety … Youth treated with olanzapine gained an average of 6.1 kg.115  
… those associated with olanzapine and risperidone are likely to have persistent 
effects on long-term physical health.116 
The increases in cholesterol levels and other metabolic disruptions in the olanzapine 
group were such that they may have become dangerous and prompted the safety review 
board to stop the olanzapine arm of the study before it had been completed.117 
The final conclusions were that: 
These findings have broad public health implications.  In the long term, the 
metabolic side effects of olanzapine and risperidone may place many youth at risk 
for diabetes and cardiovascular problems.  Second-generation antipsychotics are 
now widely used to treat nonpsychotic mood and behavioral disorders in youth.  
The balance between potential therapeutic benefits and risk of adverse events 
needs to be carefully considered in this age group.118 
__________ 
The editorial which accompanied the publication of both studies, noted the limited 
efficacy of all the antipsychotics that had been tested, particularly when contrasted with 
placebo treatment:  
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For both studies, the target mean dose was reached within 2 weeks of study onset.  
All treatment arms (including placebo) demonstrated a 12%–16% decrease in 
symptoms over the first 2 weeks of treatment.  By 6 weeks, the placebo arm had a 
symptom decrease of 22%, while the active treatment arms had decreases of 23%–
30%.119 
__________ 
The widespread – and often off-label – use of atypical antipsychotics as shown by, for 
example, Kalverdijk (2008) (supra), in conjunction with extremely limited evidence as 
to their efficacy and the seriousness of the side effects is striking and provides little 
comfort for those who argue that clinical paediatric psychiatry is an evidence-based 
discipline.  Furthermore, the ethical concerns raised by psychiatrists on the use of 
conventional antipsychotics in place of atypical antipsychotics was shown to be deeply 
misplaced in that it effected an interdict against seeking supporting evidence, yet when 
the evidence was obtained it showed that the use of atypical antipsychotics in 
adolescents was likely to cause “persistent effects on long-term physical health” 
(supra).  This provides a cautionary tale against yielding to the similar concerns which 
have been raised against examining the evidence for non-drug treatment of 
schizophrenia.   
__________ 
Further evidence on the extent and severity of the adverse effects of the adult use of 
antipsychotics emerged in Douglas & Smeeth (2008) which sought to determine 
whether the adult use of antipsychotics increased the risk of stroke.  The study had been 
based on the General Practice Research Database and thus had access to the records of 
over 6 million patients; this allowed the authors to conclude that the study was: “… 
large and statistically powerful … largely representative of the population of the UK 
and so the results are likely to be highly generalisable.”  
The study concluded that: 
All antipsychotics are associated with an increased risk of stroke, and the risk 
might be higher in patients receiving atypical antipsychotics than those receiving 
typical antipsychotics. … During the periods after treatment the rate ratio fell 
towards unity. 
The increased risk of stroke was further analysed according as to whether dementia was 
present; the data is summarised in the following table: 
 
 
 
                                               
119
 Ross (2008), p.1371 [Emphasis added] 
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 No Dementia Present Dementia Present 
Typical Antipsychotics  140% 326% 
Atypical Antipsychotics  190% 586% 
                  Table L-1: Increased risk of stroke associated with antipsychotics use 
Evidence that the use of atypical antipsychotics can nearly double the risk of stroke 
gives an added emphasis to the warnings of psychiatrists such as Moncrieff (2007) who 
berates her fellow psychiatrists for ignoring the evidence of the harm caused by 
antipsychotics thereby risking “an epidemic of iatrogenic brain damage.”120  It gives an 
additional urgency to addressing Lehtinen’s (2006) concern (supra) that the high 
mortality in schizophrenia is attributable to the use of antipsychotics; some of these 
concerns were addressed by Ray (2009) which is discussed in the following subsection. 
L–11: Some research findings from 2009     
Ray (2009), which was an analysis of more than 250,000 Medicaid records, was the first 
study to rigorously document the risk of cardiac harm attributable to the adult use of 
atypical antipsychotics.121  The study concluded that: 
Current users of typical antipsychotic drugs had an adjusted rate of sudden cardiac 
death that was twice that for nonusers …  A similar increased risk was seen for 
current users of atypical antipsychotic drugs, who had a rate of sudden cardiac 
death that was more than twice that for nonusers … The risk of sudden cardiac 
death increased with an increasing dose … 122  
By using a parallel secondary analysis of those subjects who had not been diagnosed 
with schizophrenia they were able to answer the concern raised by Lehtinen (2006) 
(supra) – in so far as it related to deaths due to cardiac arrest – and to conclude that the 
increased risk was attributable to antipsychotic use rather than any underlying 
psychiatric condition.   
An accompanying editorial123 noted, without comment, that: 
It is striking that it took so long to establish the elevated risk associated with 
atypical antipsychotic medications given that the first agent in this class … 
entered the U.S. market in 1989.124 
Given the increased risk, it is important to judge it in context and to ask ‘how common 
is sudden cardiac death among adults treated with antipsychotic medications?’  Ray 
                                               
120
 James, A. (2008). ‘Myth of the antipsychotic’. The Guardian. 2 March: “‘It is as if the psychiatric 
community can not bear to acknowledge its own published findings,’ she writes.”  
121
 Carey, B. & Rabin, R. (2009). ‘Study Finds Drug Risks With Newer Antipsychotics.’ The New York 
Times. 14 January. 
122
 Ray (2009), p.225. 
123
 Schneeweiss & Avorn (2009). 
124
 Ibid. and noted that three of the antipsychotics: “Zyprexa, … Risperdal, … Seroquel,  are among the 
10 top-selling drugs worldwide, with a combined sales volume of $14.5 billion in 2007.” 
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(2009) estimated the prevalence at 2.9 events per 1000 patient-years.  A commentary on 
this stated: “The risk of death from the drugs is not high, on average about 3 percent in 
a person being treated at least 10 years.”125 
Such a perspective must be viewed against an earlier editorial in the New England 
Journal of Medicine126 which advocated a life time use of antipsychotics in the 
treatment of schizophrenia; within such a context and analysing the risk-profile of ten 
subjects diagnosed with schizophrenia and using antipsychotics for a period of 30 years, 
Ray (2009) implies that 1 will die from cardiac arrest.  Seen in the context of a lifetime 
use of antipsychotics, the risk of death due to cardiac arrest cannot – at 10% – be 
described as being “not high”. 
__________ 
Leucht (2009) was a meta-analysis of 150 double-blind randomised controlled trials of 
antipsychotics.  Its goal was to compare the effects of conventional antipsychotics and 
atypical antipsychotics in the treatment of patients with schizophrenia; it was funded by 
the National Institute of Mental Health.  It differed from earlier studies such as Geddes 
(2000a) (supra) which analysed only one efficiency outcome; it differed from CATIE 
and CUtLASS in that they used comparator drugs that are less potent than haloperidol 
whereas according to Leucht (2009): “A major limitation of our meta-analysis is that 
haloperidol was the comparator drug in most of the studies.”127   
Leucht (2009) concluded that: 
Four of these128 drugs were better than first-generation antipsychotic drugs for 
overall efficacy, with small to medium effect sizes … The other second-
generation drugs were not more efficacious than the first-generation drugs, even 
for negative symptoms. … 
Only a few have been shown to induce fewer extrapyramidal side-effects than 
low-potency first-generation antipsychotic drugs.129 
The study noted that of the 150 studies, only 14 reported on the rate of relapse and 17 
on the quality of life of medicated subjects and that “In previous meta-analyses … side-
effects were not assessed thoroughly.”130  Their final conclusion was to the effect that 
because atypical antipsychotics differ in many of their properties: 
… they do not form a homogeneous class and neither do first-generation 
antipsychotic drugs. Improper generalisation creates confusion and as a result the 
classification might be abandoned. … 
The second-generation drugs are expensive, and cost-effectiveness has not been 
                                               
125
 Carey & Rabin (2009). 
126
 Davis (2006) (supra). 
127
 Op. cit., p.40. 
128
 I.e. atypical antipsychotics.  
129
 Op. cit., p.31. 
130
 Ibid. 
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proven.  Public institutions could save costs by funding studies to accurately 
define selected old compounds, because they were not rigorously studied at the 
time they were introduced.131 
Tyrer & Kendall (2009) in an editorial accompanying Leucht (2009), comment that: 
 … what was seen as an advance 20 years ago … is now, and only now, seen as a 
chimera that has passed spectacularly before our eyes before disappearing and 
leaving puzzlement and many questions in its wake. … 
The spurious invention of the atypicals can now be regarded as invention only, 
cleverly manipulated by the drug industry for marketing purposes and only now 
being exposed.132 
In an echo of the comment by the lead author of Jones (2006) (supra), they ask: “But 
how is it that for nearly two decades we have … ‘been beguiled’ into thinking they were 
superior?”133  A rhetorical question that eloquently reflects the woeful standard of 
evidence which had been used by clinical psychiatrists for over a decade, to justify their 
belief in the superiority of atypical antipsychotics.    
L–12: Examples of industry manipulation of test results 
Sketched below are three examples – Zyprexa [L–12(i)], Seroquel [L–12(ii)] and 
Neurontin134 [L–12(iii)] – where either negative test data was withheld or where the 
pharmaceutical company engaged in illegal practices such as off-label marketing, which 
were uncovered in litigation undertaken in US courts.   
There is a more complete discussion of such practices in Appendix J.  
L–12(i): Zyprexa 
Eli Lilly (the manufactures of Zyprexa) had been found by the courts to have withheld 
data which had shown that the antipsychotic caused obesity and diabetes.  Under threat 
of criminal proceedings the company had offered $1 billion as payment of a fine in 
addition to $1.2 billion already paid in settlement of civil actions.  Eli Lilly sales 
material encouraged representatives to engage in off-label marketing and to promote 
Zyprexa as a “safe, gentle psychotropic” suitable for people with mild mental illness.135  
                                               
131
 Ibid., p.40. 
132
 Op. cit., p.4.  They also note some of the methods whereby this sleight of hand has been achieved (e.g. 
high doses of haloperidol as a comparator; selective publication). 
133
 Ibid. 
134
 Though Neurontin is not strictly an antipsychotic, it has been used as a treatment for tardive dyskinesia 
and is thus associated with the use of antipsychotics. [See Hardoy (2003)]. 
135
 Berenson, A. (2006). ‘Eli Lilly Said to Play Down Risk of Top Pill’. The New York Times. 17 
December.  
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L–12(ii): Seroquel136  
AstraZeneca (the manufacturers of Seroquel) were sued in a class action comprising 
9,200 patients who alleged that their diabetes was caused by their use of Seroquel. 
Details of a research study known as ‘Study 15’ emerged during proceedings; it had 
been completed in 1997 but never made public nor made known to clinicians though 
provided to the FDA.137 
The drug was approved by the FDA in 1997, was widely prescribed and “has earned 
billions for … AstraZeneca … including nearly $12 billion in the past three years.” 
Study 15 showed that the test subjects gained an average of 11 pounds a year – a result 
which precipitated an exchange of e-mails between company executives:  
- [X] reported that across all patient groups and treatment regimens, regardless of 
how numbers were crunched, patients taking Seroquel gained weight: "I'm not 
sure there is yet any type of competitive opportunity no matter how weak.” … 
- [Y] praised AstraZeneca's efforts to put a "positive spin" on "this cursed study" 
and said of Arvanitis: "Lisa has done a great 'smoke and mirrors' job!"  “Thus far, 
we have buried Trials 15, 31, 56 and are now considering COSTAR."  
In 1999, two years after those exchanges, the company presented different data at an 
American Psychiatric Association conference, to the effect that Seroquel helped 
psychotic patients lose weight – a claim which was based on a company-sponsored 
study by a psychiatrist who had reviewed the records of 65 patients who had switched 
their medication to Seroquel. 
L–12(iii): Neurontin138  
Neurontin had been approved by the FDA for a very narrow use in the controlling of 
seizures in epileptics but had been widely prescribed off-label. 
Under a so-called ‘shadowing’ programme which came to light during a civil and 
criminal investigation of the drug’s manufactures (Pfizer): 
… physicians, in exchange for money, have allowed pharmaceutical sales 
representatives into their examining rooms to meet with patients, review medical 
charts and recommend what medicines to prescribe. 
Pfizer tracked whether doctors prescribed Neurontin, “rewarding those who were 
considered high-volume prescribers by paying them as speakers and consultants”  
                                               
136
 The information below has been drawn from Vedantam (2009) except where otherwise stated. 
Vedantam, S. (2009). ‘A Silenced Drug Study Creates An Uproar.’ The Washington Post. 18 March.  
137
 Though “the agency has strenuously maintained that it does not have the authority to place such 
studies in the public domain.” 
138
 The information below has been drawn from Peterson (2002) except where otherwise stated. 
Peterson, M. (2002). ‘Suit Says Company Promoted Drug in Exam Rooms.’ The New York Times. 15 
May. 
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In 2000, more than 78% of Neurontin prescriptions were written for off-label uses.  
However, some psychiatrists had found that: 
… some patients taking Neurontin for schizophrenia or bipolar disorder appeared 
to become more aggressive after starting on the drug. … “Neurontin is being used 
like water for disorders where there is not much evidence it is effective, …” 
Pfizer pleaded guilty to criminal charges and was fined $430 million;139 it was also 
found to have manipulated test data, suppressed negative test results and fraudulently 
manipulated the drug’s supposed benefits.140   
L–13: Some conclusions concerning the safety and efficacy of 
antipsychotics 
Having discussed the CATIE and CUtLASS 1 findings (supra) three interim 
conclusions were drawn [L–7 supra].  The goal of this final subsection is to see whether 
the studies published between 2006 and 2009 necessitate a revision of these interim 
conclusions.  
The first interim conclusion was to the effect that the existence of grossly inconsistent 
results regarding the safety and efficacy of atypical antipsychotics implied that some 
earlier studies were deeply flawed.  The statement by a Lancet editorial141 that the 
advent of the supposedly safer and more efficacious atypical antipsychotics: “… is now, 
and only now, seen as a chimera that has passed spectacularly before our eyes …”, in 
addition to evidence of the manipulation of test results in published studies, adds further 
strength to that interim conclusion and allows it to be stated without reservation:  
1. The inference to be drawn from the existence of grossly inconsistent results in 
relation to trials of first and second generation antipsychotics, is that some 
supposedly evidence-based studies supporting the psychiatric use of 
antipsychotics, are deeply flawed.  
__________ 
The second interim conclusion concerned the reluctance of clinical psychiatrists to  
change their beliefs concerning the safety and efficacy of atypical antipsychotics in the 
light of new and authoritative disconfirmatory evidence.   
The continuously increasing use of atypical antipsychotics (including evidence of 
extreme levels142 of off-label use), especially in the treatment of children and young 
adults,143 in the face of mounting evidence144 as to risk of serious adverse effects such 
                                               
139
 Harris, G. (2004). ‘Pfizer to Pay $430 Million Over Promoting Drug to Doctors.’ The New York Times. 
14 May.  
140
 Saul. S. (2008). ‘Experts Conclude Pfizer Manipulated Studies.’ The New York Times. 8 October.  
141
 Tyrer & Kendall (2009) (supra). 
142
 See, for example, (supra) 78% of Neurontin prescriptions were for off-label use.  
143
 As shown by, for example, Kalverdijk (2008) (supra). 
144
 See, for example, Sikich (2008) (supra). 
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as EPS and diabetes and “persistent effects on long-term physical health” (supra), 
suggests that the beliefs of clinical psychiatrists in relation to the use of atypical 
antipsychotics is relatively immune from readily available disconfirming evidence.  In 
that the reluctance to adjust robustly held views in the face of disconfirming evidence is 
one of the criteria used by psychiatrists in the definition of delusional behaviour,145 this 
conclusion is disconcerting.  In these circumstances, the second interim conclusion can 
only be strengthened: 
2. There is a manifest reluctance amongst clinical psychiatrists to changing their 
beliefs in relation to the appropriate prescribing of antipsychotics, in the face of 
authoritative disconfirming evidence relating to the safety and efficacy of atypical 
antipsychotics. 
__________ 
The third interim conclusion was to the effect that both the extent and severity of harms 
associated with antipsychotics use had been underestimated.   
Results published in the years between 2006 and 2009: 
- as to the risk of diabetes and EPS, 
- long term and extensive brain damage,146  
- the doubling of the risk of stroke,147  
- the limited duration of drug trials (6 -8 weeks) when compared to a possible 
lifetime use of such drugs,  
- the lack of attention paid to possible adverse effects and to the subjective effect of 
such adverse effects,148  
- the reluctance of clinical psychiatry to acknowledge the seriousness of the adverse 
effects of antipsychotics as evidenced by its earlier attitude towards the emergent 
risk of tardive dyskinesia,149  
suggest not only a stronger conclusion in relation to the underestimation of harm, but 
also the conclusion that clinical psychiatry appears to be somewhat inured to the 
possibility of such harm.   
Kane (2006) (supra) had suggested that it was the threat of litigation that forced clinical 
psychiatry to confront the risk of tardive dyskinesia.  If this is correct, the effective 
absence of legal recourse under Irish Law in respect of harm occasioned by coercive 
treatment with antipsychotics, is in need of urgent redress.   
                                               
145
 See Chapter 2 (supra). 
146
 See Andreasen (supra). 
147
 See Douglas & Smeeth (2008) (supra). 
148
 See Leucht (2009) (supra) who noted that of the 150 studies examined, only 14 reported on the rate of 
relapse and 17 on the quality of life of medicated subjects and that “In previous meta-analyses … side-
effects were not assessed thoroughly.”  
149
 Kane (2006) (supra). 
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3. There are substantial grounds for holding not only that the extent and the 
severity of harms associated with the use of antipsychotics have been grossly 
underestimated both by researchers and by clinical psychiatrists, but that even 
when the magnitude of such harms has been conclusively established, it has not 
informed the beliefs of psychiatrists as reflected in their prescribing habits. 
The implementation of an effective means for seeking legal redress for those 
harmed by coercive treatment with psychotropic medication, is a precondition for 
the minimising of iatrogenic harm consequent on psychiatric intervention. 
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Appendix M: Journal searches for rates of psychiatric 
misdiagnosis  
In an attempt to locate estimates of the rates of psychiatric misdiagnosis, journal 
searches were undertaken; these searches were of two types: 
- searches of journals which were not specific to psychiatry for occurrence of the 
phrase ‘psychiatric misdiagnosis’ anywhere in the text i.e. in the title, abstract or 
body of the journal article. [Subsection M-1]   
Contrary to expectations these searches elicited so few results that a further search 
was undertaken for articles which contained both the terms ‘psychiatric’ and 
‘misdiagnosis’ but not necessarily adjacent nor in the same context.1  
- searches of psychiatric journals for occurrences of the term ‘misdiagnosis’ firstly 
in the title or abstract, and secondly, anywhere in the text.  [Subsection M–2] 
Within these results, a further search was undertaken for ‘compulsory admission’ in 
an attempt to find estimates of the proportion of coercive psychiatric interventions 
that had been grounded in a misdiagnosis.  
The conclusions drawn from these searches are discussed in Chapter 4, Section D. 
M–1: Searches of non-psychiatric journals2 
The search was first undertaken within some individual medical journals: 
(i) The British Medical Journal [M–1(i)]; 
(ii) The Lancet [M–1(ii)]; and  
(iii) The New England Journal of Medicine [M–1(iii)]. 
And then within medical databases: 
(iv) PubMed [M–1(iv)]; and  
(v) MEDLINE [M–1(v)]. 
M–1(i): The British Medical Journal 
A search of the British Medical Journal between January 1994 and July 2008, for the 
term ‘psychiatric misdiagnosis’ occurring anywhere in a journal article, retrieved just 
one article;3 it concerned the misdiagnosis of ‘conversion symptoms’4. 
                                               
1
 I.e. the search term was “psychiatric AND misdiagnosis”. 
2
 Searches were conducted between 3 and 10 September 2008. 
3
 Stone (2005).  
Searches for the terms "psychiatric mis-diagnosis"; "psychiatric under-diagnosis"; "psychiatric 
underdiagnosis"; "psychiatric over-diagnosis" or "psychiatric overdiagnosis" retrieved no results.  
4
 I.e. physical symptoms diagnosed as being of psychiatric origin. 
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A search for “psychiatric AND misdiagnosis” retrieved 24 results; of those results 
which had some relevance to psychiatric misdiagnosis: 
- 8 concerned the misdiagnosis of conversion symptoms; 
- 3 discussed the misdiagnosis of physical illness (e.g. epilepsy) as psychiatric;  
- 1 discussed whether the high diagnosis of psychiatric illness amongst immigrant 
communities, could be attributed to misdiagnosis; 
- 2 were news items reporting the rapid increase (“40-fold from 1994 to 2003”)5 in 
the diagnosis of bipolar disorder and whether this indicated extensive misdiagnosis. 
M–1(ii): The Lancet 
A full text search of the Lancet series of journals for use of the term ‘psychiatric 
misdiagnosis’ between January 1996 and January 2008 retrieved no results.   
A full text search for ‘psychiatric AND misdiagnosis’ over the same period retrieved 26 
results, the most common topic being epilepsy (3 results) followed by chronic fatigue 
syndrome (2 results).  Only one result had a general relevance to psychiatric 
misdiagnosis and its author (a consultant psychiatrist who had worked at Ashworth 
Maximum Security Hospital) detailed how his attempt to introduce non-
pharmacological psychiatric treatments had been frustrated by other psychiatrists:6  
… [these] psychiatrists are not alone in misdiagnosing all mental disease – 
contemporary psychiatry takes its cue from DSM-IV, bizarrely presuming, against 
all the evidence, that social and emotional stress, even the death of a loved one, 
have no impact on mental disease.  The horrors from this misdiagnosis exceed 
even those from the Ashworth variety – and are harder to remedy, given the level 
of support for it among government departments and medical editors.7  
M–1(iii): The New England Journal of Medicine 
A full text search for occurrences of the term ‘psychiatric misdiagnosis’ in articles 
published between September 1993 and September 2008, retrieved no results. 
A full text search for “psychiatric AND misdiagnosis” retrieved 9 results the most 
common topic being ADHD (2 results); none were relevant to estimating levels of 
psychiatric misdiagnosis.  
                                               
5
 Tanne (2007). 
6
 Johnson (1999): 
The 15 consultant psychiatrists showed their managerial power by having us both removed … It 
was only when the so-called treatment-resistant patients insisted on attending every group session, 
as did the Head of Psychology herself, that the consultant staff cited General Medical Council 
guidelines and the Mental Health Acts to expel me.  The consultants deflected patients from the 
very door of the group therapy sessions, denying them entrance.  
7
 Ibid. 
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M–1(iv): PubMed 
A full text search for ‘psychiatric misdiagnosis’ retrieved 12 results, the most relevant 
were: 
- the misdiagnosis of physical or neurological illness as psychiatric (5 results);  
- analyses of cases of psychiatric misdiagnosis (4 results);8  
- misdiagnosis of Black patients (1 result). 
A search for ‘psychiatric AND misdiagnosis’ retrieved a further 270 results of which 42 
had some relevance to psychiatric misdiagnosis.  Of these results,  
- 8 related to technical misdiagnosis;9  
- 7 related to the misdiagnosis of physical illness as psychiatric;10    
- 1 concerned deliberate misdiagnosis of depression.   
- 12 examined race as a cause of misdiagnosis11 and  
- 13 examined other causes, some of which have already been discussed.12   
Of the remaining relevant studies, one argued that:  
Recent research has raised concerns about the adequacy of psychiatric diagnostic 
evaluations conducted in routine clinical practice.  Semistructured diagnostic 
interviews have been considered the diagnostic gold standard. Judged against this 
standard, studies comparing unstructured clinical evaluations with semistructured 
interviews have found that there is a high rate of missed diagnoses and 
misdiagnosis using the usual clinical assessment.  Whether this is clinically 
significant is uncertain because there are no studies that have examined whether 
the use of standardized research interviews improves clinical outcome.13 
A second examined the social causes of psychosis and concluded that: 
The relation between the etiology of psychosis and such social factors as poverty, 
migration, and racial discrimination has been neglected in the North American 
psychiatric literature for the last 40 years. … the study of social causes of 
psychosis has been replaced by a focus on the clinical encounter, in which 
                                               
8
 Khan & Shaikh (2008) examined four case reports in an attempt to isolate the factors contributing to 
psychiatric misdiagnosis; one such factor was the “excessive reliance on the expertise of specialists.”  
The authors emphasised “the need to challenge and correct erroneous diagnoses to avoid inadequate 
response”. 
The other three papers were by Israeli researchers on psychiatric misdiagnosis: Witztum (1992), Margolin 
(1995) and Witztum (1995a).  (See supra) 
9
 E.g. bipolar disorder misdiagnosed as unipolar depression.   
Instances of misdiagnosis of schizophrenia in place of affective disorders, have not been classified as 
‘technical’ because the diagnoses are qualitatively different when viewed from the perspective of 
assessing the risk of stigma, dangerousness or coercive intervention.  [See infra and Chapter 4]. 
10
 E.g. Reeves (2000) who examined the cases of 64 patients with unrecognized medical emergencies who 
were inappropriately admitted to psychiatric units, concluded that: 
In none of the cases (0%) was an appropriate mental status examination performed.  Other 
common causes of misdiagnosis included inadequate physical examination (43.8%), failure to 
obtain indicated laboratory studies (34.4%), and failure to obtain available history (34.4%). 
11
 The existence of a possible link between race and misdiagnosis is contentious [see infra]. 
12
 E.g. Witztum (1995a). 
13
 Zimmerman (2003). 
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clinician bias is presumed to be responsible for widespread misdiagnosis of 
psychosis in minority … populations.14 
A standpoint which if adopted, might help dispel some of the confusion that surrounds 
the debate on race and psychiatric misdiagnosis (supra).  
M–1(v): MEDLINE 
A full text search for the term ‘psychiatric misdiagnosis’ between 1979 and 2007 
yielded 9 results;15 these added little to the results already obtained. 
The search for ‘psychiatric AND misdiagnosis’ between 1996 and 2007 yielded 129 
results; as an analysis of these added little to earlier results, no searches were made prior 
to 1996. 
M–2: Searches of psychiatric journals16  
Searches were made of two authoritative journals: 
- The American Journal of Psychiatry [M–2(i)]; and  
- The British Journal of Psychiatry [M–2(ii)].  
for occurrences of the term ‘misdiagnosis’17 firstly in the title or abstract, and secondly, 
anywhere in the text. 
M–2(i): The American Journal of Psychiatry 
A title or abstract, search for ‘misdiagnosis’ between 1844 and 2008, yielded 19 
results.18  Though none of the studies yielded information sufficient to estimate rates of 
misdiagnosis (whether general or specific) some did give an insight into the 
misdiagnosis of schizophrenia:  
                                               
14
 Jarvis (2007). 
15
 More accurately: 
1975–1979: none;  
1980–1984: 1 [racism];  
1985–1988: 1 [psychiatric misdiagnosis of myasthenia gravis (muscle weakness)];  
1989–1990: none;  
1991–1995: 5 [3 Witztum papers (supra), misdiagnosis of myasthenia gravis and of cystitis]; 
1996–1999: 1 [racism];  
2000–2002: none;  
2003–2007: 2 [racism]. 
16
 Searches were conducted on 11 September 2008. 
17
 Being psychiatry journals, a search for ‘misdiagnosis’ was considered to be more appropriate that one 
for ‘psychiatric misdiagnosis’. 
18
 Of which: 
3 were ‘Letters to the Editor’;  
3 were book reviews;  
4 concerned technical misdiagnosis;  
2 discussed misdiagnosis and race; 
7 concerned the misdiagnosis of schizophrenia.   
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Example (i): It appears from these data that black and Hispanic … bipolar patients 
may be at a higher risk than whites for misdiagnosis as schizophrenic … 19 
Example (ii): Two groups of inpatients who were initially misdiagnosed are 
described.  The pseudoschizophrenics showed little affect and had histories of 
exotic and sensational behavior; the initial misdiagnosis of schizophrenia 
appeared to be a moral censure.   
The pseudoneurotic schizophrenics (mistakenly diagnosed at admission as 
nonschizophrenic) had more affect and were frequently pregnant, affiliated with 
the medical profession, or twins; these diagnostic mistakes appeared to be 
attempts to protect someone from the label of schizophrenia.20 
Example (iii): In the Amish Study of affective disorders, 79% of the 28 active 
bipolar I patients, … previously had received hospital record diagnoses of 
schizophrenia.21 
A full text search for ‘misdiagnosis’ yielded no additional results. 
A full text search for ‘misdiagnosis AND “compulsory admission” ’ yielded 3 results of 
which 1 had no relevance,22 both of the remaining concerned race; of these, one 
discussed the advisability of “matching clients from a minority group with clinicians 
from the same ethnic background”23; the second24 was a meta-analysis which found that 
the relative risk of schizophrenia in immigrant communities was 4.8 times that of non-
immigrants; it did not, however, give credence to the possibility of misdiagnosis as 
being a possible cause.25  
M–2(ii): The British Journal of Psychiatry 
A title or abstract search for ‘misdiagnosis’ yielded 13 results;26 of most interest in the 
present context was an especially authoritative27 survey of UK psychiatrists as to 
whether they believed that race contributed to psychiatric misdiagnosis.28 It concluded 
that: 
                                               
19
 Mukherjee (1983). 
20
 Schorer (1968).  
21
 Egeland (1983). 
22
 The context was: “This interview was compulsory for all potential living kidney and kidney/pancreas 
recipients.” 
23
 Ziguras (2003).  
24
 Cantor-Graae (2005).  
25
 Ibid., p.20:  
Some researchers have argued that migrants preferentially receive schizophrenia diagnoses 
because of cultural misunderstanding and/or language difficulties … Nevertheless, evidence in 
support of this notion is not convincing. 
It did, however, canvass the possibility that the experience of racial discrimination possibly “facilitates 
the development of psychotic symptoms”. (p.21). 
26
 Of these results, 4 discussed the possible link between misdiagnosis and race; 4 examined the 
misdiagnosis of a physical illness as psychiatric; 1 discussed a technical misdiagnosis. 
27
 Each member of the Royal College of Psychiatrists in the UK was canvassed and 43% participated. 
28
 The opening sentence of the report: “Stigmatisation of people with mental illness, especially 
schizophrenia, seriously affects their lives by its effects, for example on job prospects and relationships.” 
[Ibid., p.401] provides some justification for the decision taken earlier in this discussion to distinguish 
between a ‘technical misdiagnosis’ and the misdiagnosis of schizophrenia. 
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Misdiagnosis of schizophrenia in Black people is believed to be common29 … 
This may be surprising in view of research studies, which have suggested such 
misdiagnosis to be uncommon (Harrison et al, 1988), but accords with the views 
of many patient groups and some recent research (Hickling et al, 1999).  It is 
possible that such studies using standardised instruments are seen by psychiatrists 
as not being typical of ‘normal’ clinical practice where such misdiagnosis may be 
more common.30 
The dichotomy noted between research findings and clinical perceptions of 
misdiagnosis, raises the question – particularly because the survey was so authoritative 
– as to whether other research findings on psychiatric misdiagnosis underestimate the 
phenomenon.   
A full text search for ‘misdiagnosis’ yielded 172 results; whilst some discussed 
instances of physical disorders misdiagnosed as psychiatric (e.g.  Huntington's Chorea) 
and some examined small studies of technical misdiagnosis, none – with the exception 
of 25 results which discussed racial factors – had any immediate relevance to the 
problem of estimating general rates of psychiatric misdiagnosis.  The studies on 
misdiagnosis and race focused mainly on whether the high rates of diagnosis of 
schizophrenia found in the Afro-Caribbean population in the UK, was evidence of 
misdiagnosis.   
Searching within these 172 results for those which discussed ‘compulsory admission’ 
yielded 9 results, 6 of which31 concerned race as a cause of psychiatric misdiagnosis.  
Amongst these papers there is broad agreement on a number of propositions:  
1. The existence of disproportionately high rates of compulsory admission amongst 
Afro-Caribbeans and Blacks when compared to Whites.32  
2. The existence of disproportionately high rates of schizophrenia amongst Afro-
Caribbeans and Blacks when compared to Whites.33  
                                               
29
 47.9% of respondents ‘strongly agreed/agreed’ that misdiagnosis of schizophrenia in Black people is 
common whereas 25.1% ‘strongly disagreed/disagreed’.  
30
 Kingdon (2004).  
31
 The remaining 3 were: 
(i) Porter (2001) which concerned non-pharmacological treatment of depression; 
(ii) Clark (2001) which examined the treatment of adolescent psychosis; and  
(iii) Davison (2002) which discussed managing patients with personality disorder. 
32
 Singh (2007): “Black patients were 3.83 times … more likely to be detained.”  
33
 Bhugra (2001) cites studies showing rates of schizophrenia amongst African–Carribeans as between 2 
and 14.6 times that of their White counterparts. (p.286). 
See also De Vries (1995) who in discussing South Africa, stated:  
Audit of community psychiatric clinics, however, showed strange figures: “Schizophrenia was 
diagnosed in 68% of black patients compared with 19% of white patients; mood disorders were 
diagnosed in 9% of black patients compared with 41% of white patients.” 
He also posed the following questions:  
What criteria have been used to make the diagnosis?  By whom were the diagnoses made?  …  Is it 
not a sign of wisdom for rural black people to "hear voices" or "see vision" of their forefathers? 
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3. The raised rates of compulsory admission were largely attributable to increased 
rates of schizophrenia.34 
The question of whether the disproportionately high rates of diagnoses of schizophrenia 
amongst Afro-Caribbeans and Blacks (and the corresponding high rates of compulsory 
admission) could be accounted for by misdiagnosis due to an (unconscious) racial 
prejudice amongst psychiatrists,35 was generally discounted: 
(i): Bebbington (1994) concluded: “Ethnicity did not appear to be of outstanding 
importance in decisions to use the Mental Health Act.” 
(ii): Singh (2007) concluded: Although BME36 status predicts psychiatric 
detention in the UK, most explanations offered for the excess detention of BME 
patients are largely unsupported.”    
(iii): Harvey (1990): “ … [this study] does not support the hypothesis that 
misdiagnosis within the psychoses can explain the higher admission rates of 
schizophrenia calculated for Afro-Caribbean populations.”  
(iv): Sharpley (2001): “No simple hypothesis explains these findings.” 
(v): Bhugra (2001): “However, misdiagnosis alone cannot explain all the findings 
in both the USA and the UK.”37 
The conclusions that might be drawn from these search results are discussed in Chapter 
4, Section D. 
                                               
34
 Thomas (1993):  
In the Afro-Caribbean group, the raised rates of admission were largely attributable to increased 
rates of schizophrenia.  The highest rate occurred in second-generation (UK-born) Afro-
Caribbeans and was nine times that among Europeans. 
See also Bebbington (1994): “… admission under the Act was strongly associated with challenging 
behaviour and diagnosis of schizophrenia.”… 
35
 See Luhrmann (2010) who notes that in the 1980s:  
African American men came to represent the problem of schizophrenia in popular culture and, 
arguably, in psychiatry.  Advertisements for antipsychotic medications in the psychiatric journals 
showed angry black men or even just African tribal symbols. (p.479) 
36
 I.e. Black and minority ethnic groups  
37
 Op. cit., p.285. 
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Appendix N: Journal searches for occurrences of ‘irrational(ity)’  
Of the various journal searches for occurrences of the term ‘irrational’ (which have been 
detailed in Chapter 2, Section B) the smallest set of search results (6) was for the British 
Journal of Psychiatry and – in order to convey a ‘flavour’ of the general results – this 
complete set is listed in Subsection N–1.   
Subsection N–2 contains an analysis of the aggregated results of all the journals which 
were searched. 
N–1: The British Journal of Psychiatry: complete listing  
A search for occurrences of either ‘irrational’ or’ irrationality’ in title or abstract38  
between October 1855 to December 2009, yielded 6 results:39  
[In the interests of readability, occurrences of ‘irrational’ or ‘irrationality’ are underlined.] 
1. Philpot, M. et al (2001). ‘The use of operationalised criteria for inclusion on a 
Care Programme.’ Psychiatr. Bull. 25: 172 – 174.  
Health service policies exist to reduce variation in clinical practice and to 
ensure minimum standards.  Clinical audit may be a useful tool in 
identifying irrational variation within the framework of clinical governance. 
2. Anderson, D. (1989). ‘A comparison of in-patient and out-patient prescribing.’ 
The British Journal of Psychiatry. 154: 644 – 649.  
This suggests that psychiatrists do not adopt intransigent stances in favour 
of polypharmacy and irrational psychotropic prescribing, as previous studies 
have implied.  Caution is advised before attributing apparently irrational 
prescribing to bad clinical practice, or advocating remedial action aimed at 
changing the habits of prescribers.  
3. McKerracher, D. et al (1968). ‘Self-Mutilation in Female Psychopaths.’ The 
British Journal of Psychiatry. 114: 829 – 832.  
It may be that the acts of self-mutilation and window-smashing have a 
ceremonial quality.  There would certainly seem to be a compulsive element 
in the repetitive and irrational manner of their perpetration … 
4. Kräupl, F. (1948). ‘Some Observations on the Analytical Group Treatment of a 
Phobic Patient.’ Journal of Mental Science. 94: 77 – 88.  
The psychosexual constitution of the patient and his response to the group 
were unusually transparent.  He showed marked anal-erotic, sado-
masochistic, and bi-sexual trends with repressed passive homo-erotic 
impulses.  The result of group treatment was mainly limited to a correction 
of irrational social fears through the reduction of guilt feelings and the 
gradual acceptance of his passive-feminine and masochistic leanings. 
5. Stengel, E. (1941). ‘On the Aetiology of the Fugue States.’ Journal of Mental 
Science. 87: 572 – 599.   
                                               
38
 Full text searches over the same period, yielded 652 results for ‘irrational’ and 87 for ‘irrationality’. 
39
 The results are listed in reverse chronological order. 
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Certain types of behaviour akin to wandering states occur in children in 
whom there is a disturbance of home conditions similar to what has been 
noted in this paper.  A tendency towards rationalization and sublimation 
indicates in some cases the effort to oppose the irrational urge.  
…  to find a compromise between the irrational impulse and rational 
strivings. 
6. Unsigned (1902). ‘Epidemic Irrationality: an American City of Unreason.’ 
Journal of Mental Science. 48: 542-543  
… such an extensive outburst of irrationality, that it really calls for grave 
consideration. 
In that these results comprise the complete listing of all ‘Title/Abstract’ occurrences 
(over a period of 154 years) of the term ‘irrational’, in the leading UK clinical 
psychiatric journal, they clearly exhibit a less than full understanding of the nuances of 
the term and a lack of precision in its usage.  The following analysis will help determine 
the generalizability of this conclusion.  
N–2: Analysis of the aggregated search results of all journals 
The aggregated search results were analysed under a number of headings as shown in 
the tables in N–2(i).  Examples of individual search results as categorised under the 
various headings are given in N–2(ii).   
N–2(i): Tables 
The headings were suggested by a preliminary scrutiny of the search results; the 
examples given in N–2(ii) (infra) will give an indication of the meanings of the various 
categories that were adopted.   
Category Number 
Colloquial 41 
Emotion 12 
Management 10 
Philosophy (General) 12 
Philosophy (Psychiatry) 23 
Phobia / Fear 8 
Polypharmacy 7 
Psychiatric  9 
Psychotherapy  8 
Society 18 
Suicide 15 
Treatment Refusal 1 
Treatments 17 
Total: 181 
          Table N-1: Analysis of journal search results by category 
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Precision rankings Number 
* (low) 105 
** 42 
*** 15 
**** 16 
***** (high) 3 
Total:     181 
          Table N-2: Analysis of journal search results by precision 
 
Coercion indicated Number 
Yes  12 
No 169 
Total:       181 
           Table N-3: Analysis of journal search results by coercive context 
 
N–2(ii): Examples40 
Examples of categorisation are given in N–2(ii)(a); examples of precision rankings are 
given in N–2(ii)(b)and examples of coercion rankings are given in N–2(ii)(c).   
Two examples are given of all categories and rankings.41 
N–2(ii)(a): Examples of categorisation 
- Colloquial 
Example (i): Thomas Kuhn was criticized for allegedly suggesting … that 
scientific decisions regarding theory choice, interpretation of data, and the 
like were determined by "mob psychology" or similar irrational sources.42 
Example (ii): One autumn evening when the university corridors were 
deserted, an irrational-seeming male student whom I did not recall having 
seen before, asked if he could speak to me.43  
- Emotion 
Example (i): French sociologist who viewed punishment as an irrational 
emotional reaction driven by a culture's desire to maintain … 44  
Example (ii): … a mother crazed with the stressors of incomprehensible 
behaviors, controversial professional advice, minimal support, and irrational 
guilt.45  
- Management 
Example (i): There is much that is inconsistent and irrational in the present 
methods of training surgeons.46  
                                               
40
 Page numbers for some examples could not be readily determined from the search results. 
41
 Except for ‘Treatment Refusal’ for which only one example was found 
42
 Sadler (1996). 
43
 Code (1996). 
44
 Kaempf (2009). 
45
 Lefley (2006). 
46
 Ravdin (1957). 
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Example (ii): The authors believe this experience demonstrates that political 
factors can overwhelm standard clinical practice and reasoned health 
planning to force irrational change on health care delivery.47  
- Philosophy (General) 
Example (i): … arguments based on Kantian conceptions of autonomy are 
rejected as confused, and preference is given to Millian arguments based on 
the right to make decisions about one's own life, however irrational, as long 
as they do not harm others. In light of this discussion, it is argued that 
mentally disordered people cannot be denied this right on grounds of their 
'irrationality', which is anyway a vague concept with several meanings.48  
Example (ii): The problem shows up very clearly, interestingly enough 
given the present context, in Davidson's application of the theory to the 
phenomena of irrationality.  Irrationality is explicated in terms of the causal 
efficacy of a reason overriding rational principles …49 
- Philosophy (Psychiatry) 
Example (i): He tackles the crucially important issue of how practical 
rationality is related to mental health and of how certain forms of 
irrationality are connected with mental illness.50  
Example (ii): The history and present practice of psychiatry, as well as much 
ordinary moral thinking, is replete with examples of discounting some 
desires of patients on grounds of their supposed irrationality, a discounting 
which often, upon inspection, comes to little more than the evaluator 
disagreeing with the patient about what should be desired in the 
circumstances in question.  Grounds for judging desires as intrinsically 
irrational, or as intrinsically less rational than other desires (as opposed to 
instrumentally irrational in achieving agreed upon ends), are notoriously 
unclear and controversial.51 
- Phobia / Fear 
Example (i): Such a model will need to take account of the intuition that, for 
example, people who are paralyzed by irrational fear, … may not be in the 
ideal position to make medical decisions …52 
Example (ii): A lasting psychological result from the accident is an irrational 
fear that while driving or bicycling, a car or truck will suddenly swerve into 
my path.53  
- Polypharmacy 
Example (i): We are all aware that polypharmacy is a common practice – 
eminently rational when we engage in it but blatantly irrational in the hands 
of others.54  
                                               
47
 Hogben (1979).  
48
 Matthews (2000). 
49
 Bolton & Hill (1997). 
50
 Fields (1996a). 
51
 Brock (1998). 
52
 Elliot (1998). 
53
 Ship (2004). 
54
 Jefferson (2003). 
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Example (ii): However, irrational polypharmacy occurs too frequently.  
Examples include the use of several benzodiazepines or several 
antipsychotics at the same time.55 
- Psychiatric  
Example (i): The authors conclude that the experience of volitional control 
in patients with OCD [obsessive-compulsive disorder] is not significantly 
related to the level of insight they have into the irrationality of their 
behavior.56   
Example (ii): During the last decade there has been increasing pressure to 
legislate legal rights for psychiatric patients especially in relation to consent 
to treatment. The attempt to subject the irrationality of psychotic illness to 
the due process of rational laws has caused problems.57  
- Psychotherapy  
Example (i): Discussion groups of various kinds have been called "group 
psychotherapy."  This irrational practice is illustrated and discussed.58  
Example (ii): … very concept of therapeutic alliance involves contradiction 
– namely, the expectation that the patient is motivated to be rational about 
his or her own irrationality.59 
- Society 
Example (i): Belief systems which may be just as irrational but which are 
shared by millions are called world religions.60  
Example (ii): … notion that climate change is an impending problem, the 
fear of nuclear power and radiation is perhaps based on ignorance and 
irrationality.61 
- Suicide 
Example (i): And the law in England makes clear that a person can refuse 
treatment for no reason or for an irrational reason … But perhaps in 
practice, one reason why physicians do not respect the preferences of people 
like John and Ron is that they believe that such patients are irrational in 
desiring to die.  Are such preferences irrational? In philosophy and 
economics, a dominant school maintains that there is only one form of 
rationality: instrumental rationality.  According to this school, we are only 
irrational if we choose means which are inappropriate to our ends.  Neither 
John nor Ron is irrational in this sense.  Is John's choice intrinsically 
irrational?62  
Example (ii): The author's literature survey suggests that the incidence of 
suicide among psychiatric residents … During their residencies psychiatrists 
                                               
55
 Kingsbury (2002). 
56
 Rotter & Goodman (1993). 
57
 Draper & Dawson (1990). 
58
 Pinney (1965). 
59
 Lindy (2000). 
60
 Storr (1997).  
61
 Kotchen (2008). 
62
 Savulescu & Dickenson (1998a). 
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should be helped to prepare themselves to endure the irrationalities of their 
patients and the burden of isolation in their professional practice.63  
- Treatment Refusal 
Example (i): Twelve renal homotransplantation donors were interviewed in 
depth between five weeks and 18 months after surgery.  Unexpected 
findings were (1) the decision-making process about donorship did not at all 
follow a pattern compatible with the concept of "informed consent" but 
occurred as an instantaneous, irrational response which subsequently was 
justified and maintained with the aid of a number of defensive techniques; 
… 
64
 
- Treatments 
Example (i): Contemporary biological psychiatry is in a seemingly inchoate 
state.  I assert that this state of biological psychiatry is due to its violation of 
an epistemological criterion of rationality, i.e., the relevance criterion; that 
is, contemporary biological psychiatry is irrational as it adopts a conception 
irrelevant to the psychobiological domain.  This conception is mechanistic.  
The irrationality of biological psychiatry is manifest as the dominance of 
neurochemical explanations of psychopharmacological correlations, 
resulting in predictive sterility and, correspondingly, in the dominance of 
serendipity.65 
Example (ii): Meprobamate: A Study of Irrational Drug Use. 
The history of the tranquilizer meprobamate illustrates how factors other 
than scientific evidence may determine physicians' patterns of drug use. 
Forceful advertising and publicity, an attitude of general optimism, and 
uncontrolled studies with favorable results combined to elevate 
meprobamate to the position of America's magical cure-all tranquilizer. This 
drug remains in wide use despite a large body of sound scientific data that 
questions its efficacy.  
N–2(ii)(b): Examples of precision rankings [* (low) to ***** (high)] 
*  
Example (i): When a group therapy program is instituted on a psychiatric 
service …  It exposes as diversionary maneuvers by various group members 
irrational distortions of the administrative physician as a surrogate 
authority.66  
Example (ii): Some psychiatrists allege that the death fear (whether on the 
battlefield or in the death house) serves as an irrational surrogate for some 
other fear – such as castration.67 
**  
Example (i): Hence, I can accommodate eccentric, irrational or even "crazy" 
moral beliefs like that of Duff's split-infinitive fanatic.  A person can have 
irrational factual beliefs; why not irrational moral beliefs? 68 
                                               
63
 Kelly (1973). 
64
 Fellner & Marshall (1968). 
65
 Rudnick (1990). 
66
 Cruvant (1953). 
67
 Bluestone & McGahee (1962). 
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Example (ii): The clinical manifestations of PD [Parkinson's disease] 
depression include apathy, psychomotor retardation, memory impairment, 
pessimism, irrationality, and suicidal ideation without suicidal behavior.69 
*** 
Example (i): The definitions seem to be stating the degree of irrationality or 
abnormality necessary to invalidate deeds or to require action by society.70  
Example (ii): He tackles the crucially important issue of how practical 
rationality is related to mental health and of how certain forms of 
irrationality are connected with mental illness.71  
**** 
Example (i): Delusion, then, has traditionally been presented as synonymous 
with irrationality (absurdity, groundlessness, error, chaos), whereas by 
contrast its mirror image, reason, has been defined in terms of evidence, 
demonstrability, truth and order.  I will analyse and contrast their 
paradoxical definitions.72  
Example (ii): The ubiquitous nature of irrational thought in nonpathological 
states is acknowledged; "We are all—even the most insightful among us—
holding a great many false beliefs at any moment."  Irrationality is defined 
as pathological only when it obstructs an individual's ability to realize 
important life goals.73  
***** 
Example (i): As he points out, the paradox of irrational actions or beliefs is 
that they are failures within the space of reasons.  If they were simply non-
rational they would lie outside the sphere of rationality completely and 
would not be paradoxical.  But irrational acting or thinking is subject to 
reason explanation and thus subject to the in-built rationality that that form 
of explanation carries.  They are, however, subject to merely partial reason 
explanations, reason explanations which fail to be fully rational.  The 
philosophical difficulty is to account for this half way house.74  
Example (ii): I do have reservations about the way in which Bolton and Hill 
use intentional predicates and whether the intentional stance is as successful 
for irrational behavior as they need it to be. Once they have used the 
intentional stance for irrational behavior, does it still have the predictive 
force that it is supposed to?  Bolton and Hill state, "If a person believes 
such-and-such, then she must, in appropriate circumstances, act in a way 
that accords with that belief" … They note, correctly, that the force of the 
word must derives (if it does at all) from the assumption of rationality.  
They suggest that irrational behavior may likewise be predicted by adding 
ceteris paribus clauses that account for variation away from the norm.75  
                                                                                                                                          
68
 Fields (1996b). 
69
 Slaughter (2001). 
70
 Mezer & Rheingold (1962). 
71
 Fields (1996a). 
72
 Bodei (2005). 
73
 Trevino (2008). 
74
 Thornton (1997). 
75
 McMillan (1999). 
 511 
 
 
N–2(ii)(c): Examples of coercion rankings 
- Yes 
Example (i): John Burnside considers that suicidal intent is "prima facie 
evidence of disease of the mind," and that "irrationality with intent to kill the 
self" justifies the force of the law and an ethical duty of psychiatrists to 
prevent suicide … 76 
Example (ii): My contention of prima facie status extends to their discussion 
about competence and autonomy.  Irrationality, I agree, does not amount to 
incompetence, but irrationality with the intent to kill a self justifies the force 
of law and the maximum requirements of psychiatrists … 77 
- No 
Example (i): … insistence on all possibly beneficial care worsens this 
toxicity.  Good mediation technique can help to clarify misunderstandings, 
soften anger, and ease irrational distrust.78  
Example (ii): So when Halpern explains repeatedly that emotions are 
irrational – a common view dating back to Plato – it is not very useful.79  
                                               
76
 Burgess & Hawton (1998b). 
77
 Burnside (1998). 
78
 Bloche (2005). 
79
 Cassell (2002). 
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